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Based on public law and Presidential mandate, ballistic missile defense 
development is a front-burner issue for homeland defense and the defense of U.S. and 
coalition forces abroad.  Spearheaded by the Missile Defense Agency, an integrated 
ballistic missile defense system was initiated to create a layered defense composed of 
land-, air-, sea-, and space-based assets.  The Ship Anti-Ballistic Response (SABR) 
Project is a systems engineering approach that suggests a conceptualized system solution 
to meet the needs of the sea portion of ballistic missile defense in the 2025-2030 
timeframe.  The system is a unique solution to the sea-based ballistic missile defense 
issue, combining the use of a railgun interceptor1 and a conformable aperture skin-of-the-
ship radar system. 
 
                                                 
1 Faculty Advisor’s Note:  There are four major technical challenge areas associated with the transition 
of the railgun to the fleet.  These are Barrel/Rail Life, Pulsed Power Management, Ship Integration, and 
Projectile Material and Guidance.  Barrel/Rail Life addresses the issues associated with developing a 
material lining system which can withstand the repeated multiple launches required by the BMD mission.  
Pulsed Power Management encompasses the shipboard system required to store and deliver the significant 
amounts of pulsed power required for firing of the railgun.  Ship Integration issues include all of the ship 
design requirements associated with the railgun including EMI/EMP effects and heat rejection.  Projectile 
Material and Guidance addresses the significant challenges associated with Atmospheric heating and 
projectile guidance.  Creating a railgun with the specific parameters in this report is not currently feasible 
given current technologies associated with the four major technical challenge areas, especially as they 
relate to system requirements for the firing rates, guidance, and top end projectile accelerations and 
velocities used in this study.  Although the project parametric results examine alternate capabilities needed 
to meet the future threat, the study does not address the technological aspects of creating a physically 
feasible railgun to achieve the top end performance that would be needed to meet the worst case scenarios 
used in the study.  Those aspects are addressed in more detail in a follow on study in the NPS Total Ship 
Systems Engineering (TSSE) program to be completed in December 2006.  If these technological 
challenges are met in future developments, then the railgun implementation analysis used in this study can 
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It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is 
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system 
capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited 
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) 
with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the 
annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense. 
 




























 Sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is developing into a new front-line 
shipboard warfare area, along the same lines and importance as anti-submarine warfare 
and anti-air warfare.  A significant developmental effort is being applied by various 
agencies within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to mature the technologies 
associated with this mission. 
 This project seeks to look at current technologies which are in the developmental 
and the conceptual stages, and to use a systems engineering process to determine a 
conceptual system architecture to fulfill the sea-based BMD mission 20-25 years from 
now, 2025-2030.  This project looks at the entire “kill chain,” from initial detection of the 
launch of a ballistic missile through the tracking, identification, and interception phases, 
and to post-engagement assessment.  The intent of this study is to provide the reader a 
comprehensive analysis of the mission problem, a well-researched examination of 
various physically feasible system alternatives, and offer a recommendation for a 
suggested path for future development. 
 
* * * 
 
 The challenge of large scale, complex problem solving is often determining the 
actual nature of the problem.  To accomplish this, one must understand the context, 
complexities, deficiencies, and timeline of the problem in order to start down the path 
towards a solution. 
 Oftentimes problems are very broad in nature and require definition prior to 
creating a plan of action.  Such is the case of sea-based ballistic missile defense study.  
The original tasking, “Use a top-down, system of systems approach to examine future 
surface combatant operations in terms of their conduct and support of current and 
emerging sea-based Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) missions,”2 covered a 
wide landscape of possibilities.  Though the preceding statement offered direction and a 
basic topic in which to conduct the study, it does not explain what the actual problem(s) 
                                                 
2 Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering, “SEA-9 Integrated Projects Objectives,” 
(Unpublished Memorandum:  2005). 
xxviii 
that required solving.  Based on group interpretation of the tasking statement, 
consultation with external resources in the DoD and industry, and historical knowledge of 
both surface combatant systems and BMD systems, it was determined that the  
problems are: 
• There is no operational sea-based BMD capability 
• There is no integrated network to connect all players in BMD (sea, air, 
land, and space) for layered defense 
• Current systems in development will not be able to compete with future 
developments in ballistic missile technology 
• Current systems in development will not be able to counter large salvos of 
ballistic missiles 
With such a range of possibilities, ideas conceived within the group for project 
direction were widespread.  The initial brainstorming sessions eventually developed into 
a classic detect-to-engage scenario as the base functionality for the system to be 
developed.  Figure Preface-1 is the result from the brainstorming sessions depicting 
critical aspects of a BMD system and the perceived subcomponents that encompass the 
system as a whole. 
xxix 
 
Figure Preface-1.  Initial BMD System Ideas 
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 Brainstorming efforts often reveal a large scope of topics that must be addressed 
in order to develop a solution.  The core issues for the conceptual system (solution for the 
problems) that were revealed from these sessions were: 
• Current and Prospective Threats (principle measure for performance 
evaluation) 




• Command and Control (C2) 
CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE THREATS 
 This issue addresses the current threats and prospective threat attributes that are 
applicable in the timeframe of the study (2025-2030).  Key attributes include: 
• size (mass, dimensions, etc.) 
• fuel type 
• number of stages 
• mobile or fixed launch (or both) 
• proliferation 
• number of warheads 
• decoy capability 
• range 
• expected velocities throughout trajectory 
• radar cross section 
• max altitude (range dependent) 
NETWORK 
 The network is the means to communicate and exchange data between all 
participating units in ballistic missile defense.  Key attributes of the network include: 
• number of required data feeds 
• cryptological requirements (security) 
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• expected size (bytes) of significant BMD information (bandwidth 
consideration) 
• interoperability with participating BMD units 
• ability to exchange detection, tracking and fire control (FC) data 
SENSOR 
 Sensors and their networking is a critical issue for ballistic missile defense.  If 
launches and ballistic missiles in flight are not detected, then interception is impossible.  
This issue considers the attributes required for the whole of BMD (on and off the ship) 
Key attributes for sensors include: 
• capability to detect ballistic missile launches and missiles in flight  
from space 
• number of required satellites to provide continuous worldwide  
BMD coverage 
• capability to detect ballistic missile launches and missiles in flight from 
land-based sensors 
• number of required land based sensors to provide BMD coverage in key 
world “hotspots” 
• sea-based capability to detect ballistic missile launches and ballistic 
missiles in flight 
¾ sensor sensitivity 
¾ sensor power requirements 
¾ sensor rate of track/update 
¾ sensor error 
¾ sensor maximum and effective ranges 
¾ sensor altitude 
¾ sensor interoperability with nonorganic detection system 
¾ sensor compatibility with ship display, weapon control, and  
C2 system 
SEAFRAME 
 In order for the preceding components to participate in the integrated BMD of a 
given region, there must be a means of getting the components on station.  Since the 
xxxii 
tasking directive specified “sea-based” BMD, the logical response was a ship or 
seaframe.  The term seaframe is generic term used to describe a nondescript, yet 
nonfixed, sea-based vessel capable of mobility, sustainability, and reliability to conduct 
the given mission at hand (regional BMD).  Specific characteristics of the  
seaframe include: 
• capability to arrive on station at a given time (speed) 
• capability to maintain station for a given period of time (endurance) 
• capability to provide requisite power for all BMD systems 
• capability to provide favorable conditions for BMD system component 
operation (stability) 
• capability to contain requisite BMD system components (capacity) 
INTERCEPTOR 
 The means for completing a ballistic missile defense engagement is the 
interceptor.  The interceptor encompasses three key aspects necessary to putting 
ordinance on target:  the launcher, the projectile, and projectile guidance.  The key 
attributes of the interceptor for this study include: 
• type (e.g., missile, directed energy weapon (DEW), railgun, etc.) 
• depth of magazine 
• rate of fire (accounts for reliability) 
• power requirements 
• launcher configuration (e.g., vertical, slewed-turret, etc.) 
• compatibility with ship weapon control and C2 system 
• launcher size (includes mass, dimensions, etc.) 
• interceptor size (if applicable; includes mass, dimensions, etc.) 
• interceptor speed 
• interceptor maximum and effective ranges 
• interceptor ability to receive guidance 
• interceptor maneuverability 
• interceptor kill mechanism (warhead, KKV, energy duration, etc.) 
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COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) 
 The final critical element of BMD is decision making.  Whether controlled by 
computer or an actual commander, C2 decisions are essential to an effective defense.  
The requisite attributes for C2 are: 
• Common Operation Picture (COP) for BMD (covering BMD asset 
positions and threat activity) 
• Interceptor inventory of all available 
• Network and communication availability 
 The next logical step in development of the study’s plan of attack would be to 
solicit input from customers to determine the actual overall needs and desires for the 
system’s performance.  This aspect of system development did not occur in this study.  
No customers or stakeholders initiated this study; rather the Wayne E. Meyer Institute for 
Systems Engineering produced the tasking directive (mentioned previously) and let the 
student team develop the problem statement, needs, and scope of the study under the 
auspices of faculty advisors and Institute approval. 
Scope 
 Unhindered by external customer guidelines, the broad scope of the sea-based 
ballistic missile was intentionally narrowed.  This was due to both the complexity of the 
sea-based BMD issues and a very brief timeframe (just under five months from tasking to 
conceptual system design).  As any one of the previously mentioned core areas 
brainstormed for BMD could constitute systems sufficiently complex for a systems 
engineering integrated study, the scope was confined to two areas of BMD (commit stage 
and intercept stage) and anchored with the seaframe as the “hub” of the system.  As such, 
the only variables to be explored, altered, and forecasted would those aspects that are 
seaframe-oriented.  These aspects would be referred to as organic aspects.  Those aspects 
that are external to the seaframe or nonorganic aspects, would be fixed entities that would 
be binary in nature (their attributes are part of the system or not) in order to demonstrate 
the system capability of both organic and non-organic together or just the performance of 
the organic system alone. 
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 The two core areas of this BMD study, commit and intercept, are the governing 
factors of system development.  Every aspect explored in the study falls under one of 
these areas.  These areas are defined as: 
• Commit – All actions taken to detect, track, identify, develop a fire 
control solution, and make a C2 decision to intercept a ballistic missile. 
• Intercept – All actions that occur from the decision to employ an 
interceptor until a ballistic missile is destroyed, handed off, or reaches the 
end of its midcourse phase. 
 Any aspects of BMD that precede or occur after these areas were the first items to 
be designated outside the scope of the study. 
 Rooted in the original tasking statement and later in the problem statement, the 
team developed a list of sea-based BMD aspects that are a part of the study’s scope and 
those that are outside the scope due to relevance, complexity (time issue), and by 
definition of sea-based BMD.3  The following are aspects that were considered as “in-
scope” this study: 
• [The system is] Part of the overall layered U.S. Integrated Ballistic Missile 
Defense System (IBMDS) and coalition BMD effort (the sea-based 
portion of BMD) 
• 2025-2030 timeframe4 
• Sea-based 
• Must counter the perceived SR to IR ballistic missile threats5 
• Intercept warhead in the boost through midcourse phases6 (earliest 
engagement possible) 
                                                 
3 By direction of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), sea-based BMD is confined to boost through 
midcourse intercept of short-range to intermediate-range ballistic missiles (500 km - 3,500 km).   
Missile Defense Agency, “MDA Link,” http//www.mda.mil/mdalink, (Washington, D.C.:  2006). 
4 Deliberate decision by the group to meet the “future surface combatant operations for emerging  
sea-based BMD” portion of the tasking statement beyond the projected developmental timeline of DD-X 
and CG-X. 
5“Perceived” refers not necessarily to the most dangerous threat of the future, but the likely,  
highly-proliferated ballistic missile easily bought and sold by nations, factions, and terrorists alike.   
Missile Defense Agency, “MDA Link,” http//www.mda.mil/mdalink, (Washington, D.C.:  2006). 
6 Ibid. 
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The following are those items deemed “out-of-scope” based on the reasons mentioned 
previously, faculty and external advisor assistance, and team preference: 
• BMs that survive beyond midcourse will not be engaged by the  
sea-based system7 
• Post-intercept debris collateral damage and intercept over-flight issues 
• Vulnerability of the ship due employment of sensors, FC radar, and 
employment of interceptor(s) (EW signature) 
• Ability for ship self-defense while conducting active BMD (will be 
covered by ship self-defense system) 
• Nonphysical interceptors (cyber attack, etc.) 
Assumptions 
 Determining the project scope is just one part in the definition of the study.  To 
focus on a select few elements to generate a conceptual system design using systems 
engineering processes, many assumptions must be made.  Since the focus of the study is 
sea-based BMD in a future timeframe (2025-2030), a certain level of expected capability 
must be assumed.  Additionally, those external aspects (nonorganic aspects) that interact, 
support, and aid the organic system aspects must also have assumed capability that can be 
fixed in a variable sense.  Based on this logic, the system-bounding assumptions are: 
• Integrated external sensor network is deployed and operational for all 
Unified Commands8 
• Collaborative Information Exchange (CIX) exists between all participants 
in the IBMDS 
• BMD system will be installed as part of a ship9 
• Physical interceptor(s) (i.e., missile, railgun, DEW, etc.) will be employed 
if able 
                                                 
7 This situation is treated as a “handoff” to which a terminal intercept system within the IBMDS  
would address. 
8 This indicates that there is worldwide sensor coverage available. 
9 This is to indicate that a “BMD barge” or fixed “BMD platform” off shore does not constitute  
sea-based BMD in the system to be developed. 
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• Automated Battle Management System exists on ship and interacts with 
other participants in regional BMD via CIX 
 The scope and system bounding assumptions define the breadth of the study and 
serve as enablers to ensure the quality of the study and that study is completed as per 
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 This section presents the guidance provided to the Systems Engineering Analysis 
Cohort Nine (SEA-9) Future Surface Combatant Ballistic Missile Defense Integrated 
Project Team (SEA-9 BMD) received for this campus-wide integrated project and 
provides the underlying basis for this thesis technical report.  This project assumed the 
name SABR, for Ship Anti-Ballistic missile Response. 
1.1.1 Project Motivation 
 The contemporary and emerging missile threat from hostile states is 
fundamentally different from that of the Cold War and requires a different approach to 
deterrence and new tools for defense.  The strategic logic of containment and fear from 
mutually assured destruction that kept the United States, its allies, and the Soviet Union 
from all-out missile engagements does not exist in this new world order of irrational 
state, faction, or terrorist group leadership.  These newer threats on the world stage see 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) as weapons of choice, not weapons of last resort 
to exert political pressure or to evoke unpopular responses.  In this case, ballistic missile 
(BM) WMDs are a lethal means to compensate for the conventional strength of the 
United States, allowing these entities to pursue their objectives through force, coercion, 
and intimidation. 
To deter such threats, the United States and its allies must devalue BMs as tools 
of extortion and aggression through an overt regional presence and a formidable  
ballistic missile defense (BMD).  Doing so would undermine the belief of adversaries that 
threatening a missile attack would succeed in affecting the secure status of the target 
citizenry and their way of life.  In this way, although missile defenses are not a 
replacement for an offensive response capability, they are an added and critical 
dimension of contemporary deterrence.10 
                                                 
10 George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive No. 23,” (Washington, D.C.:   
The White House, 2002). 
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There are three critical factors that have changed in terms of BM development in 
comparison to the superpower model of the past. 
• Newer BM and WMD development programs no longer follow the 
patterns initially set by the United States and the Soviet Union.  These 
programs require neither high standards of missile accuracy, reliability and 
safety nor large numbers of missiles and therefore can be developed  
more rapidly. 
• A nation that wants to develop BMs and WMDs can now obtain extensive 
technical assistance from outside sources.  Foreign assistance is not a wild 
card.  It is a fact. 
• Nations are increasingly able to conceal important elements of their 
ballistic missile and associated WMD programs and are highly motivated 
to do so.11 
 From these three factors, it is crucial that the U.S. and its allies field a highly 
adaptable and rapidly deployable BMD capability to meet these emerging threats.  
Deterrence and defense against the BM threat must encompass the entire spectrum of 
threat capabilities to provide maximum security for the United States, U.S. forces,  
and allies. 
1.1.2 Project Assignment 
Use a top-down, system of systems approach to examine future 
surface combatant operations in terms of their conduct and support of 
current and emerging sea-based Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
(TBMD) missions.12 
 The intent of this thesis technical report is to look into the “future” of BMD in 
order to conceptualize a surface combatant-based system of systems that becomes part of 
the whole of integrated BMD as envisioned by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).  
                                                 
11 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, “Executive Summary of the 
Report from the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,”  
(Washington, D.C.:  Congressional Record, 1998). 
12 Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering, “SEA-9 Integrated Projects Objectives,” 
(Unpublished Memorandum:  2005). 
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BMD systems have been studied, conceptualized, and developed ever since the advent of 
BMs as a threat.  As such, this study strives to be sensitive to the historical precedents of 
past and current systems, yet not constrained by their ideas (produced or conceptual in 
nature), in order to implement an objective approach to the development of a system  
of systems. 
 In the summer of 2005, it was announced that the SEA curriculum, for the first 
time, would have three integrated projects instead of one large integrated project.  As a 
result, the Wayne E. Meyer Institute, the Temasek Defence System Institute (TDSI), and 
the students of the SEA-9 curriculum spent the summer and fall of 2005 determining 
ideas for project topics.  Three broad topics emerged (Maritime Domain Awareness, 
Rapid Response Command and Control, and Future Surface Combatant Systems) and 
each student chose their topic that they wished pursue for their capstone project 
requirement.  Each project was to be a campus-wide, integrated project focused on 
current issues facing the U.S. Navy and its coalition partners. 
 The topic of Future Surface Combatant Systems was a popular topic, attracting 
ten SEA students (just under half of the overall cohort); however, the topic was too broad 
for a focused integrated project.  After examination of current operational obstacles, 
strategic visions of both the U.S. Navy and the United States as a whole, and emerging 
technologies of the near future, it was mutually decided by the Meyer Institute and 
students of the future surface combatant integrated project team (i.e., the SEA-9 BMD 
Integrated Project Team, prior to being renamed “SABR”) to address the front-burner 
issue of ballistic missile defense, specifically the roles and requisite capabilities of a 
future surface combatant as a system in the whole of global BMD. 
1.1.3 Project Definition 
“Future surface combatant operations” is defined as looking 20-25 years into the 
future (2025-2030).  This extends the scope beyond the 10-15 year development time 
frame of both DDG-1000 and CG-X, yet keeps the dates close enough to be synergistic 
with the development of limited-use current and future technologies such as conformable 
radars, railguns, and directed energy weapons (DEWs). 
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 The “current and emerging sea-based TBMD missions” consideration for limited 
BMD capabilities currently employed in the Fleet and the overall concept of BMD must 
include the ability to detect and engage the threat as well as to exchange information 
between joint and coalition forces. 
 “Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD)” is defined as operating within an 
Area of Responsibility (AOR), meaning targets within a limited geographical area.  This 
is interpreted as the deployment of the future surface combatant BMD system to a given 
region (theatre) to provide area defense.  Further clarification for the role of sea-based 
BMD in the overall scheme of Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense (IBMD) assets is 
provided by the MDA, which designates “sea-based systems… to intercept short to 
medium range hostile missiles in the ascent and descent phase of midcourse flight”13 and 
“capable of intercepting short and medium-range ballistic missiles.”14 
 The result of this examination is the following Problem Statement: 
Develop and evaluate a conceptualized ship-based BMD system 
architecture to meet emerging short- to intermediate range ballistic missile 
threat capability in the 2025-2030 time frame.  The system must be able to 
integrate with prospective coalition BMD architectures and contribute to 
the whole of layered BMD. 
1.1.4 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Definition 
BMD is defined by the MDA as “the capability to defend forces and territories of 
the United States, its allies, and friends against all classes and ranges of ballistic missile 
threats.”15  Specifically, it categorizes the defense into the three phases of a BM 
trajectory:  Boost, Midcourse, and Terminal, Figure 1. 
Boost:  The portion of flight immediately after launch, when the missile burns 
fuel (solid or liquid) to accelerate and lift its payload into the air.  Duration is 
approximately 110-300 seconds. 
 Midcourse:  The portion of flight where the missile payload is separated from the 
booster rocket and is traveling without power on its trajectory toward a target. 
                                                 
13 Missile Defense Agency, “MDA Link,” http//www.mda.mil/mdalink, Washington, D.C.:  2006. 
14 Missile Defense Agency, A Day in the Life of the BMDS, 3rd Ed., Washington, D.C.:  2004, p. 17. 
15 Missile Defense Agency, “MDA Link,” http//www.mda.mil/mdalink, Washington, D.C.:  2006. 
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 Terminal:  The final portion of flight when the missile’s warhead reenters the 
earth’s atmosphere (if exo-atmospheric) and falls toward its target, propelled only by its 
momentum and the force of gravity. 
 
Figure 1.  Trajectory Phases16 
1.1.4.1 Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) Definition 
TBMD is the capability to defend forces, territories, and interests of the  
United States, its military allies, and friends against BM threats employed in a given 
geographical region.  Specifically, it includes all classes of missiles that are employed 
against short-range (SR), medium-range (MR), and intermediate-range (IR) targets  
(500 km-3,500 km) within a given region. 
 Figure 2 depicts the different ranges and provides examples of each 
category of missile. 
                                                 
16 Raytheon Company, “Missile Trajectory Phases,” http//www.raytheonmissiledefense.com/phases/ 
index.html, Waltham:  2006. 
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Figure 2.  Missile Classifications by Range and Comparative Distances 
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2.0 OVERVIEW 
2.1 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (SE) PROCESS 
 The SE methodology is not a “one-size-fits-all” process.  The definition and 
implementation of SE varies depending on the project environment and domain of 
application.  Even though there are differences in definition, approach, and 
implementation, the SABR team developed and executed a viable SE process for this  
SABR project. 
 “A systems approach is one that focuses on the system as a whole, particularly 
when making valued judgments (what is required) and design decisions (what is 
feasible).”17  The first priority is to realize that, “Inherent within the systems engineering 
process must be a provision for continuous feedback and corrective action.”18  SE is an 
iterative procedure that follows a top-down process (definition of the system), to a 
bottom-up approach (system validation), as seen in Figure 3.  This is a continuous 
approach that is applied throughout the complete life cycle of the system, from system 
design to phase out and disposal. 
                                                 
17 M.W. Maier and E. Rechtin, The Art of Systems Architecting, 2nd Ed., CRC Press LLC, 2002, p. 8. 
18 B.S. Blanchard and W.J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 3rd Ed., Prentice Hall, Inc., 
1998, p. 25. 
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Figure 3.  DoD Systems Engineering Process Model19 
 After validating the system needs and creating an operational concept definition 
from the customer, focus is placed on accurately defining and developing system neutral 
technical requirements.  “Requirements definition is a core systems engineering process 
that begins with the considerations of what the stakeholder needs, and ends with the 
establishment of a requirements baseline for the project.”20  Not only is it important for 
the system requirements to be well defined, but they need to be traceable to the 
customer’s needs and to the system and subsystems themselves to allow functional 
analysis and functional allocation to begin. 
 After defining the systems requirements, the SABR team can begin to develop 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs) to determine if 
the system meets requirements.  After MOE and MOP definition, the functional analysis 
and allocation phase of the project allows for a functional architecture to be developed. 
                                                 
19 United States Department of Defense, Systems Management College, Systems Engineering 
Fundamentals, Defense Acquisition University Press, January 2001, p. 31. 
20 C. Whitcomb, Ph.D., “A Systems Engineering Process,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
Winter 2006. 
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“Functional analysis is the iterative process of breaking down, or decomposing 
requirements from the system level, to the subsystem level, and as far down the 
hierarchal structure as necessary to identify specific resources and components of the 
system.”21  This will allow for development of solution neutral functions with regard to 
the customer’s stated needs and technical requirements.  The intent here is not to identify 
how the system will work, but identify what the system needs to do, and provide the first 
stable baseline of the system about which the SABR team can make reasonable 
judgments. 
During the functional allocation process, similar functions are grouped together 
and the “whats” are converted into “hows” by mapping alternative components to 
functions.  Functions can be accomplished by hardware, software, or peopleware.  In this 
phase, different conceptual design architectures are developed and trade-off studies are 
conducted at many levels in order to identify the preferred design and proper combination 
of hardware, software, and peopleware.  “From a systems engineering perspective, it is 
essential that the requirements for equipment, software, people, facilities, and so on, be 
justified by responding to some functional need.”22  By using tools such as  
Quality Function Diagrams (QFDs) and Function Flow Block Diagrams (FFBDs), a 
traceable method for developing design architecture is used.  This allows for needs, 
requirements, MOEs, MOPs, and functions to be mapped together, justifying the 
architecture created. 
 As the system design alternatives start to come together, trade-offs progress.  
Trade-offs on technologies and components may continue into the synthesis, analysis, 
and evaluation phase of the project.  It is important to note that feedback has been 
gathered from all phases of the SABR systems engineering process and subsequent 
changes have been made, as necessary. 
                                                 
21 B.S. Blanchard and W.J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 3rd Ed., Prentice Hall, Inc., 
1998, p. 62. 
22 Ibid. 
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2.2 SHIP ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE RESPONSE (SABR) PROJECT SE 
APPROACH 
 In the SABR project, the SE process consisted of a multinational team dynamic 
all utilizing an SE process model to develop a BMD system.  In the rest of this section, 
details are provided on the team’s organization and the SABR project process, which has 
been utilized to develop the preferred architecture. 
2.2.1 Project Team Organization 
 “Success in system engineering derives from the realization that design activity 
requires a ‘team’ approach.”23  Teamwork and effective communication are crucial to 
having a successful project.  Hence, using a team approach is the foundation of the SABR 
project.  The SABR team consisted of students from SEA-9, TDSI, and Total Ship 
Systems Engineering (TSSE).  The SABR project was assigned to SEA-9 in lieu of 
individual theses, with tasking to integrate TDSI and TSSE for assistance in various 
specialty areas.  Formulation of the team began with the Meyer Institute assigning a team 
lead from SEA-9, based on rank, to the project.  From there, individuals within SEA-9 
were assigned as component leads for different areas of the BM project.  A full 
breakdown of the initial team format can be seen in the organization chart in Figure 4. 
                                                 
23 B.S. Blanchard and W.J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 3rd Ed., Prentice Hall, Inc. 




Figure 4.  SABR Project Organization Chart 
The students assisting from TDSI and TSSE brought a plethora of technical 
capabilities to the table.  The TDSI students consist primarily of coalition military forces 
and various non-U.S. defense agencies.  They brought technical experience in areas such 
as current and future radar capabilities and designs, as well as current and future missile 
and interceptor technologies.  The TSSE students brought experience in the area of naval 
architecture.  Outputs from the BMD project will be used by TSSE to develop a future 
platform capable of housing the BMD system. 
2.2.2 Systems Engineering Process Model 
 With the team structure set, the systems approach was implemented.  There are 
many different system process models and philosophies that can be used to represent the 
flow of the project work.  In order to choose a process model the team had to investigate 
the characteristics of the project at hand.  Certain process models work better for different 
situations.  For example, the spiral process model is an iterative model based on a  
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is developed, allowing for risk assessment before proceeding to the next phase, all the 
way to final system development. 
 Basically, all of the system process models end in some version of an operational 
system and utilize some method of feedback into the system to make corrections as 
needed to validate and verify.  The end state of the SABR project and feedback into the 
system were major considerations, while determining what type of process model or 
philosophy to follow.  In the case of the SABR project, there is no physical system 
development.  The project goal is to develop and define a refined set of system 
requirements and a preferred system design concept, with sensitivity analysis that could 
be used to develop a future SABR system.  The decision was made to follow the waterfall 
process model seen in Figure 5 as represented in Blanchard and Fabrycky’s  
Systems Engineering and Analysis, because the SABR team chose to display the project 
approach as a progression from phase to phase, allowing for feedback  
when necessary. 
 
Figure 5.  SABR Systems Engineering Process Model 
For the purpose of the SABR project, the waterfall model had to be modified.  
Since the SABR project ends with a preferred system design concept and not a physical 
development, the process is not used past the Design phase.  Instead amplifications have 
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been made and the phases have been broken down into the steps needed to end with a 
preferred system design as seen in Figure 6.  Further amplification of the process 
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3.0 SYSTEM NEEDS 
3.1 THE BALLISTIC MISSILE (BM) THREAT 
BM proliferation has become a significant issue in the past 20 years.  This 
situation has developed as more nations have been afforded the opportunity to purchase 
missiles as a result of the former Soviet Union selling large portions of its missile 
stockpiles and missile technology in an effort to bolster its failing economy.  In addition 
to the former Soviet Union, rogue nations like North Korea continue to supply missiles 
and missile technology to virtually anyone who can pay for the information or weapons.  
This willingness to sell missiles and technology for either monetary or political reasons 
(or both) has created a weapons market unlike any other. 
As a result of this flood of weapons being available to rogue nations and the 
proliferation of missile technology from the former Soviet Union to states such as Iran 
and North Korea, the world has become less safe and the Western world must increase its 
efforts to suppress the acquisition of missiles and missile technology. 
3.1.1 Project Threat Definition 
 A BM is a weapon that follows a prescribed course that cannot be significantly 
altered after the missile has burned its fuel (its course is governed by the laws of 
ballistics).  In order to cover large distances, BMs are usually launched very high into the 
air or in space, in a suborbital spaceflight; for intercontinental missiles the altitude 
halfway through the flight is 1,200 km.  Once in space, after more thrust is provided, the 
missile goes into freefall. 
 BMs are not new and have been effectively employed in combat by nations since 
World War II.  In fact, the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler effectively used the V-2 Rocket as 
a weapon of terror during the war,24 when many as 3,225 were launched in combat, 
primarily against Antwerp and London.”25  The Iranians and Iraqis exchanged volleys of 
missiles in their near decade-long war.  More recently, the Iraqis used their indigenous 
                                                 
24 http://www.flyingbombsandrockets.com/V2_intro.html, 4 April 2006. 
25 http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/v2.htm, 4 April 2006. 
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variant of the Soviet-developed SCUD missile against Israel and Saudi Arabia.  The 
primary difference between today’s weapons and their predecessors is in the realm of 
accuracy.  Today’s weapons are accurate to within meters, whereas older weapons, 
specifically the V-2s employed against Great Britain in World War II, experienced a 
Circular Error Probable (CEP)—the radius within which 50% of the shots’ impact of  
12 km26 (as determined through accuracy analysis data based on the number of missiles 
launched, their intended targets, and the impact distance from the intended target). 
Many missiles are available on the world arms market and the BM is the most 
threatening of all, due to the devastating effects of the various payloads a weapon of this 
type is capable of delivering.  Although conventional payloads were used with great 
effect in past conflicts (Gulf War, Iran/Iraq War, and World War II, respectively), the 
conventional payload did little physical damage when compared to the psychological 
terror ballistic missiles had on the populations they were used against, specifically Israel 
in the 1991 Gulf War. 
A fact of particular note is that: 
The damage caused by the 39 Iraqi Scud missiles that landed in  
Tel Aviv and Haifa was extensive.  Approximately 3,300 apartments and 
other buildings were affected in the greater Tel Aviv area.  Some  
1,150 people who were evacuated had to be housed at a dozen hotels at a 
cost of $20,000 per night.27 
This evidence not only substantiates the claim of BMs as weapons of terror, but 
places a dollar value on the cost of being attacked by such weapons. 
Beyond the direct costs of military preparedness and damage to 
property, the Israeli economy was also hurt by the inability of many 
Israelis to work under the emergency conditions.  The economy 
functioned at no more than 75 percent of normal capacity during the war, 
resulting in a net loss to the country of $3.2 billion.28 
From this, it can be concluded that the BM has significant value as a weapon of 
terror regardless of the warhead it carries.  This fact is evidenced by the uneasiness 
                                                 
26 http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/v2.htm, 4 April 2006. 
27 http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Gulf_War.html, 4 April 2006. 
28 http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Gulf_War.html, 4 April 2006. 
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experienced by the world powers when considering those nations that have the potential 
to possess or that do possess BMs. 
3.1.2 Case-In-Point:  North Korean Missile Systems 
 Although there are a myriad of potential threats to Western nations regarding 
BMs, one of the most likely threats is from the North Korean Taepo Dong missile or 
some derivative thereof.  This is evidenced by North Korea’s 31 August 1998 firing of 
this missile, which flew over the Japanese island of Honshu and landed roughly 330 km 
away from the Japanese port city of Hachinohe after flying for approximately 1,320 km.29 
Another factor taken into consideration, beyond the knowledge of a nation 
possessing BMs, is the likelihood of proliferation of the technologies possessed by  
North Korea.  Such proliferation of missile technology has occurred between the nations 
of Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  As this 
technology was transferred between the aforementioned nations, it is assumed that there 
will be a significant commonality in the missiles possessed by those nations.  As a result, 
it is assumed that the common threat technology, regardless of the nation of origin, will 
possess the majority of characteristics of the North Korean Taepo Dong missile.  
Therefore, the basis of the information regarding threat and political motivation to 
employ weapons will mimic the approach of North Korea. 
The North Korean regime under Kim Jong Il has displayed a propensity to 
provide any nation requesting assistance with information regarding missile development 
technology.  This willingness, in conjunction with the collaboration of efforts with the 
Iranian/Pakistani/Chinese missile programs, has significantly increased the likelihood of 
BMs being used against Western interests in the future.  As a result of this situation, 
western powers must continue their efforts in developing a BMDS capable of effectively 
neutralizing the near-term threats.  If this does not occur, there are potential security 
ramifications for decades to come. 
The Taepo Dong 2 is a three-stage, liquid-propellant, surface-based 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of ranges up to 4,300 km.  The  
                                                 
29 Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/factsht.htm,  
Monterey, CA, 2006. 
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Taepo Dong 2 missile is a likely threat due to the nation that possesses it, the probability 
that the technology will be transferred (or has already been transferred) to nations not 
friendly to Western powers, and the perceived likelihood of one of those nations 
employing the weapon. 
3.2 CURRENT (2006) SEA-BASED BMD CAPABIILITIES 
 Defense against BMs has been a prime national security objective for nearly  
30 years.  Significant research and funding were allocated as part of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI), a significant program and part of the defense buildup undertaken by the 
Reagan Administration in 1981-1989.  While no systems were fielded as a result of this 
research, significant scientific advancements were made in related fields. 
 The need for regional BMD became more apparent in the 1991 Gulf War.  Iraq’s 
use of SCUD missiles against targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel presented coalition 
forces with a threat for which there was no dedicated countermeasure.  U.S. Army Patriot 
missile systems, designed to shoot down conventional aircraft, were modified and 
pressed into service as a last ditch defensive measure.  This solution was far from 
optimal, however.  Engagement was only possible while the enemy projectile was in the 
terminal, or reentry, phase of flight.30 
 In the years since this conflict, there has been considerable investment and 
research on the BMD problem.  In the short term, the U.S. military in general, and the 
U.S. Navy in particular, has sought to retrofit currently fielded systems to provide an 
initial BMD capability.  As of 2006, significant progress has been made. 
3.2.1 Maritime Component of Current U.S. BMD Efforts 
 The U.S. Navy had initial technological success with modifying the Aegis 
weapons system.  This program has sought to improve the already impressive detection 
capabilities of the AN/SPY-1 series of shipboard phased array radars.  The physical 
                                                 
30 Steven A. Hildreth, “Evaluation of U.S. Army Assessment of Patriot Antitactical Missile 
Effectiveness in the War Against Iraq,” Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs and National 
Defense Division, Congressional Research Service.  Prepared for the House Government Operations 
Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, 7 April 1992. 
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transmitters and receivers of this system are highly capable.  The supporting software was 
initially designed to filter out extraneous data resulting from these capabilities; detection 
of exo-atmospheric tracks was considered an impediment to the systems design capability 
of anti-air warfare.  Now, software modifications have been developed to accurately 
process and track exo-atmospheric objects.  U.S. Navy Aegis warships are equipped to 
operate off of the coast of potential threat nations, acting as early-warning assets and 
communicating with a worldwide network to counter a possible BM launch against the 
United States. 
 Alongside the sensor development, the Navy and the aerospace industry have 
been developing a ship-launched, exo-atmospheric, interceptor missile.  Currently in 
testing is the SM-3, a derivative of the widely fielded Standard Missile.  The SM-3 has a 
series of successful test intercepts to its credit, but has yet to be deployed to  
frontline assets. 
3.3 NEEDS ANALYSIS 
 The SE process as a whole starts with the identification of an aspiration, want, or 
need.  This need is developed or defined from a noticed deficiency in an as-is system, or 
a lack of capability.  The system needs should give a good representation of what 
stakeholders want or desire as a system performance outcome.  These needs are then used 
to derive traceable top-level requirements, MOEs, MOPs, and functions to be used in 
system development. 
3.3.1 SABR System Needs 
 The definition of the system needs for the SABR project are derived from several 
different areas.  First, the tasking statement, gives specific design criteria for the  
SABR system. 
• Create a ship-based BMD system architecture. 
• Use emerging criteria for SR to MR threats. 
• Integrate with coalition partners. 
• Contribute to the whole of layered BMD. 
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System bounding assumptions and scope have been imposed on the project, and the 
system needs definition must fit them.  Next, using the tasking statement and bounding 
assumptions the SABR team identified current and future BM threats and  
defense capabilities. 
 The development of the needs statements have been through many revisions.  
Initial problems have come from not having a well-defined set of stakeholders or 
customers available.  By not having a customer, the SABR team has had to act as the 
customer and decide what the possible “wants” of the system needed to be.  Various 
faculty members and visitors have served as verifying and validating agents to ensure that 
the needs statements actually fit the desires of the institute for the project.  Other 
problems have been encountered during the definition of the system need such as keeping 
the statements general and the solution neutral.  With regard to this phase of the project, 
needs analysis was one of the most difficult hurdles the SABR team had to overcome due 
to the extremely focused tasking statement. 
Six system needs statements have been defined. 
1. Protect coalition partners from BM threat. 
2. Operate independent of nation-state territorial boundaries. 
3. Employ over a wide range of environmental conditions. 
4. Assimilate into the integrated, layered BMD system. 
5. Interoperate with coalition partners. 
6. Destroy TBM system with a high probability of kill. 
Using these need statements the SABR team was able to begin identifying  
solution-neutral requirements and technical performance measures.  Scenarios were also 
developed in the Design Reference Mission (DRM) that would address the needs of the 
SABR system. 
3.4 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION (DRM) 
 The DRM has been developed to define the environment in which the system will 
be working, in a language that is understandable by stakeholders and the SABR team 
alike.  The DRM is an SE design tool that defines the problem, not the solution.  The 
DRM takes critical technical performance measures and develops scenarios in which 
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certain factors are considered.  First, a Design Reference Mission Profile (DRMP) was 
developed.  Next, stressed operational factors were identified.  These factors were input 
into the DRMP.  Three scenarios were chosen:  best, most likely, and worst case.  The 
worst case scenario is the stressed scenario, which puts the most limitations on the 
system.  The best case scenario is the basis for the initial modeling efforts.  The model 
developed for the best case scenario was altered to determine what types of changes need 
to be made and how to alter SABR’s concept of operations in order to reflect the stressed 
scenario.  All scenarios are realistic and possible.  Stressed factors are divided into two 
groups:  naturally induced and human induced.  Examples of naturally induced stressing 
factors are weather, sea state, geography, atmospheric ducting, and topography.  
Examples of human induced stressing factors include launch location, number of threats 
launched, systems status, and weapons available. 
Scenario 1 
 Scenario 1 is the SABR team’s best case, or least stressed, scenario as seen in 
Figure 7.  This scenario is a perfect world in which all environmental and human induced 
stressing mechanisms minimally affect the system.  The threat’s location is known.  
There is only one missile threat.  The threat is launched near the shore.  There is no cloud 
cover and the sea is calm.  All sensor systems are functional and the network is 
functional.  There is no delay in the transfer of data; therefore, the system is operating in 
a real time environment.  All weapon systems are on-line and available.  Satellite 
detection is instantaneous.  The ships are able to detect the threat as soon as it reaches the 








Figure 7.  Least Stressed Scenario 
Scenario 2 
 Scenario 2 is a more stressed scenario as seen in Figure 8.  There is 100% cloud 
cover.  Satellite detection will not occur until after the threat has cleared the cloud layer.  
There are two threats launched from two different locations.  The threats are launched  
50 NM inland.  All weapon systems are on-line and functional.  The network is 
functional; however, there is a delay in data transmission and, therefore, the system is 
less than real time.  Ship sensors are functional and are able to detect the threats as soon 








Figure 8.  More Stressed Scenario 
Scenario 3 
 Scenario 3 is the most stressed scenario as seen in Figure 9.  This scenario will 
fully exploit the limitations of the system and will further identify the systems short 
comings.  There is complete cloud coverage.  Sea state is rough with large swells  
(sea-state 5).  The network is down; ships can only fire on their own fire control data.  
Satellite detection is not functional.  Own ship sensors are functional and are able to 
detect the threat as soon as they reach radar horizon.  However, since the collaborative 
information exchange system is down, if one part of a ship system is down then it is not 
functional.  There will be multiple threats launched from multiple sites.  The threats are 
launched from deep inside the threat territory and are masked by terrain.  Engagement 







Figure 9.  Most Stressed Scenario 
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4.0 REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
4.1 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
 After the definition of the system needs statements, focus shifts to the 
development of system requirements.  As with the system needs statements, the system 
requirements also need to be solution neutral, completely describe the system to be 
developed, and be traceable back to the system needs.  The system requirements describe 
the “whats,” not the “hows,” of the system.  The requirements, in conjunction with the 
MOEs and MOPs, are used to develop a functional system description. 
 Like most systems engineering processes the development of the system 
requirements is also iterative.  When defining the systems requirements the  
SABR team kept in mind that requirements come from a variety of different sources.  
With the SABR project, one source for requirements development is the needs that were 
defined during the needs analysis phase. 
 Brainstorming initially produced somewhere in the range of 50-60 different 
system requirements.  Upon first inspection, they all seemed to be legitimate.  However, 
after further analysis, some statements appeared to be redundant, solution specific, or 
immeasurable.  After many iterations, a final set of system requirements was generated.  
The final set of top-level requirements is: 
• Rapidly deployable, sea-based platform capable of prolonged operations. 
• Stable platform capable of operations in heavy seas. 
• Detect and track over-the-horizon BM launch and flight path. 
• Share real-time sensor, weapon, fire control, and BDA data among 
coalition forces. 
• Prioritize threats and optimally pair assets with the highest probability  
of kill. 
• Designate targets with a low probability of kill to other assets. 
 To validate the requirement statements and ensure that every need had been met, a 
QFD House of Quality (HOQ) was developed. 
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In HOQ 1, shown in Table 1, the needs are listed down the left side, representing 
the “whats.”  Weights are assigned to the different needs to show a breakout of 
importance based on customer desires.31  The requirements are then filled in across the 
top, representing the “hows.”  The matrix is filled in using a weighted metric to show 
relative impact of requirement to need; where 9 reflects a high impact, 3 a medium 
impact, 1 a low impact, and 0 no impact.  The impact value is multiplied by the 
respective normalized weight for the needs and summed down each column to produce a 
weighted impact for each requirement.  As a quick check that the weighting was not 
sensitive to possible bias in customer weights, another HOQ1 was created that assigned 
all of the needs an equal weight.  After doing this, it was discovered that the rankings of 
requirements did not change from the previous weighted rank, therefore showing little to 
no sensitivity to bias from customer wants on the requirements for system development.  
From here, HOQs 2, 3, and 432 were developed to further define metrics and provide 
traceability from the needs all the way to the MOEs. 
                                                 
31 Since there is no customer for the SABR project, the weights were assigned by the project faculty 
advisor, Professor Clifford Whitcomb. 
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Needs (What's) Weights
Protect coalition partners from ballistic missile threat 0.2727 0.273 3 1 9 9 9 9
Operate independent of Nation State territorial 
boundaries 0.0909 0.091 9 1 9 0 0 0
Employ over a wide range of environmental 
conditions 0.1364 0.136 9 9 9 3 3 3
Assimilate into the Integrated Layered BMD system 0.0909 0.091 0 0 9 9 9 9
Interoperate with coalition partners 0.1364 0.136 0 0 0 9 9 9




Weighted Performance 3.1 4.0 7.8 7.4 7.4 7.4 37.0
Percent Performance 0.085 0.109 0.210 0.199 0.199 0.199
0.00
0.15
1 2 3 4 5 6
 
Table 1.  QFD HOQ 1 System Needs to System Requirements 
4.2 OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
The SABR team’s BMD project involves a complex and detailed system.  The 
individual components are described in other sections, but the process as a whole is best 
shown in Figures 10 through 14. 
Based on modeling and information provided through operations research 
techniques, a standard Naval Task Unit for an effective BMD force, equipped with an 
effective BM interceptor, consists principally of three warships.  It is assumed that 
intelligence-gathering efforts and the geo-political situation will permit sufficient time 
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(measured in weeks) for decision makers to deploy assets to observation positions in the 
region of the threat area.  These warships are equipped with the conformal hull-mounted, 
phased array radar system for organic, long-range detection.  Supplementing this onboard 
system are nonorganic detection and early-warning assets, principally satellites designed 
to detect missile launches through the use of EO detection equipment.  This initial setup 
is shown in Figure 10, with the satellite shown in the upper left-hand corner, orbiting 
over a nation that has threatened a BM launch.  The BMD Task Unit ships are stationed 
at different locations and distances off of the coast. 
 
Figure 10.  Naval BMD Task Force Stationed Off Coast, Monitoring for Missile Launch33 
Should a BM launch occur, the expected sequence of events is analogous to the 
standard Air Defense “Detect-to Engage” sequence.  This sequence consists of the 
following steps:34 
                                                 
33 Google Earth, Copyright 2006, Image modified 2 February 2006. 






E. THREAT EVALUATION 
F. WEAPONS PAIRING 
G. ENGAGEMENT 
H. ENGAGEMENT ASSESSMENT 
STEPS A, B:  Detection and Entry:  A BM launch is detected, most likely by 
nonorganic assets.  This detection is entered into the detection network and queuing 
information is sent to the “firing units”—the warships stationed offshore. 
 
Figure 11.  Hostile nation launches missile.  The launch is detected by satellite, and this 
information is relayed to ships off shore.35 
                                                 
35 Google Earth, Copyright 2006, Image modified 2 February 2006. 
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STEPS C, D:  Tracking and Identification:  The target is detected by the nearest 
warship, and a fire-control solution is generated.  This tracking data is shared with other 
BMD ships via the Collaborative Information Exchange (CIX).  The kinematics of the 
target is analyzed and a determination is made as to whether or not the target being 
tracked is classified with high confidence as being a BM. 
 
Figure 12.  BM is ascending.  The nearest ship begins to track the missile and shares 
targeting information with the other ships.36 
STEPS E, F:  Threat Evaluation and Weapons Pairing:  As the firing units track the 
target, its flight path and threat to potential downrange targets is assessed.  Anticipating 
that the target will be engaged, the best available weapon system and platform are 
selected.  This is based on a system analysis of which platform will have the highest 
probability of hit and probability of kill (Pk). 
                                                 
36 Google Earth, Copyright 2006, Image modified 2 February 2006. 
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Figure 13.  BM continues in flight.  Ship that is tracking computes a firing solution and 
shares this data with the other ships.37 
STEPS G, H:  Engagement and Engagement Assessment:  Having determined that the 
BM is a threat that needs to be engaged, the selected ship will open fire with its railgun.  
A standard salvo will be four projectiles per engagement, per individual target.  One ship, 
equipped with two railguns, will be able to have all four projectiles in-flight within  
four seconds (based on SABR project modeling and entering assumptions).  Once the 
anticipated time of flight for the railgun projectiles has expired, tracking systems will 
assess the effectiveness of the engagement, looking for detection of impact and breakup 
of the target.  If no impact is detected, the fire control system will assess the feasibility of 
a reengagement, another salvo from the shipboard railgun.  If this is possible, another 
salvo will be fired, and steps G and H are repeated.  If another salvo is not physically 
possible (i.e., the P (Hit) and P (Kill) are too low), the CIX will “hand-off” all tracking 
data to other BMD assets. 
                                                 
37 Google Earth, Copyright 2006, Image modified 2 February 2006. 
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Figure 14.  As BM continues its flight, the tracking ship assigns the ship with the highest Pk to engage 
the missile with interception weapons.  This ship fires the weapon and destroys the missile.38 
4.3 MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES) AND MEASURES OF 
PERFORMANCE (MOPS) 
 The definition of the MOEs and MOPs is crucial to the development of the 
SABR-preferred system design.  The MOEs and MOPs provide a quantitative means for 
the team to determine which of the different architectures is the most effective in 
conducting BMD.  As in every other phase of the SE process, the definition of MOEs and 
MOPs is an iterative process.  It was important that the MOEs and MOPs were specified 
in terms of importance to the criticality of the functions to be performed by the system.  
The metrics developed were as follows: 
                                                 
38 Google Earth, Copyright 2006, Image modified 2 February 2006. 
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MOEs: 
• Max number of sufficient power supply situations for mission 
accomplishment per minute 
• Max number of missions completed regardless of environmental 
conditions (wind, seas, and cloud cover) per minute 
• Number of days of sustained operations 
• Probability of detection (Pd) 
• Probability of false alarm (Pfa) 
• Probability of correct identification 
• Probability of engagement (Pe) 
• Pk 
• Probability of handoff 
• Max number of targets simultaneously tracked and identified per minute 
• Probability of worldwide sensor coverage 
• Probability of CIX function being operational 
• Max number of targets effectively engaged per minute 
• Number of successful Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) (good or bad) 
gathered and processed per minute 
• Number of successful Command and Control (C2) decisions made  
per minute 
• Max number of designated target files passed to other assets per minute 
MOPs: 
• Number of BM simulated 
• Number of BM detected 
• Number of nondetections 
• Number of false alarms 
• Number of handoffs 
• Number of engagements 
• Number of simultaneous engagements 
• Number of failed engagements 
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• Mean nonorganic detection time 
• Mean time to relay detection 
• Mean time to process detection 
• Mean organic detect time 
• Mean track formulation time 
• Mean time to identify 
• Mean threat prioritization time 
• Mean weapons pairing time 
• Mean engagement time 
• Mean time from detection to BDA 
• Mean time to conduct BDA 
• Mean time available for reengagement 
• Mean time to end of midcourse 
The same method of using a QFD HOQ is used to define the MOEs and MOPs.  
A HOQ 2 was constructed to examine the relationship of the requirements as they relate 
to the different MOEs.  This provides a method to ensure that every system requirement 
has some method of being quantitatively measured and allows the team to establish a 
level of importance for analysis.  From here, HOQ 3 was constructed showing a 
traceability from the MOEs to basic solution neutral top-level functions.  HOQ 3 helped 
the team to begin determination of what functions needed to take place in order to meet 
the expectations delineated by the system needs.  It also aided in ranking the functions to 
determine which functions are critical for system success.  HOQ 4 followed showing the 
relationship between the functions and the MOPs.  As with HOQ 2, HOQ3 provided a 
breakout of the MOPs establishing a ranking to determine a level of importance to the 
system for analysis. 
These MOEs, functions, and MOPs became direct components of the simulative 
analysis models.  Once implemented into the models, the MOEs and MOPs provide 
information on each of the system architectures and provide a method of ranking one 
system’s architecture against another.  This allowed for tradeoffs analysis among the 
different systems to determine the preferred architecture. 
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5.0 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS, ALLOCATION, AND MODELLING 
5.1 SHIP ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE RESPONSE (SABR) FUNCTIONAL 
ANALYSIS AND ALLOCATION 
 The objective of the functional analysis process is the creation of a functional 
architecture based on technical requirements in appropriate solution neutral terms to 
guide the development of alternative physical architectures in the system synthesis 
process.  Functional analysis is an iterative process that starts with the defined system 
requirements and the initial identification of the top-level functions of the system and 
decomposing them to subsystem levels.  The definition of the top-level system functions 
for the SABR project began by using QFD HOQs.  These QFD HOQs were used to 
translate the functions from requirements, MOEs, and MOPs.  The result of this was the 
following top level functions for the SABR systems to accomplish. 
• Receive intelligence cueing 
• Acquire nonorganic asset information 
• Acquire/detect target 
• Track target 
• Identify target 
• Generate fire control solution(s) 
• Make C2 decision 
• Engage BM 
• Exchange information 
• Gather and process BDA 
Using these top-level functions, the SABR team decomposed the system into sublevels 
creating different FFBDs to depict how the various top-level functions could be achieved. 
 Moving on from functional analysis into functional allocation, the “whats” are 
converted into the “hows.”  During this process, similar functions are grouped together 
and different design approaches to achieve those functions are developed.  After 
establishing several different design approaches to achieve the functions and meet the 
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needs of the system, tradeoff studies are conducted.  In the end, the tradeoff studies give 
way to a preferred system design architecture for the SABR system. 
 The functional analysis and functional allocation process used is discussed, 
showing how different FFBDs are used to describe and decompose the system functions 
and kill chains.  Details are provided as to how the system functions can be achieved via 
a combination of different physical systems and different design approaches. 
5.2 FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
5.2.1 Requirements for the Support Vessel 
 The SABR system is a sea-based BMD platform for the defense of U.S. and allied 
assets.  In order to support the sensor and interceptor systems, the vessel that carries and 
supports these functions must be designed to meet specific system needs. 
The ship must be able to sustain operations under severe environmental 
conditions.  Although a relatively calm area of operations, the Arabian Sea, for example, 
can experience sea states up to level 6 under certain weather conditions, other potential 
areas of operation, such as the South China Sea, Yellow Sea, North Atlantic, and others, 
have the potential to be much more environmentally hostile.  Operating successfully 
under these conditions will necessitate the use of a stable hull design with high endurance 
and the ability to operate independent of support assets due to the nature of the BMD 
mission.  The following is a description of the platform component in moderate detail. 
 Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) components of the platform need to 
support lengthy on-station periods.  The sea frame must be a stable sea-keeping platform.  
It must effectively operate in seas up to and including Sea State 5:  30 knots sustained 
winds and 18-foot seas.  This is based on mission requirements for continuous on-station 
operations in adverse weather conditions.39  Sea keeping is a factor in real-world,  
sea-based BMD operations, with ships occasionally leaving assigned patrol stations and 
proceeding to port due to heavy weather.  The platform must be capable of 30 days of  
on-station operations (not replenished), and up to 90 days of on-station operations if 
supply assets are available, again, based on mission requirements for operating 
                                                 
39 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_State 
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independently for extended periods.  It must interface with all existing Underway 
Replenishment (UNREP) systems and rigs, both U.S. and allied.  This encompasses rigs 
for petroleum products, fresh water, cargo, and ammunition. 
High speed capability will be needed for transit to and from the designated patrol 
region (25 kts sustained).  The vessel will require an unreplenished cruising range of 
5,000 NM at 16 kts,40 with a low fuel-consumption capability for loitering in patrol 
regions for extended periods of time.  Bow and stern thrusters will be installed to permit 
maximum lateral maneuvering capability, maximum flexibility in harbor maneuvering 
situations, and to alleviate some need for the use of harbor tugs—a significant issue if a 
short-notice sortie is necessary.  Overall draft will not exceed 20 feet (approximately  
7 meters).  This permits entry into a greater number of ports worldwide for resupply and 
pier side maintenance.  Sufficient Ship’s-Service Generator capacity to produce a power 
output supporting continuous high-power operation of radars, communications, 
environmental and propulsion systems will also be essential.  Also, the excessive power 
consumption of some proposed BMD interceptors, such as DEWs and railguns, must  
be accommodated. 
Like all frontline U.S. Naval warships, aircraft and small-boat facilities are 
needed for defensive measures, collateral duties, and in this case, for the support and 
completion of the overall mission of successful BM interception.  Such facilities will 
include being capable of embarking one helicopter of at least MH-60R/MH-60S size, 
weight, and dimension with a hangar facility for maintenance and storage.  A flight deck 
of sufficient size and weight will be needed to land at up to one MH-53E or one MV-22 
aircraft, to support long-range Vertical On-board Delivery (VOD).  Furthermore, 
facilities and provisions for at least two embarked small boats, nominally one 11-meter 
Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) and one 7-meter RHIB are necessary to be used for  
force protection, search and rescue, and personnel transfer. 
For self-defense weaponry, a variety of weapon systems should be considered.  
For short-range anti-surface and anti-air defense, one deck gun, similar in performance to 
the MK 45 series 5-inch (127 mm) weapon system, should be included.  Additionally, a 
short-range missile system to defend against hostile aircraft, missiles, and small surface 
                                                 
40 http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/ticonderoga/ 
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craft is necessary.  For close-in defense, a Block 1 B Phalanx Close In Weapon System 
(CIWS) with infrared tracking and antisurface capability,41 or a successive system of 
similar specifications, for close-in anti-missile defense and deterrence of the small 
boat/low-slow aircraft threat. 
To satisfy the force protection mission, the design should include installation of 
an optical surveillance system to support Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) 
measures, including multiple remote-controlled, heavy caliber, machine guns, and a 
rudimentary Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) suite for self-defense, to include two 
torpedo decoys, a hull-mounted, passive detection, sonar system, fire control systems to 
support Vertically Launched ASROC (VLA), for self-defense purposes.  Various smaller 
personal and crew-served weapons for contingency operations, such as boarding and 
force protection, will be needed. 
Crew complement should not to exceed that of a TICONDEROGA-class cruiser:42  
Ship’s company:  24 officers, 340 enlisted; Helicopter Detachment:  6 officers,  
25 enlisted, with an additional provision for overflow capability:  6 officer berths,  
30 enlisted berths. 
The vessel will also field a Vertical Launching System (VLS), nominally 
matching the design capabilities of the MK 57 VLS, developed for the  
DDG-1000 program.  A minimum of 60 cells will be embarked, to support the 
deployment of self-defense missiles (the ESSM) and rocket-thrown torpedoes (the VLA), 
with an open architecture capable of supporting larger and heavier weapons of  
future designs. 
The top-level systems functions are represented in an FFBD.  The top-level 
diagram serves to illustrate the organization of the system, as well as to visually represent 
the major functions and interfaces.  Essentially, each block is a broad function of the 
system, and the diagram shows the input and output of each block.  The functions can be 
further decomposed and expanded through several iterations, to the desired level of 
system detail.  The diagram should be developed toward the end of the conceptual design 
phase.  Good use of the diagram will ensure that all aspects of the system are considered 




for development, and that all system functions and interfaces are defined and related to 
each other. 
5.2.2 Top-Level Systems Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) 
For the purpose of the SABR project, an FFBD, Figure 15 was developed to 
physically illustrate the top-level systems function. 
 
Figure 15.  Top-Level FFBD 
Each block of this diagram represents an event, or a function of the system. 
Intelligence Cueing:  Intelligence cueing represents the foreign intelligence 
aspect of the system, which receives and processes information concerning the threat.  
This can serve as an early warning that a launch will occur, and is shared with the ship, 
and nonorganic assets of the system. 
Launch:  Launch refers to the time and location in which a BM threat is released. 
Nonorganic Assets:  Nonorganic assets refer collectively to all detecting, 
tracking, and identification assets that are not located on the ship.  Any information 
gathered by these assets can only be shared with the ship by means of CIX. 
Acquire/Detect:  The Acquire/Detect function is the initial detection of the 
missile by the system, either through the ship’s radar, or through nonorganic assets.  At 
this point, it may not yet be identified as a BM, but its existence is known. 
Track:  The Track function refers to determining the missile’s current, as well as 
future, track.  At this point, it’s identification as a ballistic missile may still not be known. 
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Identification:  The Identification function is the actual identification of a threat 
as a BM.  At this point, it will be identified as a threat.  The Acquire/Detect, Track, and 
Identification functions may be accomplished by either the ship, nonorganic assets, or 
possibly both.  Information may be exchanged through the CIX. 
CIX:  CIX refers to the collective information exchange, and allows the exchange 
of information between ships and nonorganic assets. 
Fire Control Solution:  The Fire Control Solution function may also be 
accomplished by either non-organic assets, or ships.  It consists of determining the flight 
path for the interceptor to intercept the ballistic missile at a given point in space and time. 
C2/Decision Making:  The C2/Decision-making function is accomplished 
through the Automatic Battle Management System (ABMS), which considers the 
information and fire control solution, as well as assets available, to determine the best 
way to engage the missile. 
Engage:  The Engage function refers to the event of actually engaging the BM in 
order to neutralize it, either through an interceptor missile, or rail. 
BDA:  BDA determines if the mission was successful.  If it was not successful, 
then the C2/Decision-making function will be used again to determine if the missile will 
be reengaged or handed off to another asset. 
5.2.3 Commit Stage “Kill Chain” 
 The kill chain is the chain of events that take place in the automated battle 
management system.  Figure 16 is a graphical display of what events occur in the  
kill chain.  The events take place from left to right.  There are three end states for the  
kill chain.  The first is a kill order and positive BDA.  The second is a kill order and 
negative BDA or a handoff to another kill evaluation system.  If the BDA is negative, 
then the kill chain process can restart from the beginning.  If at any time the system 
determines that it cannot engage the threat, it will hand off the threat to another missile 
defense system.  This is indicated by the red arrows at the bottom of Figure 16.  The red 
arrow at the top of the figure indicates that the kill chain has started over and will attempt 
to reengage the threat. 
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Figure 16.  Commit Stage Kill Chain 
The first event in the kill chain is receiving fire control inputs.  Inputs can come 
from both organic and nonorganic assets.  All threat track information that is sent to the 
ABMS will be fire control quality data.  The reason for only using fire control quality 
data is to reduce the amount of data sent over the CIX.  By decreasing the amount of 
transmitted data, the cycle time will be reduced.  In order for an asset to participate in the 
ABMS kill chain it must provide a certain quality of track data.  The quality of the fire 
control data must meet the standard for the system.  The MDA is utilizing a  
“Gold Standard” for track data.43  If the fire control data being sent is not within the 
standard, it will not be used.  Fire control data will be continually updated throughout  
the engagement. 
 Next in the kill chain, the ABMS evaluates the fire control inputs.  The fire 
control inputs received are evaluated in order to determine if they meet the standards for 
engaging the threat missile.  The system then chooses the best inputs to be used for the 
engagement of the threat missile.  The system can utilize any asset that is in the area of 
operation.  The system then takes all the inputs that meet the requirements for 
                                                 
43 Interview with LTC Thomas Cook, USA, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,  
3 February 2006. 
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intercepting the threat missile.  From the quality inputs, the system will fuse the inputs 
into a common track.  Fusing the tracks will ensure a higher probability of kill. 
 The second to last event in the kill chain is to analyze and assign the firing assets 
assigned to the ABMS.  The system determines what firing platform has the highest 
probability of kill.  The system will then assign the firing assets to engage the threat 
missile.  Finally, the kill order is sent to the platform with the highest probability of kill.  
If the threat is eliminated, and BDA is good, then the kill chain ends.  If BDA is bad, and 
there is enough time to reengage the threat, then the cycle will start over and attempt 
another engagement.  If an engagement is not possible, then the threat data will be sent to 
another missile defense system. 
5.2.4 Functional Allocation 
Once the functions of the system are identified, system components are allocated 
to carry them out.  Table 2 depicts the functional allocation table.  On the left, each 
system function is listed and assigned to each component.  The top part of the chart lists 
the system components.  On the left, each system function is listed, and they are then 
assigned to a component. 
 
Table 2.  Functional Allocation 
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5.3 SHIPBORNE SENSORS 
 In order for the system to operate continually, and in all theaters, an organic 
sensor must be developed.  The system cannot rely on external or nonorganic sensors 
only; therefore, it is essential that the ship system include an organic sensor.  The sensors 
must perform the functions of early warning, detection, tracking, fire control, and BDA.  
The radars must also be capable of sharing data with other BMD assets.  Current ship 
radars do not have the capability to perform the above functions from extended ranges.  
The group developed a conceptual radar system that is comprised of two separate radar 
systems that work together to achieve the requirement to intercept a BM threat from a 
sea-based asset.  The radars were specifically designed for BMD; however, they may 
have the capability to perform other functions as well.  Those functions were outside the 
scope of this project. 
5.3.1 Requirements for the Support Vessel 
 The SABR system is a sea-based BMD platform for the defense of U.S. and allied 
assets.  In order to support the sensor and interceptor systems, the vessel that carries and 
supports these functions must be designed to meet specific system needs. 
The ship must be able to sustain operations under severe environmental 
conditions; although a relatively calm area of operations, the Arabian Sea, for example, 
can experience sea states up to level 6 under certain weather conditions.  Other possible 
areas of operation, such as the South China Sea, Yellow Sea, North Atlantic, and others 
have the potential to be much more environmentally hostile.  Operating successfully 
under these conditions will necessitate the use of a stable hull design with a high 
endurance and the ability to operate independent of support assets due to the nature of the 
BMD mission.  The following is a description of the platform component in  
moderate detail. 
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 Hull, Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) components of the platform need to 
support lengthy on-station periods.  The sea frame must be a stable sea keeping platform. 
It must effectively operate in seas up to and including Sea State 5:  30 knots sustained 
winds and 18-foot seas.  This is based upon mission requirements for continuous  
on-station operations in adverse weather conditions.44  Sea keeping is a factor in  
real-world, sea-based BMD operations, with ships occasionally leaving assigned patrol 
stations and proceeding to port due to heavy weather.  The platform must be capable of 
30 days of on station operations (not replenished), and up to 90 days of on-station 
operations if supply assets are available, again, based on mission requirements for 
operating independently for extended periods.  It must interface with all existing 
Underway Replenishment (UNREP) systems and rigs, both United States and allied.  
This encompasses rigs for petroleum products, fresh water, cargo, and ammunition. 
High speed capability will be needed for transit to and from the designated patrol 
region (25 kts sustained).  The vessel will require an unreplenished cruising range of 
5,000 nautical miles (NM) at 16 kts,45 with a low fuel-consumption capability for 
loitering in patrol region for extended periods of time.  Bow and Stern thrusters will be 
installed to permit maximum lateral maneuvering capability, permitting maximum 
flexibility in harbor maneuvering situations, and alleviating some need for the use of 
harbor tugs, a significant issue if a short-notice sortie is necessary.  Overall draft will not 
exceed 20 feet (approximately 7 meters).  This permits entry into a greater number of 
ports worldwide for resupply and pier-side maintenance.  Sufficient Ship’s-Service 
Generator capacity to produce a power output supporting continuous high-power 




operation of radars, communications, environmental and propulsion systems will also be 
essential.  Also, the excessive power consumption of some proposed BMD interceptors, 
such as DEWs and railguns, must be accommodated. 
Like all frontline U.S. Naval warships, aircraft and small-boat facilities are 
needed for defensive measures, collateral duties, and in this case, for the support and 
completion of the overall mission of successful BM interception.  Such facilities will 
include being capable of embarking one helicopter of at least MH-60R/MH-60S size, 
weight, and dimension with a hangar facility for maintenance and storage.  A flight deck 
of sufficient size and weight will be needed to land at up to one MH-53E or one MV-22 
aircraft, to support long range Vertical On-board Delivery (VOD).  Furthermore, facilities 
and provisions for at least two embarked small boats, nominally one 11-meter RHIB and 
one 7-meter RHIB are necessary to be used for Force Protection, Search and Rescue, and 
personnel transfer. 
For self-defense weaponry, a variety of weapon systems should be considered.  
For short-range Anti-Surface and Anti-Air defense, one deck gun similar in performance 
to the MK-45 series 5-inch (127 mm) weapon system should be included.  Additionally, a 
short-range missile system to defend against hostile aircraft, missiles, and small surface 
craft is necessary.  For close-in defense, a Block 1 B Phalanx Close In Weapon System 
(CIWS) with infrared tracking and antisurface capability,46 or a successive system of 
similar specifications, for close-in antimissile defense and deterrence of the  
small boat/low-slow aircraft threat. 
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To satisfy the force protection mission, the design should include installation of 
an optical surveillance system to support Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) 
measures (including multiple remote-controlled, heavy caliber machine guns), and a 
rudimentary Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) suite for self-defense (including two 
torpedo decoys, a hull-mounted passive detection sonar system, and fire control systems 
to support Vertically Launched ASROC (VLA)), for self-defense purposes.  Various 
smaller personal and crew-served weapons for contingency operations such as boarding 
and force protection will be needed. 
Crew complement should not to exceed that of a TICONDEROGA-class cruiser.47  
Ship’s company:  24 officers, 340 enlisted; Helicopter Detachment:  6 officers,  
25 enlisted, with an additional provision for overflow capability:  6 officer berths,  
30 enlisted berths. 
The vessel will also field a Vertical Launching System (VLS), nominally 
matching the design capabilities of the MK-57 VLS, developed for the DDG-1000 
program.  A minimum of 60 cells will be embarked, to support the deployment of  
self-defense missiles (the ESSM) and rocket-thrown torpedoes (the VLA), with an open 
architecture capable of supporting larger and heavier weapons of future designs. 
5.3.1 Performance Analysis of Shipborne Radar Systems 
5.3.1.1 Radar Background 
WMDs, and the BMs that deliver them, pose a major threat to the security 
of the United States and its allies.  A vital component of the strategy is the ability to 
perform long-range surveillance and tracking of the TBMs upon initial launch.  A key 
element in the overall Sensor Architecture for BMD is the radar system.  Radar provides 
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around-the-clock, all-weather surveillance and tracking of BM threats with extremely 
accurate range, azimuth, elevation, and velocity (Doppler) measurements.  Onboard 
shipborne radar systems, in particular, can perform: 
• 24/7, all around surveillance and early warning detection of BM launch; 
• target acquisition and continuous accurate tracking of the missile threat 
throughout its trajectory; 
• guidance of interceptor in-flight from launch until the Kill Vehicle 
autonomously acquires the target for the engagement; and 
• BDA of the engagement. 
As such, performance analysis of onboard shipborne radar systems for BMD is an 
important and integral part of designing robust and effective BMD solutions. 
5.3.1.2 Radar Objectives 
The objectives are: 
• Analyze the detection performances of two types of onboard shipborne 
radar systems; namely, the upgraded SPY-1B radar and the Conformal 
aperstructure phased array radar that exploits the entire ship’s structure as 
a radar aperture. 
• Specify detection ranges of the two types of onboard shipborne radar 
systems against BMs as inputs for further system-level architecture 
modeling. 
5.3.1.3 Surveillance Radar Equation and Range Prediction for the 
Upgraded SPY-1B 
The theoretical maximum detection range (Rmax), for a radar operating in 
surveillance mode, can be predicted using the radar range equations discussed in  
Merrill Skolnik’s book, Introduction to Radar Systems.48  These equations account for 
many, but not all, of the factors that influence the detection performance of a  
noise-limited radar system.  The surveillance radar range equation is given as 
                                                 















Rmax = Maximum radar range or detection range [m] 
Pave = Average transmitted power [W] 
Ae  = Antenna effective aperture [m2] 
σ = Radar cross-section of target [m2] 
n = Number of pulses integrated 
εi(n) = Integration efficiency 
k = Boltzmann’s constant = 1.38×10−23 [J/degree] 
T0  = Standard temperature = 290 [K] 
Fn  = Receiver noise figure 
(S/N)1 = Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) required for detection based on a 
single pulse 
 L = System loss 
 ts = Time required to scan a solid angle, Ω [sec] 
Thus, the surveillance radar detection capability is largely dependent on the average 
power and the effective aperture; collectively known as the power-aperture product and 
the time required to scan one steradian in solid angle. 
The solid angle, (Ω) is determined by the azimuth to be scanned and the 
elevation of the scanned sector.  The scan time, ts, is equal to t0Ω/Ω0, where t0 = n/fp is the 
time that the radar beam dwells on the target, n is the number of pulses integrated for 
detection in surveillance mode, fp is the radar pulse repetition frequency and Ω0 is the 
solid angle of the radar main-lobe beam. 
5.3.1.4 Computation of Integration Efficiency, εI(N) and Improvement 
Factor, I(N) 
The integration efficiency for noncoherent integration may be defined as 
( ) ( )ni NSn
NSn 1=ε , 
where (S/N)n is the required signal-to-noise ratio per pulse when n pulses are integrated. 
49 
The corresponding improvement in signal-to-noise ratio when n pulses are 
integrated is called the integration improvement factor, I(n) = nεi(n) and can be derived 
empirically49 as 








⎛ ++= . 
A plot of improvement factor, I(n) verses the number of pulses 
(noncoherent integration) is shown in Figure 17 for probability of detection (Pd) of 0.5, 
0.9, 0.95 and 0.999 and probability of false alarm (Pfa) of 1.0 x 10-2, 1.0 x 10-6, 1.0 x 10-
10, and 1.0 x 10-13, respectively. 






































Figure 17.  Plot of Improvement Factor versus the Number of Pulses Integrated 
From the above plot, the improvement factor, I(n) when n = 2 (assumed 
number of pulses integrated for the upgraded SPY-1B radar in surveillance mode) is 
2.718dB.  The corresponding integration efficiency εi(n) is 0.93. 
Similarly, the improvement factor, I(n) when n = 9 (assumed number of 
pulses integrated for the upgraded SPY-1B radar in tracking mode) is 7.929dB.  The 
corresponding integration efficiency, εi(n) is 0.69. 
                                                 
49P.Z. Peebles, Jr., Radar Principles, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1998. 
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5.3.1.5 Computation of Single Pulse Signal-to-Noise Ratio, (SNR)1  
for Detection 
The SNR required for detection based on a single pulse, (S/N)1 for a given 
probability of detection (Pd) and probability of false alarm (Pfa) can be approximated by 
Albersheim’s empirical formula50 given as: 
( )[ ] ( )BBANS dB 7.112.0log101 ++= , 
where A = ln [0.62 / Pfa] and B = ln [Pd / (1 – Pd)]. 
A plot of the single pulse detection Signal-to-Noise Ratio, (S/N)1 versus 
the probability of detection (Pd) for probability of false alarm (Pfa) of 1.0 x 10-2,  
1.0 x 10-6, 1.0 x 10-10, and 1.0 x 10-13 is shown in Figure 18. 






























Figure 18.  Plot of Probability of Detection versus Single Pulse SNR 
From Figure 18, the single pulse Signal-to-Noise Ratio, (SNR)1 required 
for a 90% probability of detection and a 1.0 x 10-6 probability of false alarm is 13.14dB.  
The cumulative detection probability is 0.99 for two scan (assumed requirements for the 
upgraded SPY-1B radar). 
                                                 
50 W.J. Albersheim, “A Closed-Form Approximation to Robertson’s Detection Characteristics,” 
Proceedings IEEE 69, July 1981, p. 839. 
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5.3.1.6 Computation of Minimum Signal-to-Noise Ratio, (SNR)min 
The minimum signal-to-noise ratio, (SNR)min required is given by,  





min = . 
The corresponding (SNR)min required by the upgraded SPY-1B radar for a 
single scan probability of detection of 0.9 and probability of false alarm of 1.0 x 10-6 are 
13.4dB for surveillance mode and 14.8dB for tracking mode. 
5.3.1.7 Radar Parameters 
The upgraded SPY-1B radar is intended to have an increased power-
aperture product of about 70% using the same 3.85m by 3.65m physical antenna aperture.  
The assumed radar parameters are tabulated in Table 3. 
Radar Parameters Upgraded SPY 1B Radar 
Operating frequency (GHz) 3.3 
Pulse repetition frequency (Hz) 17 
Total average power (kW) 100 
Antenna height (m) 3.85 
Antenna width (m) 3.65 
Physical aperture (m2) 14.1 
Effective aperture (m2) 12.0 
Power-aperture product (dB) 60.8 
Receiving gain (with weighting) (dB) 42.6 
Weighted azimuth beamwidth (deg) 1.6 
Weighted elevation beamwidth (deg) 1.52 
Azimuth scan sector (deg) 90 
Search solid angle (sr) 0.0415 
Beam solid angle (sr) 7.38x10-4 
Noise temperature (K) 500 
Noise figure (dB) 3.2 
System and atmospheric losses (dB) 18.4 
Surveillance scan time (sec) 6.6 
Pulses integrated for surveillance 2 
Track integration time (sec) 0.53 
Pulses integrated for tracking 9 
Table 3.  Estimated Radar Parameters for the Upgraded SPY-1B Radar 
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Many of the above parameters used for the computation of range 
performance come from the American Physical Society (APS) study.51 
5.3.1.8 Computation of Radar Range Performance in Surveillance Mode 
Using the radar parameters listed in Table 3, the radar range performance 
in surveillance mode against a 0.5m2 BM is computed using the MATLAB codes52 to 
have a maximum detection range of 722 km given a power-aperture product of 60.8dB as 
shown in Figure 19. 
                                                 
51 APS Study, “Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense,” July 2003,  
Sections 10.2.3-10.2.5. 
52 Bassem R. Mahafza, Radar Analysis and Design Using MATLAB, Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2000. 
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Figure 19.  GUI and Plot for the Computation of Radar Performance in Surveillance Mode 
5.3.1.9 Computation of Radar Range Performance in Tracking Mode 
Similarly, the radar range performance in tracking mode (when SPY radar 
is cued by an early warning radar) against a 0.5m2 BM, can be computed using the radar 
parameters listed in Table 3 and MATLAB codes.53  The maximum detection range is 
                                                 
53 Bassem R. Mahafza, Radar Analysis and Design Using MATLAB, Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2000. 
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computed to be 971 km given a power-aperture product of 60.8dB as shown in  
Figure 20. 
 

























Figure 20.  GUI and Plot for the Computation of Radar Performance in Tracking Mode 
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5.3.1.10 Phased Array Surveillance Radar (PASR) and  
Skin-of-the-Ship (SOTS) Radar 
A vital component of the BMD strategy is the ability to perform  
long-range surveillance and tracking of the BMs upon initial launch.  Navy ships that 
perform this role are equipped with conventional, large, phased array radars with 
thousands of independent, active array elements to detect and discriminate missile targets 
from thousands of miles away.  Clearly the volume and weight of such an array is 
undesirable, especially if it is to be mounted on a ship for forward deployment.  Thus, 
new antenna concepts and technologies have been studied and dramatic performance 
improvements can be made to the PASR. 
The “opportunistic array” concept54 has been the focus of research and 
development undertaken by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  An opportunistic 
array is an integrated, ship-wide, digital, phased array, where the array elements are 
placed at available open areas over the entire surface of the platform.  The elements of 
the opportunistic array are self-standing, digital, transmit/receive (T/R) modules with no 
hardwire connections other than prime power.  Element localization and synchronization 
signals, beam control data, and digitized target return signals are passed wirelessly 
between the elements and a central signal processor. 
The opportunistic array concept and its digital architecture also 
complement the “aperstructures” philosophy, where the array is an integrated  
load-bearing part of the ship structure.  The aperstructure concept aims to exploit the 
entire ship’s structure as a radar aperture and employ individual antenna elements that are 
conformal and integrated into the ship’s structure.  The opportunistic array concept and 
aperstructure concept can be synergized into a SOTS radar.  The advantages of a SOTS 
radar are: 
High Angular Resolution 
The primary advantage of the SOTS radar is the high angular resolution 
that can be achieved by utilizing the entire ship’s structure as an aperture. 
                                                 
54 Yong Loke, “Sensor Synchronization, Geolocation and Wireless Communication in A Shipboard 
Opportunistic Array,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2006. 
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Enhanced Stealth 
Low profile patch antennas, integrated into the ship’s structure using hull 
appliqués, hold the key to minimizing the ship’s visual and infrared signatures, and its 
radar cross section. 
Multifunction 
The digital architecture of the SOTS radar offers several advantages over 
conventional radar designs.  Advanced signal processing techniques, coupled with 
broadband patch antenna designs, offer the possibility of integrating radar,  
direction finding, and satellite communications functions into the array.  The result is a 
single aperstructure replacing the numerous antennas and masts populating the 
superstructures of present-day ships. 
Increased Survivability and Operational Availability 
The SOTS array is inherently more survivable and has increased 
operational availability vis-à-vis conventional radars.  A radar architecture, with hundreds 
of dispersed antenna elements ensures that operations will continue even if a number of 
elements, are disabled (due to enemy action or maintenance requirements).  The 
modularity and accessibility of the antenna elements also means that damaged elements 
can be quickly replaced, even if the ship is on the high seas.  In addition, the relationship 
between the performance of the radar and the number of functioning elements can be 
well-predicted, allowing any degradation in radar performance to be compensated by 
tactical means. 
The radar’s theoretical maximum range was given by 
( )









where the additional terms are 
Bn = Receiver noise bandwidth [Hz] 
τ = Pulse width [m] 
fp  = Pulse repetition frequency [Hz]. 
Using the values of gain determined for various numbers of elements, the relationship 
between the theoretical maximum range and the total number of antenna elements can be 
57 
determined.55  Figure 21 shows this relationship for N = 400, 800, and 1,200.  Assuming 
that each element delivers an average power of approximately 500 W, only 400 elements 
are required to achieve a theoretical maximum range of 1,000 km.  If 800 elements are 
available, a theoretical maximum range of approximately 1,600 km is possible.  If  
1,200 elements are available, a theoretical maximum range beyond 2,000 km is possible. 
 
Figure 21.  SOTS Radar Performance for Different Number of Elements 
5.4 INTERCEPTORS 
To counter the threat of a BM that threatens to destroy strategic, operational, 
and/or tactical points of interest, an interceptor weapon must be employed to negate the 
threat of the BM.  To negate the BM threat, several technologies were investigated to 
determine their respective feasibility as an anti-ballistic missile interceptor.  The 
interceptor technologies investigated during the course of project SABR fall into three 
major categories:  missiles, directed energy, and railgun.  Within these categories several 
alternatives were explored and those deemed feasible as a BM interceptor were carried 
                                                 
55 Tong M. Chin Hong, “System Study and Design of Broadband U-Slot Microstrip Patch Antennas for 
Aperstructures and Opportunistic Arrays,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2005. 
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forward into physical and system modeling for evaluation.  The most feasible interceptor 
technologies were the missile, free electron laser, particle beam, and railgun. 
5.4.1 Missile 
The airframe body and control deflection surfaces of the missile generate the bulk 
of the maneuver capability to steer the missile for interception towards the target.  Thus 
airframe maneuverability is a crucial design specification and evaluative parameter to 
assess the performance of the missile. 
5.4.1.1 Classes of Missiles 
Most missiles may be classified into four general classes:  AAM, SAM, 
ASM, and SSM, of which only the AAM and SAM will be discussed. 
The air-to-air missile (AAM), as the name implies, is one which is 
launched in the air against another flying aircraft or air target.  The AAM is generally of 
the smaller variant due to carriage limitation and is typically short range in nature.  
However, the maneuverability requirement for this class of missile is most severe in 
comparison with other classes of missiles, mainly due to relatively high launch velocity, 
high target velocity and maneuverability and relative short flight time for flight path 
corrections.  In addition, the wide range of operating altitude imposed steep design 
challenges for the missile deflection control, as the missile is expected to meet both the 
low altitude and high altitude control requirement, which are diametrically different in 
nature, due to variation of atmosphere with height. 
The surface-to-air missile (SAM) is designed for area defense against 
attacking aircraft or BMs.  As such, the aerodynamic design depends on its range, which 
varies from a few miles to several hundred miles.  The maneuverability requirement for 
this class of missile can be quite severe, especially against low, fast-flying targets.56 
                                                 
56 S.S. Chin, Missile Configuration Design:  General Aerodynamic Design Considerations,  
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1961, p. 4-12. 
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5.4.1.2 Types of Design and Control 
In general, there are many types of aerodynamic control configurations 
(and modifications thereof) employed for the four classes of missiles. 
Wing Control 
The wing control configuration consists of a relatively large wing located 
close to the missile’s center of gravity (CG) and a set of tail or stabilizing surfaces at the 
aft end of the missile.  Because the wing deflection generates instantaneous lift for 
maneuvering flight, the response is very fast, and additional lift is generated as the  
angle of attack (AOA) builds up.  However, control effectiveness mC δ (pitching or turning 
moment due to control surface deflection) from the wing is generally small due to the 
wing proximity to the CG of the missile.  The resulting downwash has a beneficial effect 
on the tails as it generates a download that provides the desired turning moment to 
develop AOA for additional lift.  The position of a wing for a wing control design is 
crucial, as the CG of a missile will change during flight due to the rocket fuel being 
expended.  The trimmed AOA value is usually small for wing control design, and this is 
advantageous for inlet design of air breathing power-plant and guidance seeker designs. 
Canard Control 
A canard control configuration consists of a set of small control surfaces 
located well forward on the body and a set of large surfaces (wing or tail) attached to the 
middle or aft section of the missile.  Canard downwash is less significant compared to 
wing control; as such, the longitudinal stability is affected less adversely, which implies 
that large static margins can be obtained by simple variation in wing location.  
Advantages of canard are its inherent simplicity due to the small size in control system 
and its location in the nose.  The total drag and weight of the missile are also reduced, as 
the total lifting surface area is lower.  Disadvantages of canard control are:   
(1) roll stabilization is difficult with the use of canard, hence a more complex method of 
roll control is required; and (2) relatively large control surface rate is required to obtain 
the desired rate of response, since the AOA must be generated before lift is developed.  




As the name implies, the control deflection comes from the tail, thus the 
deflection must be opposite in direction to the AOA, which results in relatively slow 
response.  Advantage of tail control is tail load and hinge moments are kept relatively low 
as the total local AOA on the tail is reduced, which reduces the body bending to a 
minimum; moreover, the aerodynamic characteristics are more linear than wing control 
design.  Disadvantages are:  (1) limited tail estate to house the control mechanism if solid 
rocket motor is employed; and (2) deficiency of tail surfaces to provide desired  
lateral control. 
Tail-less Control 
Tail-less (or wing control) involves one set of surfaces (wing) with control 
flaps located at the trailing edge.  An advantage is the reduced number of surfaces, which 
results in reduced drag and manufacturing costs.  A disadvantage is that the control 
effectiveness and aerodynamic damping is extremely sensitive to the location of  
the wing. 
Base Extension 
Base extensions exploit the use of pressure differential between the base 
and the free stream.  A segment is extended aft of the body into the region of differential 
pressure to generate lift force for control.  Advantages are:  (1) low servo power 
requirement due to absence of hinge moment; and (2) simplicity and compact in design.  
Disadvantages are:  (1) low maneuverability; (2) inoperability at subsonic speeds; and  
(3) reversal in control between power-on and power-off conditions due to jet effects. 
Nose Flap Control 
Nose flap control is composed of a segment of the nose or flap extended 
from each of the four quadrants.  An advantage is the compact design when used with 
extremely low aspect ratio tail surfaces.  A disadvantage is low maneuverability. 
Dorsal Control 
Dorsal control employed in certain applications where overall span of the 
missile is limited, and is considered as an “aerodynamic fix” to make up for the loss in 
aerodynamic efficiency due to reduction in tail aspect ratio and/or area. 
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Jet Control 
Jet Control is comprised of four classes:  (1) simple auxiliary jet (rocket) 
reactions; (2) gimbaled engine and/or rocket nozzles; (3) jet vanes; and (4) jetavators. 
1. Simple jet reaction can be used to provide stabilization or spin  
(rolling velocity) to minimize dispersion in free flight, especially for  
short-range missiles, and provide jet or air injection augmentation of 
aerodynamic surfaces. 
2. Gimbaled engines can be used to control the flight path of the missile 
during phases of flight where aerodynamic control is inadequate, such as 
during liftoff where dynamic pressure is low, or at extremely high 
altitudes where air density is low. 
3. Jet vanes are used to provide or supplement aerodynamic controls.  A 
major challenge is to develop a material to withstand the high temperature 
for a prolonged operating period. 
4. Jetavators are novel devices that change the direction of the jet flow for 
thrust vector control; it requires relatively low operating forces because of 
its low hinge moment. 
5.4.1.3 Maneuverability and Static Stability 
The maneuverability of a missile is examined using the load factor 
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From static stability study of the missile, the static margin normalized with 




, where the distance between the missile neutral point and its  
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is also a negative quantity for positive static stability (neutral point 
behind CG). 
From the LFS expression, requirements for large static stability margin 
and great load factor or maneuvering capability are conflicting, in that increasing the 
stability margin results in a decrease in load factor capability.  As the missile burns off its 
fuel in flight, the CG moves forward, the static margin increases, the maneuverability of 
the missile correspondingly reduces; a multistage rocket launch is one strategy that is 
employed to overcome the maneuverability problem by segmenting the control problem 
into a progressively smaller segment of the missile entity, by actively balancing the 
maneuverability and static stability requirements of the missile throughout the  
flight regime.57 
5.4.2 Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) 
DEWs have key attributes that lend themselves as highly sought after weapons for 
current and future development.  DEWs are capable of engaging targets in a near  
                                                 
57 Class Notes, ME3205, Maneuverability vs. Static Stability, Naval Postgraduate School,  
Monterey, CA, pp. 23-24. 
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speed-of-light engagement, enabling the engagement of highly maneuverable, crossing, 
and/or extremely fast targets.  Since now there is an actual munition fired, the potential 
for a bottomless magazine exists.  The deep magazines of a DEW system will enable far 
more engagements than current missile systems allow.  Not firing a physical round, there 
is also a minimization of collateral damage, since there are not booster, air-frame, and 
warhead fragments to deal with from the interceptor weapon. 
DEWs use highly correlated, intensified and directional energy beam in 
the megawatts class as the kill mechanism.  The energy, power, intensity, and threshold 
of the system are generally determined by the technology in which energy is generated.  
The technologies under consideration are lasers and particle beams. 
5.4.2.1 Lasers 
Laser pumping is the generation of energy by stimulated emission of 
radiation through the excitation of low energy photons to high energy state and 
amplification through a gain medium.  Electrical or optical laser pumping occurs in 
several forms and is dependent on the gain medium and the end state power intensity 
required.  While the physics of laser emission do not change, the means of laser pumping 
does and are generally found in the following classes: 
• Solid state laser 
• Gas laser 
• Chemical laser 
• Free electron laser 
The advantages of employing a high power tactical laser system are: 
• speed of light delivery of high power destruction beam onto desired target; 
• deep magazine as the energy required to propel laser is basically  
electrical power; 
• minimal collateral damage given precision beam tracking and firing; 
• multiple target engagements and rapid retargeting with electronic steering; 
• and low logistic support requirement and operational cost. 
This list not all inclusive, but outlines prime factors considered beneficial 
when employing a laser as the primary tactical system. 
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5.4.2.2 Laser Technical Challenges 
Lasers suffer losses that limit applications considered critical to military 
operations.  It is therefore favorable to study the feasibility of the different systems 
available to determine the most viable system with the ability to fulfill essential  
tactical requirements. 
A typical laser system generally consists of several essential components:  
a gain medium for emission, a lasing pump, a resonator cavity, thermal cooling, and 
waveguide systems. 
The primary source of loss in a laser’s effectiveness is the attenuation loss 
due to the atmospheric conditions experienced by the system.  Beam divergence at a 
distance where power loss becomes undesirable, can be determined by the equation 
( )[ ] 2/122./1)( oo wzwzw πλ+= , where w(z) = beam width at distance z, z = distance from 
emission origin, wo = minimum beam waist at origin, and λ = wavelength.  Other 
atmospheric effects critical to laser operations include blooming, absorption,  
and scattering. 
Solid State Laser 
A solid state laser uses solid material such as glass, ruby, neodymium 
YAG, etc. as the gain medium and optical pumping via flash lamp.  The beam 
wavelength emitted by a solid state laser varies from near infrared (0.5 micrometers) to 
mid infra red region (3 micrometers) and is dictated by the gain medium used.  This class 
of laser is potentially very efficient and high power generation in the kilowatt class is 
achievable through use of a different gain medium.  Nevertheless, cooling and waste heat 
removal in a high power generation system is not trivial. 
Distortion of the laser medium and reflective mirror becomes prominent 
when the system is subjected to prolonged operational duration.  As such, high power, 
solid state lasers are limited by noncontinuous operation where short pulses, followed by 
cooling down, are required.  Moreover, existing solid state technology with low powered 
flash lamp or diode requires development of a high power, high efficiency, and low cost 
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laser pump in order to be feasible for military engagement.  This, in conjunction with the 
fixed frequency output, eliminated the solid state laser from further consideration.58 
Gas Laser 
Gas lasers, inherently powered by a electrical pumping and reaction of 
gases such as argon, helium-neon, and other combinations, are capable of producing 
power in the kilowatts class and wavelength at the near infrared spectrum.  Nevertheless, 
operation of this class of laser as a tactical weapon is not desirable, as large amounts of 
reactant gas would be required to boost the kilowatt system to a megawatt class.  
Moreover, the gas dynamic varies with operating conditions and produces a beam at an 
unfavorable wavelength for propagation and is susceptible to atmospheric attenuation, 
which is not desirable for military operation.  These factors, combined with the space 
available onboard a ship’s platform, eliminated the gas laser from further consideration. 
Chemical Laser 
Chemical lasers are powered by a chemical reaction from a combination 
of chemical compounds.  An example would be the Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser 
(COIL) employed by the U.S. Air Force, which uses gaseous chlorine, molecular iodine, 
and an aqueous mixture of hydrogen peroxide and potassium hydroxide for laser 
generation.  The COIL is a megawatt-class laser operating in the midinfrared region and 
is optimal for operation in atmospheric conditions with minimal attenuation.  However, 
there is still the need to overcome atmospheric attenuation imposed by a variable 
environment, which simply cannot be met by a single frequency laser.  The employment 
of a chemical laser on a ship’s platform raises another concern.  The chemicals required 
in the generation of laser power pose serious hazards in storage, handling, and disposal.  
Based on the single frequency capability and the highly hazardous nature of the 
chemicals used, the chemical laser was eliminated from further consideration.59 
Free Electron Laser (FEL) 
An FEL seems promising.  An accelerated relativistic electron beam acts 
as the lasing medium, exhibiting tunable, high power coherent radiation in wavelength 
                                                 
58 Aristeidis Kalfoutzos, “Free Electron and Solid State Lasers Development for Naval Directed 
Energy,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2002. 
59 Mun Kit Chan, “Atmospheric Transmission Windows for High Energy Short Pulse Lasers,” 
Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2003. 
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from millimeter wavelength to visible light wavelength is highly desirable to overcome 
atmospheric attenuation.  An FEL beam is generated by accelerating a beam of electrons 
to relativistic speeds through an optical (vacuum) cavity with array of magnets arranged 
in alternating poles along the beam path, creating a periodic, transverse, sinusoidal, 
magnetic field, Figure 22.  Acceleration of the electrons along this path results in the 
release of a photon.  The released photons are subsequently captured by a resonator 
mirror to generate resonant gain.  Operation in a wide range of wavelengths can be 
achieved by adjusting either the beam energy (speed/energy of the electrons) or the 
magnetic field strength.  An FEL is therefore tunable to operate at various wavelengths, 
resulting in minimal beam distortion and atmospheric attenuation.60, 61 
 
Figure 22.  Electron Path Through Undulator and Optical Cavity.62 
The FEL system, coupled with electronic beam steering, is capable of 
delivering a highly agile, relativistic beam with rapid-aim capabilities to meet operational 
requirements for moving targets, multiple targets, redeployment, and engagement. 
                                                 
60Ivan Ng, “A Free Electron Laser Weapon for Sea Archer,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, December 2001. 
61 Aristeidis Kalfoutzos, “Free Electron and Solid State Lasers Development for Naval Directed 
Energy,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 2002. 
62 Robert E. Williams, “Naval Electric Weapons:  The Electromagnetic Railgun and Free Electron 
Laser,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2004. 
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5.4.2.3 Particle Beam 
A particle beam (Figure 23) is comprised of particles that fundamentally 
are positively charged photons, negatively charged electrons, or neutral atoms of 
hydrogen.  The beam created in a particle accelerator is directed by magnets and focused 
by electrostatic lenses.  The total energy within the beam is the aggregate energy of the 
rapidly moving particles, each having kinetic energy due to its own mass and motion, and 
is highly destructive, as accelerated subatomic particles or atoms at velocities near the 
speed of light are focused into the very high-energy beam.  The mechanism by which a 
particle beam destroys a target is by depositing this high energy beam into the material of 
the target.  As particles of the beam collide with the atomic structure of the target’s 
material, the transfer of energy takes place and results in the target being heated rapidly 
to very high temperatures, causing catastrophic damages. 
 
Figure 23.  Working Prinicple of a Particle Beam 
Broadly classified, two categories of particle beams are viable:  charged-particle 
beams would be developed for use within the atmosphere (endoatmospheric) and have a 
set of technological characteristics that are entirely different from the neutral particle 
beam weapon that would be used in space (exoatmospheric). 
An endoatmospheric system, factoring in atmospheric interference that imposes 
constraints that limit its use, is still an attractive option given the idealistic properties of 
the particle beam system.  These properties, not exhaustive, include beam velocity near to 
speed of light, minimal beam dwell time, and beam penetration as a kill mechanism by 
depositing energy from the laser (Figure 24).  Other capabilities of the particle beam 
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system generally include rapid-aim-fire, all weather operability (atmospheric attenuation 
by scattering and absorption is not an issue critical to particle beam systems), and 
ancillary kill mechanism.  An ancillary kill mechanism is created by the beam particles as 
they collide with the atoms of the air forming a cone embracing the beam and comprises 
many types of ionizing radiation, e.g., x-rays, neutrons, alpha and beta particles, etc.  
Other tertiary effects include the generation of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) by the 
electric current pulse of the beam which is highly disruptive to the electronic components 
of the target and results in a kill by the EMP mechanism.63 64 
 
Figure 24.  Energy Deposition from Lasers and Particle Beams 
5.4.2.4 Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) Conclusion 
The fact that directed energy, when subjected to atmospheric attenuation, 
greatly reduces its capabilities and effectiveness suggests that one of the major concerns 
for use of directed energy in a military context involves the ability to generate high 
energy, megawatt class, power beams in order to be effective for military operations. 
It is therefore desired that a DEW meet the following criteria: 
• high energy, megawatt power beam operable in the hundreds of 
kilometers; 
                                                 
63 Philip E. Nielson, “Effects of Directed Energy Weapons,” 1994. 




• highly tunable beam operable in a wide range of wavelengths to overcome 
varying atmospheric attenuation; 
• multiple target engagements and rapid retargeting; 
• deep magazines; 
• low logistical support requirements and nonhazardous storage, handling, 
and disposal, if any; 
• low engagement cost; and 
• minimal collateral damage. 
The hedge imposed by energy waste, hazardous materials, and 
atmospheric effects is overcome by the FEL and particle beam options and their 
performance was evaluated in the system model. 
5.4.3 Railgun 
A railgun uses electromagnetic force to propel a projectile at very high muzzle 
velocity.  The kinetic energy imparted from the projectile to the target causes  
extensive damage. 
In order to achieve the high muzzle velocity, the railgun utilizes an 
electromagnetic force called the Lorentz Force to propel an electrically conductive 
projectile, which initially was a part of the electromagnetic path.  The current flowing 
through the rails sets up a magnetic field and the current through the projectile armature 
produces the Lorentz Force that results in the acceleration of the projectile along the rails. 
5.4.3.1 Theory 
A railgun consists of two parallel metal rails connected to an electrical 
power supply, and the circuit is complete when a conductive projectile is inserted 
between the rails.  The electrical current runs from the positive terminal of the power 
supply up the positive rail, across the projectile, and down the negative rail.  The flow of 
current makes the railgun act like an electromagnet, creating a powerful magnetic field in 
the region of the rails.  Since the current flows in opposite directions along each rail, the 
net magnetic field between the rails (B) is directed vertically.  In combination with the 
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current (I) flowing across the projectile, this produces a Lorentz Force that accelerates the 
projectile along the rails (Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25.  Schematic Diagram of the Working Principles of a Railgun  
(Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Railgun) 
5.4.3.2 Application 
Current research and development shows that it is possible to use a railgun 
in BMD.  However, this research is presently confined to the environment of the 
laboratory and no railgun has actually been fielded. 
Recent developments in electromagnetic launcher technology in 
Kirkcudbright, Scotland led to a claimed speed of Mach 7.5, with a range of 370 km.  In 
addition, the power requirement for each projectile fired was 15 ~ 30 MW and of great 
importance is the sustained firing rate at 6 ~ 16 rounds per minute.  This allows the firing 
of multiple projectiles to increase overall PH against the BM. 
The requirement of the electromagnetic (EM) gun for the U.S. Navy was 
drawn according to the specifications and requirements of long-range fire support for 
ground attack, as shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26.  Exploring the Possibilities of a Naval Electromagnetic Railgun  
(Adapted from the NDIA 38th Annual Gun, Ammunition, and Missiles Symposium, 2003) 
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However, in order to defeat the BM in the worst case scenario, the 
requirement and the capabilities for the railgun in BMD is as shown in Table 465.  The 
projectile would be miniaturized in order to achieve the higher speed, but would still be 
guided and steered toward the target in flight. 
Launch Velocity 10 km/s 
Range 4,400 km 
Flight Mass 2 kg 
Guidance Global Positioning System 
(GPS)/Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) 
Firing Rate 16 ~ 20 rounds per minute
Table 4.  Railgun Requirements to Meet Worst Case Scenario for BMD 
Interaction of a high-speed interceptor with the targeted BM causes  
high-shock transmission throughout the structure, catastrophic failure, and other 
degradation effects.  In addition, the higher energy impact causes adiabatic heating and 
ignition of flammable materials, thus creating an explosion and deflagration of stored 
ammunitions and fuel.  The high temperature would destroy any chemical or biological 
agents in the missile. 
5.4.3.3 Estimated Cost per Engagement 
According to the Technical Intelligence Bulletins,66 the future U.S. Navy 
railgun uses 5-7 gallons of fuel per launch.  The cost per launch of a projectile using a 
railgun is estimated to be $5K-$10K.  If a salvo of 6 shots were fired against the BMe, 
                                                 
65 Faculty Advisor’s Note:  There are four major technical challenge areas associated with the 
transition of the railgun to the fleet.  These are Barrel/Rail Life, Pulsed Power Management, Ship 
Integration, and Projectile Material and Guidance.  Barrel/Rail Life addresses the issues associated with 
developing a material lining system which can withstand the repeated multiple launches required by the 
BMD mission.  Pulsed Power Management encompasses the shipboard system required to store and deliver 
the significant amounts of pulsed power required for firing of the railgun.  Ship Integration issues include 
all of the ship design requirements associated with the railgun including EMI/EMP effects and heat 
rejection.  Projectile Material and Guidance addresses the significant challenges associated with 
Atmospheric heating and projectile guidance.  Creating a railgun with the parameters in Table 4 is not 
feasible given current technologies associated with the four major technical challenge areas, especially as 
they relate to system requirements for the firing rates, guidance, and top-end projectile velocities used in 
this study. 
66 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Technical Intelligence Bulletins, Vol. 7, No. 5,  
September-October 2002. 
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the cost would be $30K-$60K, which is still considerably lower than using a 
conventional missile. 
However, this cost only accounts for the launch of an inert projectile.  If 
guidance of the projectile is required, the cost of the projectile would increase.  In 
addition, development of the railgun would be considerable given that it is an  
immature technology. 
5.4.3.4 Feasibility of Guidance and Maneuverability in a  
Railgun-Launched Projectile 
A projectile launched using a railgun experiences very high Gs, with 
current projections for a planned U.S. Navy application having values exceeding 
45,000Gs, as listed in Figure 26.  Even though GPS/INS guidance units have been 
successfully tested to 28,000Gs, which is the G-force experienced in a conventional 
launch method, considerable development is necessary to attain accelerations needed for 
future implementation. 
Control surfaces or fins would provide the projectile limited 
maneuverability in the low atmosphere—and have no effect in the upper atmosphere or 
when exo-atmospheric.  The increase in speed would cause the turning radius of the 
projectile, or the maneuverability to decrease correspondingly.  Given the limitation of 
the maximum G-force the projectile can operate, a two-fold increase in the velocity 
would increase the turning radius of a steerable projectile by four. 
Due to the small mass of the projectile, future development on the 
complementing miniaturization of the GPS/INS units is needed.  In addition, the 
effectiveness and maneuverability of the control surfaces on a high-speed projectile needs 
to be further examined. 
5.4.3.5 Technological Challenges 
Due to the large current, friction, and high temperature produced during a 
launch, the rails undergo tremendous erosion.  Thus, the rails need to be structurally 
strong, conductive, and possess the properties to withstand erosion at very high 
temperature.  Current materials used in the railgun development are not durable and are 
often limited to a one shot per service interval. 
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The power supply must be able to deliver large currents.  Pulsed alternator 
technology could be used in the railgun, however, the technological challenge would be 
the synchronization of the multiple alternators during discharge.  This would require 
careful attention to the design of the pulsed power supply control system.  However, in 
order to defeat the BM in the worst case scenario, the approximate required capabilities 
for the railgun in BMD are listed in Table 4-167 and are compared to the Notional Navy 
EM Gun. 
 
Table 4-1.  Contrast of the SABR Railgun and the Notional Navy Railgun 
5.5 PHYSICAL MODELING 
Modeling of the BM threat and the interceptors is based on physical properties 
evolved through many different levels of detail, with the initial layer being pure ballistic 
trajectory based on Newtonian physics.  The System Model uses these initial calculations 
to provide a starting point for the Time of Flight (TOF) aspect of the interceptor’s 
engagement of the BM threat.  Of the physical models developed for this study, the BM 
threat model was the most challenging because it required the greatest degree of fidelity 
when it came to the physical modeling.  Once the BM threat model was completed, it was 
then modified to be used as an interceptor model. 
                                                 
67 Faculty Advisor’s Note:  Although the project parametric results examine alternate capabilities 
needed to meet the future threat, the report does not address the technological aspects of creating a 
physically feasible railgun to achieve the top-end performance that would be needed to meet the worst case 
scenarios used in the study. 
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The modeling of the trajectory for the threat missile and the railgun utilize 
physics-based modeling in spreadsheets to produce the desired results.  The models are 
purely deterministic and did not require anything more complicated than Microsoft Excel 
2003.  Microsoft Excel 2003 was also used to convert Latitude and Longitude 
Coordinates into XY-Cartesian Plane Coordinates since this can be accomplished through 
relatively simple trigonometric calculations.  The results of these high-resolution models 
were then transferred to the system model.  Extend version 6.0.6 was used to house the  
system model and simulate the various scenarios because of its capability with discrete 
events cueing. 
5.5.1 Initial Interceptor Time of Flight Inputs to System Model 
The key component for interceptor flight times was a time of flight correction 
based on a linear distance to the target and accounts for flight time along a ballistic 
trajectory.  For the Directed Energy and Particle Beam Alternatives, due to the near speed 
of light engagement of the intercept, the only correction needed was the time required to 
deposit enough energy to neutralize the target.  This correction was 2 seconds and  
-61 10×  seconds, respectively.  The Missile Alternative assumed thrust vector control and 
missile frame control surfaces to maintain a linear flight path toward intercept of the BM 
threat and no time correction was utilized.  Since the two previous assumptions cannot be 
made for a railgun round with no propulsion and traveling significantly slower than the 
speed of light, separate calculations were made to compensate for the actual ballistic 
flight time given a linear range and time solution to the target. 
Direct integration of an interceptor trajectory model as a fire control solution to a 
BM threat trajectory was not implemented during the course of modeling and simulation 
in this study.  Rather, a TOF correction factor was used to allow the system model to 
calculate the engagement parameters with a time of flight that was an accurate 
approximation of the actual TOF experienced by the railgun projectile. 
A railgun interceptor with an expected maximum effective range of 4,400 km was 
used in the system model.  To properly account for the TOF a simple trajectory was 
calculated based solely on Newtonian physics. 
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Ignoring all factors except velocity (v) and gravitational acceleration at the 
surface of the earth (go), the total flight time of the projectile, time to apex, down range 
and altitude positions were calculated.  The results were then used to calculate the needed 








































Since the maximum effective range is of interest, it can be assumed that this range 
is closely approximated by the range in the horizontal plane corresponding to the Ymax 
coordinate, and therefore, the TOF of interest is half the total TOF. 
g
V
t oy=  
This equation can now be used to find the X coordinate when apex is attained. 
g
V
VX oyoxapex *@ =  
When Vo=10 km/sec, ~30˚, the resulting (X,Y) position is (4.44, 1.30), in meters.  
This point is then converted into a range, in kilometers, from the origin (0, 0) and divided 
by Vo to yield the linear TOF, 0.463 sec.  The ballistic TOF under the same conditions to 
apex is 0.515 seconds.  The resulting TOF Correction Factor is 0.116 seconds per 
kilometer.  Therefore, in the system model the linear range to the target was multiplied by 
1.12 to approximate the flight time required by the projectile to intercept the target. 
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A two-sample, two-tailed z-Test for means of the actual ballistic trajectory flight 
time correction for a linear range compared to the simple linear range and time 
approximation has a resulting p-value of -12103.1042× .  Based on this analysis, there is 
no a significant difference in the calculated flight time correction and the initial 
correction used in the Extend system model at a confidence level near unity.  As a result, 
the original TOF correction was not changed in the system model to retain as much 
continuity as possible. 
5.5.2 Ballistic Missile (BM) Threat Model 
The modeling of the BM threat went through several stages.  After an analysis of 
the problem, it was decided to implement a deterministic model that modeled the 
trajectory from a given launch location to a predetermined target.  It was not deemed 
necessary to include varying weather conditions or attempt to model the possibility of 
mechanical failure in the threat missiles; conditions that could cause a failed launch or 
deviation in trajectory.  This was done both to reduce the complexity of the models in 
areas that were not as important to the final results and to give the adversary the benefit 
of a perfectly functioning missile system and optimal weather conditions.  After all, the 
project was to develop an interception system, not build a better threat missile.  This is 
admittedly unrealistic, but it does provide a worst-case scenario for the interceptors to 
deal with, which, in this case, was thought to be more important than absolute realism. 
Initially, the model was created by simply using the trajectory implied by basic 
Newtonian physics without taking the effects of air resistance, varying gravitational pull, 
or the curvature of the earth into account.  Needless to say, the results were not 
particularly close to those that were anticipated after consulting various published works 
or the Strategic and Theater Attack Modeling Process (STAMP) software, obtained in 
order to check the results. 
As this is a simple deterministic model, a spreadsheet was used to perform the 
described calculations.  The remainder of this chapter describes first the user-defined 
parameters, then the physical constants used, and finally, the actual equations used in  
the model. 
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The model used the parameters listed in Tables 5 and 6 to describe the  
threat model. 
 
Parameter Units Symbol Description
Total Mass kg Mt The total mass of the missile
Warhead Mass kg Mw The mass of only the warhead component
Propellant Mass kg Mp The mass of only the propellent
Dry Booster Mass kg Mb The remaining mass of the missile
Number of Stages # stg The number of stages
Burn Time sec tb The total time taken for the boost phase
BM Frame Height m Hf The height of the missile frame (no warhead)
BM Frame Diameter m Df The diameter  of the missile frame
Warhead Height m Hw The height of the warhead (cone)
Warhead Diameter m Dw The diameter of the base of the warhead
Theta deg θ Initial angle of launch
Divert Angle deg f Tip over angle
Divert Time sec td Time before tip over
Specific Impulse sec Isp Thrust per unit of propellant
m-dot kg/sec Mass flow rate of the missile propellant during boost phase
Number of Engines # eng The number of engines on each stage of the missile
Time Step sec ∆t The time step used in the calculations
Thrust Control # ∆Thrust Reduces thrust to simulate throttle control
Tip-over Rate radians ∆φ Change in Angle of Attack from control surfaces
m&
 
Table 5.  List of Threat Model Parameters 
 
Table 6.  List of Constants Used by Threat Model 
The following equations show how the threat missile’s trajectory was modeled to 
produce x and y coordinates for any given time assuming the missile parameters listed in 
Tables 5 and 6 have been entered.  The equations are given in this order, as many of them 
are dependent on the results of earlier equations in the sequence and would not make 
sense otherwise. 
Angle of Attack (AOA) 
 The AOA is set to the initial theta value (which was usually set to  
90 degrees) until the divert time, which simulated the initial tip over of the missile after it 
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has left the launcher.  Rather than attempt to model all of the forces acting on the missile 
that force it to slowly tip over as the missile passes the apex of its flight and begins its 
decent, the model takes a tip-over rate that, after the burn is finished, causes the AOA to 
continue to increase all the way up until impact.  This tip-over rate begins with a positive 
sign, becomes zero at the apex and then becomes more and more negative it descends.  
This approximation avoids a possible source of error where the lift force would remain 
positive even after the apex, when it should be negative as the airflow begins to push the 
warhead downwards. 
θ = φ + ∆φ  
Lift Coefficient (CL) and Drag Coefficient (CD) 
At hypersonic velocities, the lift and drag coefficients are found using the 
equations defined by hypersonic theory.68  Due to the rapid progression through the 
various stages of subsonic and supersonic velocities (<30 sec) the choice was made to 
only model the hypersonic effects and ignore the minor errors produced by not fully 
modeling this area.  The results of the simulations, when compared to validated models, 
bears out this assumption.  As shown in Figure 27, the first two equations show the 
calculation for lift and drag coefficient at hypersonic speeds.  The second two equations 
show the calculation of the angle of attack given the shape of the projectile. 
CL = 2sin2(α)cos(α) 








                                                 
68 Jeff Scott, “Hypersonic Theory,” online tutorial, http://www.aerospaceweb.org/design/waverider/ 
theory.shtml, 2000, accessed 20 April 2006. 
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Figure 27.  Graphical Representation of Angle of Attack Calculation 





α θ− ⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Gravitational Effect (gc) 
 Due to the high altitudes obtained by the BMs, it was deemed necessary to 
account for the reduction in the effects of gravity felt by the objects as they travel up out 
of the atmosphere.  This was found using the equation: 
gc = G * Me(Re + h)2 . 
In this equation, G, Me, and Re are constants and h is the current altitude of the missile. 
Acceleration Force (Fa) 
 The acceleration provided by the thrust of the engines is found by multiplying the 
effective force of gravity to the product of the flow rate, specific impulse, and number of 


















Since the threat missile selected for this project uses a solid fuel, the fuel flow rate can 
not be adjusted as in liquid fuel systems.  To achieve the same effect, vents are used in 
solid fuel rockets to reduce the chamber pressure and the resulting thrust exiting the 
nozzle.69  To account for this in the model, a mathematical throttle control was introduced 




















* ∆Thrust  
The total force on the rocket can be determined by 
Fa
' = (Fa * cos(aoa))2 + (Fa * sin(aoa) − ge )2 . 
Temperature (T) 
 To find the atmospheric temperature at various altitudes, the standard atmosphere 
model provided on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Website 
was used.  The atmosphere for the purposes of this model is divided into three layers and 
the temperatures are found in the following equations. 
( 25,000 ) 131.21 0.00299
(11,000 25,000 ) 56.46
( 11,000 ) 15.04 0.00649
h m T h
m h m T
h m T h
≥ = − +




 Rho is defined as the density of the fluid an object is passing through.  In air it is 
related to atmospheric pressure in the following way. 
ρ = P
0.2869* (T + 273.1)  
                                                 
69 Frederick S. Simmons, Rocket Exhaust Phenomenology, Aerospace Press Series, AIAA, 2000, 
Chapter 1. 
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To find the atmospheric pressure, the NASA Website was again utilized to obtain the 




273.1( 25,000 ) 2.2488*
216.6
(11,000 25,000 ) 22.65
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Lift Force (FL) and Drag Force (FD) 
 The lift and drag forces are found using the formulae given below.  Due to the 
limitations of the model, the previous time steps velocity and rho were used when 
calculating the forces for the current forces to avoid a circular reference in the code, but 
using a time step of one second caused the differences to be insignificant. 
FL = 12 * ρ *V
2 * CL * A
 
 
FD = 12 * ρ *V
2 * CD * A
 
Here the variable A is the cross-sectional area of the warhead found using the following 
formula for the surface area of a cone (without the base): 
A = (π * r) r + r2 + h2( ) 
Missile Mass (Mc) 
 The mass of the missile is not constant.  During the boost phase, the propellant is 
being used at a given amount as captured in the parameter mdot ( m
•
).  Once the boost 
phase is complete, then the mass becomes constant for the rest of flight.  The model 
assumes that the threat missile is a single-stage missile with no boosters being used. 
MC = Mt − (m
•
* t)
MC = Mt − M p
 
Total Force Acting on Missile (Ft) 
 The total force acting on the missile at any time is the magnitude of its two 
component forces. 
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Ft = Fx2 + Fy2  
These component forces are found by adding the forces resulting from the thrust provided 
by the missile engine(s), the lifting and dragging forces, and in the case of the y 
component, the effective force of gravity. 




⎠ ⎟ − FD *cos(aoa)




⎠ ⎟ − FD *sin(aoa) 
Once the boost phase is complete, the acceleration forces become zero and the remaining 
forces acting on the missiles are shown below. 




⎠ ⎟ − FD *cos(aoa)




⎠ ⎟ − FD *sin(aoa)  
Velocity (V) 
 The current velocity is found by adding the product of the current forces acting on 
the missile and the time step divided by the current mass of the missile.  The component 
velocities are then the velocity multiplied by the cosine or sine of the missile’s angle of 
attack for the x and y components, respectively.  The AOA is used in order to 
approximate the direction of travel for the missile at any given time. 
V = V(t−1) + Ft * ∆tMc  
 
Vxa = V *cos(aoa)
Vya = V *sin(aoa)  
Location 
 The current location of the missile is then calculated in the x-y plane by 
modifying the previous (or initial) position by adding the component velocity multiplied 
by the time step.  For the y direction, the curvature of the earth is taken into account by 
adding a constant value for every meter traveled in the x direction, Table 6. 
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x = x(t−1) + Vxa *∆t
y = y(t−1) + Vya *∆t + ∆c *∆x
∆x = x − x(t−1)( )  
This information is then taken and provided to the other models to determine the 
necessary placement of interceptor platforms and interceptor capabilities requirements. 
The following possible sources of error have been identified: 
• The AOA calculation is an approximation, as the actual physical 
characteristics of the missile and warhead beyond the height and diameter 
are not readily available especially for an unclassified document. 
• The lift and drag forces are only modeled using hypersonic velocities 
since it takes a very short period of time to move through subsonic, 
transonic, and supersonic velocities and the differences were  
considered insignificant. 
After taking these factors into account, the results were, on average, within 0.05% 
of the expected impact range given by STAMP for the 1,000 km-3,000 km range  
(Figure 28).  The apex and ratio between apex and impact range were also compared to 
ensure that the missile path was correct.  The apex calculations were within 0.13% of the 
expected values and the ratios were within 0.15%.  This shows that the model is at least 
functionally correct for the ranges of interest.  STAMP was used to validate the model 
because it was originally used by the MDA to model BM threats.  The program remains 
technically correct and was available for use in validating the threat model.  The 
fundamental software does not require the extra system integration features provided by  
its successor to be used. 
Given that the overall system is a conceptual model and not being proposed for 
production, the basic threat model as developed here is sufficient to be used as inputs for 
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Figure 28.  Comparison of Threat Model and STAMP Trajectories 
5.5.3 Latitude and Longitude Inputs to Physical Model 
Once the refined BM threat model was completed, a method to place the points of 
interest into a usable grid was needed to enable modeling a scenario in any given region 
of the world.  Since latitude and longitude coordinates are a universally known coordinate 
system, they were used to designate launch sites, target sites, and ship positions (or other 
defensive sites). 
If the earth could be considered flat, the difficulty in creating a planar coordinate 
system would be negligible.  A tool was developed to transform a spherical coordinate 
system, such as latitude and longitude, into an XY-Cartesian plane coordinate system.  
Latitude and longitude positions given in the degree, minute, second format need to be 
converted into a decimal form to be used by the model.70 
360060
SecondMinuteDegreereeDecimalDeg ++=  
                                                 
70 Anthony P. Kirvan, 1997, Latitude/Longitude, NCGIA Core Curriculum in GIScience, 
http://www.ncgia.ucsb.edu/giscc/units/u014/u014.html, posted 14 April 2006. 
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The following formula is used to provide great circle ranges in kilometers from a 
given reference point to an arbitrary point in the system.  This aligns the calculated grid 
to identify relationships between each point and the selected reference point. 
[ ] 325.111*))cos(*)cos(*)(cos())sin(*)(sin(cos 2121211 longlonglatlatlatlatD −+= −  
Although parallels of latitude decrease in length with increasing latitude, the variation is 
only 1.13 kilometers from the equator to the poles; the standard figure of  
111.325 kilometers per degree of latitude can, therefore, be used. 
The length in kilometers for a degree of longitude is not quite as simple.  It is, 
however, a function of latitude.  The relationship can be defined as 
/ deg deg111.325[cos( )]km ree reeLongitude latitude= .71 
This relationship, however, is only valid when the path of travel remains on the 
same line of latitude.  This restriction is not acceptable for modeling paths of travel that 
transcend lines of latitude and lines of longitude.  In order to account for the changing 
length of a degree of longitude as the path of travel also crosses lines of latitude, the 
relationship between one degree of latitude and length of longitude was explored and 
identified (Figure 29).  The equation y = 0.0002x2 - 0.0408x + 0.0676, yields an  
R2 of 0.9993 and therefore used in the calculation of the longitude portion of the  
XY-Cartesian coordinate based on the degree of latitude.  The resulting equations used to 


















                                                 
71 Anthony P. Kirvan, 1997, Latitude/Longitude, NCGIA Core Curriculum in GIScience, 
http://www.ncgia.ucsb.edu/giscc/units/u014/u014.html, posted 14 April 2006. 
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Figure 29.  Kilometers of Longitude Lost per Degree of Latitude Crossed 
This graph describes the relationship between the latitude and the kilometers that 
make up any particular degree of longitude. 
Table 7 shows the Geographic Input Table used to enter the latitude and longitude 
coordinates of up to 6 launch sites, 12 target sites, and 3 ship sites.  The reference site is 
selected by a drop-down menu tied to the launch site table.  The use of the reference site 
enables the model to set the origin of the XY-Cartesian Plane.  Due to the inherent error 
incurred by converting an ellipsoid coordinate system to a planar coordinate system, the 
reference site that yielded minimal error in conversion was used. 
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Table 7.  Physical Model Geographic Input Table 
Table 8 shows the result of the conversion of latitude and longitude coordinates to 
an XY-Cartesian plane coordinate system.  These calculated values were used in the 
model to plot the BM trajectory from launch through impact. 
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Table 8.  Latitude and Longitude to Cartesian Plane Conversion Table 
Validation of the ranges resulting from the method used to assign XY-Cartesian 
coordinates of the entered positions were then compared to the great circle ranges 
calculated directly from the latitude and longitudes of the entered coordinates.  Referring 
to Figures 30 and 31, no significant difference was found at a 95% confidence level and 




Figure 30.  Auto Grid vs. Great Circle Range Differences 
 
Figure 31.  Statistical Results from Auto Grid vs. Great Circle Comparisons 
5.5.4 Railgun Interceptor Model 
The BM threat model was used as the primary input to the railgun interceptor 
model.  To that end, many of the equations listed in Section 5.5.3 were used for the 
interceptor model.  The primary difference between the models is the need for boost 
calculations and the integral velocities and forces acting on a BM during boost.  The 
railgun interceptor does not have this requirement and the input of a muzzle velocity 
replaced the launch angle, tip-over, and boost aspects of the BM threat model.  The 




Table 9.  List of Constants Used by the Interceptor Model 
The following equations show how the round’s trajectory was modeled to produce 
x and y coordinates for any given time assuming the railgun parameters in Table 9 have 
been entered.  As in the BM threat model, the equations are given in this order as many of 
them are dependent on the results of earlier equations in the sequence and would not 
make sense otherwise.  For the purposes of the railgun interceptor model, only the aspects 
that are different than those in the BM threat model will be discussed. 
Angle of Attack (AOA) 
The AOA is set to the initial theta value. 
Lift Coefficient (CL) and Drag Coefficient (CD) 
At hypersonic velocities the lift and drag coefficients are found using equations 
defined in hypersonic theory.72  Due to the muzzle velocity of 10 km/sec, hypersonic 
effects were modeled in this area. 
CL = 2sin2(α)cos(α) 
CD = 2sin3(α) 
For the railgun projectile, α is similar to the αnose in Section 5.5.2. 
2




α θ− ⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Total Force Acting on Missile (Ft) 
 The total force acting on the round at any time is the magnitude of its two 
component forces. 
Ft = Fx2 + Fy2  
These component forces are found by adding the forces resulting from the launch, the 
lifting and dragging forces, and in the case of the y component, the effective force of 
                                                 
72 Jeff Scott, “Hypersonic Theory,” http://www.aerospaceweb.org/design/waverider/theory.shtml, 
2000, accessed 20 April 2006. 
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gravity.  Since there is no acceleration after launch, the actual velocity of the projectile 
was used to compute an equivalent Fa in order to calculate the forces in the total forces 
component planes. 
t




















This information is then taken and provided to the other models to determine necessary 
placement of interceptor platforms and interceptor capabilities requirements. 
The following possible source of error has been identified: 
• The AOA is set to the initial angle at the time of launch.  The actual 
physical characteristics of the projectile beyond the height and diameter 
are not readily available since this is a conceptual design so further 
modeling is not possible without extensive guesswork.  Incorporating 
effects of control surfaces or utilizing actual wind effects would yield 
more accurate results. 
Given that the overall system is a conceptual model and not being proposed for 
production, the basic railgun interceptor model as developed here is sufficient to be used 
as inputs for the platform and interceptor models that are the actual focus of the project. 
5.5.5 Interceptor Time of Flight (TOF) Inputs to the System Model 
Once the refined trajectory models were completed, the TOF correction value was 
revisited to determine if its accuracy was sufficient for the modeling or if it needed to be 
changed.  Figure 32 shows the comparison of the initial TOF calculation and correction 
factor versus the refined models results.  The time correction factor shown for the refined 
model was obtained by using Microsoft Excel’s Data Table functionality to vary the 
launch angle at 0.1˚ increments from 1.0˚ to 45.0˚ and recording the apex altitude,  
x-coordinate at apex, and the TOF to apex.  The time per kilometer value was obtained 
for each line item by dividing the range by the flight time.  The resulting value for each 
line item was then averaged, mean=0.1089, and statistically compared to the earlier 
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correction factor of 0.1116.  The results are also listed in Figure 32.  With a resulting  
P-value < alpha (which is the default 0.05 in this case) the null hypothesis of equal means 
is rejected, resulting in support of the alternative hypothesis of unequal means, so the 







time of flight (tof) t=(2*Voy)/g 1029.03 sec
apex =tof/2 t=Voy/g 514.52 sec
X=Vox*t 4443219 meters 4443.219 km
Ymax=(Voy^2)/(2*g) 1297164 meters 1297.164 km
Linear Approximation
Vo 10000 m/sec





Expected Max Effective Range 4400 km
Newtonian-Linear Adjustment: 0.1116 sec/km
Actual Adjustment: 0.1089 sec/km
z-Test: Two Sample for Means
Calculated Linear-adjusted
Mean 0.1089 0.1116
Known Variance 6.40E-05 5.18E-17
Observations 441 44
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
z -6.9729
P(Z<=z) one-tail 1.5521E-12
z Critical one-tail 1.6449
P(Z<=z) two-tail 3.1042E-12
z Critical two-tail 1.9600
2 Sample unpaired t-Test w/unequal Variance
P(T<=t) 4.0819E-11
 
Figure 32.  Statistical Comparison of Ballistic and Known Flight Times 
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5.6 PRELIMINARY DATA 
5.6.1 Preliminary System Model 
 The preliminary system model is a discrete event model that was used for the 
purpose of choosing the best architecture or eliminating possible architectures.  A 
discrete event model was used because the detect to engage sequence is quantified by a 
series of events.  Although the model does not completely mimic reality, it provides a 
good approximation for the purposes of this project.  Faults can be found with any model 
and there is always going to be a tradeoff between complexity and how much added 
insight it provides.  There are six versions of this model that have small differences from 
model to model.  The six different models represent the six different architectures that 
were investigated.  The scenarios did not change the actual models, just the inputs.  
Figure 32-1 shows an overview of the preliminary system model.  Decision variables are 
the various architectures the SABR team evaluated.  There were no direct environmental 
factors in the model.  However, system performance was varied to account for the 
environmental factors of three scenarios. 
 
Figure 32-1.  Preliminary System Model General Overview 
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5.6.1.1 Inputs 
  Figure 33 shows the block diagram of the overall integrated model.  As 
can be seen from the diagram, the system model receives inputs from the BM threat 
model and utilizes these inputs during the detect to engage sequence.  The system model 
also receives inputs through the notebook feature in Extend.  These inputs represent 
various sensor and interceptor inputs.  Inputs are broken into three major categories:  
threat model, commit stage, and interceptor.  Commit stage is further broken down into 
organic and nonorganic inputs.  The system model receives all of these inputs to simulate 
a ship’s anti-ballistic missile response. 




















Engagement Battle Damage Assessment
Trajectory Data
 
Figure 33.  Integrated Models Block Diagram 
5.6.1.1.1 Threat Model Inputs.  The threat model used  
Microsoft Excel to calculate the trajectories of a BM from three launch sites to six 
targets.  From the calculations, the missile’s three-dimensional position is calculated for 
every second of missile flight.  The missile’s x, y, and z coordinates are in a table where 
Extend can obtain this information using “Data Receive” blocks.  The x, y, and z 
positions of the missile are assigned to each object in Extend as attributes that are 
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updated at various points throughout the model.  Another major input from the  
threat model is the time to end of midcourse.  This input is assigned as an attribute and 
used in “Decision Blocks” to determine when to hand off the missile to another asset. 
5.6.1.1.2 Commit Stage Inputs.  As per the design reference 
mission profile, inputs were divided into three different categories:  best case, most 
likely, and worst case.  The best case inputs are the optimum settings where all 
subsystems and components are functioning perfectly.  Most likely has some delays 
assigned due to normal situations and events.  Worst case settings are those when some 
systems or components are not functioning or are in a highly degraded state.  The inputs 
were, for the most part, time delays.  Rates were minimally used.  Probabilities of 
detection and missed detection were also utilized. 
Nonorganic Characteristics 
Nonorganic inputs are the systems outside of the SABR platform.  For the most 
part, they were attributed to satellite detection times, rates, and probabilities.  Inputs that 
were not affected were the number of tracks that can be detected or held in the system.  
Delay times were accounted for due to system overload, weather, and communication 
delays.  Table 10 shows the nonorganic inputs used for the various scenarios. 
 Best Case Most Likely Worst Case 
Model Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
P(Sat Missed Detection) 0.01 Batch size=1 0.15 Batch size=1 0.3 Batch size=1
Sat Sweep Rate 6 1 8 1 10 2 
Detection Delay for Satellite 0.5 0.4 3 0.5 10 2 
Max Target Detected at a time (Sat only) 100 Constant 100 Constant 100 Constant 
Processing Delay for Sat 0.001 0.0001 1 0.5 3 1 
Max Processed at a time (Sat only) 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Communications Delay for Sat 0.001 0.0001 1 0.02 2 0.1 
Max detection simultaneously 
communicated by Sat only 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Table 10.  Nonorganic Asset Preliminary Model Inputs 
Organic Characteristics 
Organic inputs are those related to systems that are inside of the SABR platform.  
Two systems were evaluated.  The multifunctional phased array was evaluated by itself.  
The next architecture that was evaluated was the phased array working in conjunction 
with the skin of the ship conformable radar.  Attributes that were affected for each 
scenario were delay times for the system and probabilities.  Many of the attributes 
remained constant for all three modeling scenarios.  To keep the preliminary models 
97 
simple, radar ranges were not how far the radar can detect.  The ranges are how far the 
detection platform was from the launch site.  It was kept this way to simplify future 
model refinement.  Organic inputs used for all scenarios for the PASR are shown in  
Table 11.  SOTSR inputs are shown in Table 12. 
 Best Case Most Likely Worst Case 
Model Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Ship Detection Range (km) 500 Constant 625 Constant 750 Constant 
Detection Height 13.86 Constant 21.92 Constant 31.81 Constant 
P(Sensor System Detection) 0.95 Batch size=1 0.9 Batch size=1 0.85 Batch size=1 
Sweep Rate for System 10 5 12 6 15 6 
P(False Alarm) 0.02 Batch size=1 0.02 Batch size=1 0.02 Batch size=1 
Detection Delay for Ship 2 1 4 1 8 2 
Max targets simultaneously detected 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Processing Delay for System 0.01 0.0001 1 0.2 2 0.5 
Max targets processed at a time 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Tracking Stage Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
P(keeping track) 0.95 Batch size=1 0.9 Batch size=1 0.9 Batch size=1 
Time to reacquire track 5 2 6 2 7 2 
Tracking Delay 1 0.1 2 0.5 3 0.7 
Max Simultaneous Tracks 1,000 Constant 1000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Track Processing Delay 0.001 0.0001 1 0.5 2 0.5 
Max Simultaneous Tracks Processed 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Communicate Tracks Delay 0.001 0.0001 1 0.5 2 0.5 
Max Tracks Communicated at Once 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Identification Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Identification Delay 2 0.5 4 0.5 6 1 
Max Targets Simultaneously Identified 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Threat Evaluation Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Priority 1% to MC 80 Constant 80 Constant 80 Constant 
Priority 2% to MC 60 Constant 60 Constant 60 Constant 
Priority 3% to MC 40 Constant 40 Constant 40 Constant 
Priority 4% to MC 20 Constant 20 Constant 20 Constant 
Threat Evaluation Delay 5 1 6 1 7 1.5 
Weapons Pairing Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Delay for Weapons Pairing 1.5 0.2 2.5 0.4 3.5 0.6 
Max Targets Paired at a Time 1 Constant 1 Constant 1 Constant 
BDA Stage Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Time to Conduct BDA 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 
Max Simultaneous BDA 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Prob. Good BDA 0.9 Batch size=1 0.9 Batch size=1 0.9 Batch size=1 
Table 11.  Phased Array Radar Preliminary Model Inputs 
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 Best Case Most Likely Worst Case 
Model Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Ship Detection Range (km) 1,000 Constant 1,500 Constant 2,000 Constant 
Detection Height 92 Constant 120 Constant 150 Constant 
P(Sensor System Detection) 0.95 Batch size=1 0.9 Batch size=1 0.85 Batch size=1 
Sweep Rate for System 10 5 12 6 15 6
P(False Alarm) 0.02 Batch size=1 0.02 Batch size=1 0.02 Batch size=1 
Detection Delay for Ship 2 1 4 1 8 2
Max targets simultaneously detected 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Processing Delay for system 0.01 0.0001 1 0.2 2 0.5
Max targets processed at a time 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Tracking Stage Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
P(keeping track) 0.95 Batch size=1 0.9 Batch size=1 0.9 Batch size=1 
Time to reacquire track 5 2 6 2 7 2
Tracking Delay 1 0.1 2 0.5 3 0.7
Max Simultaneous Tracks 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Track Processing Delay 0.001 0.0001 1 0.5 2 0.5
Max Simultaneous Tracks Processed 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Communicate Tracks Delay 0.001 0.0001 1 0.5 2 0.5
Max Tracks Communicated at Once 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Identification Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Identification Delay 2 0.5 4 0.5 6 1
Max Targets Simultaneously Identified 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Threat Evaluation Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Priority 1% to MC 80 Constant 80 Constant 80 Constant 
Priority 2% to MC 60 Constant 60 Constant 60 Constant 
Priority 3% to MC 40 Constant 40 Constant 40 Constant 
Priority 4% to MC 20 Constant 20 Constant 20 Constant 
Threat Evaluation Delay 5 1 6 1 7 1.5
Weapons Pairing Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Delay for Weapons Pairing 1.5 0.2 2.5 0.4 3.5 0.6
Max Targets Paired at a Time 1 Constant 1 Constant 1 Constant 
BDA Stage Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Time to Conduct BDA 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01
Max Simultaneous BDA 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 1,000 Constant 
Prob. Good BDA 0.9 Batch size=1 0.9 Batch size=1 0.9 Batch size=1 
Table 12.  Skin of the Ship Radar Preliminary Model Inputs 
Radar detection heights were calculated using the equation 
2121 **3/8**3/8 hRhRRR EarthEarth +=+ ,73 substituting RMS (Range from Launch 












                                                 
73 Robert Harney, Combat Systems, Vol. 1, pp. 107-108. 
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Interceptor Inputs 
For the initial round of simulations, the interceptor inputs were kept very basic.  
Forecasted, nominal values were used for the probability of kill for all interceptors.  A 
time correction factor was added to the model.  This factor accounts for the time a laser 
must be held on target to achieve a kill.  For the railgun, it accounts for the ballistic 
trajectory.  An assumption was made that the missile’s control surfaces allowed it to fly a 
linear path so its time correction factor remained 1.  The maximum engagement range did 
not change for the missile and railgun.  However, to account for the increased attenuation 
from the weather in the most likely and worst case scenarios, the laser engagement range 
and height were both degraded.  Table 13 shows the model inputs used for the  
three scenarios. 
    Best Case Most Likely Stressed 



















DE/Particle Beam 270,000 km/s Add 10^-6 seconds 0.95 500 200 400 200 300 200 
DE/Free Electron 300,000 km/s Add 2 seconds 0.9 500 2,000 400 1,800 300 1,600 
Missile 6 km/s Multiply by 1 second 0.8 1,800 750 1,800 750 1,800 750 
Missile 8 km/s Multiply by 1 second 0.8 2,400 1,000 2,400 1,000 2,400 1,000 
Railgun 8 km/s Multiply by 1 second 0.8 2,200 1,000 2,200 1,000 2,200 1,000 
Railgun 10 km/s Multiply by 1.12 second 0.8 4,400 2,000 4,400 2,000 4,400 2,000 
Table 13.  Interceptor Preliminary Model Inputs 
5.6.1.2 Programs Used 
Modeling and simulation were performed using two different programs 
that were linked.  Microsoft Excel was used to calculate the ballistic missile trajectories.  
The system model was created using Extend Version 6.0.  The system model was linked 
to three separate Excel workbooks, one for each launch site, each containing six 
worksheets, one per target.  The BM trajectories were used as inputs to the system model.  
Microsoft Excel was also used to record the outputs from the system model.  Extend sent 
various data to the Excel worksheets using “Data Send” blocks. 
5.6.1.3 Subcomponents 
 The main components of the entire system model are hierarchical blocks 
representing launch sites and the detect to engage sequence plus BDA.  All of these 
blocks will be discussed in detail.  Other components that can be seen in the highest level 
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of the model are various “Data Send” blocks, system variable blocks, “Exit” blocks, and 
attribute blocks.  Together, all of these blocks simulate a single ship performing BMD 
against three total launch sites and a varying number of missiles.  Figure 34 shows the 
left half of the system model overview. 
 
Figure 34.  Extend Preliminary Model Overview Left Half 
The first block in the top left corner of the model is an “Executive” block.  
One “Executive” block must be used for a discrete event model to act as a controller that 
allows the simulation to be ended at a set time or after a preset number of events.  The 
blocks in the lower left corner are both “System Variable” blocks.  One of these blocks 
inputs the system variable “CurrentTime,” which is the current simulation time.  The 
other block inputs the system variable “CurrentRun,” which is the run number, which the 
simulation is currently going through.  Both of these variables are used in various 
calculations throughout the model. 
The next blocks in the simulation are “Launch Site” hierarchical blocks.  
There are three of these blocks, one representing each BM launch that was used for 
preliminary simulation.  The blocks sent items into the system that have various attributes 
based on launch site and target.  Once the items (missiles) enter the system they are 
combined to a single path using a “Combine (5)” block.  Once the missiles are combined 
to a single path, they pass through a “Count Items” block.  This block is used to count the 
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number of missiles used for the simulation.  This data is passed to an Excel spreadsheet 
using a “Data Send” block.  The value of the “Count Items” block is passed to the 
connection name “Missiles” and is used in the calculation for the column number to send 
the data from the “Data Send” blocks for both launch site and target.  These blocks are 
both at the top of Figure 34.  The system variable “Current Run” is used to determine the 
proper column to which to send the data for launch site and target.  The calculations to 
determine the proper row and column can be seen in the top of Figure 34.  They are 
performed using system variables and constants as inputs to “Add” and “Multiply” 
blocks.  The values sent to the Excel spreadsheet come from the “Get Attribute” blocks 
that follow the “Count Items” block.  The first of these blocks contains the attribute 
“LaunchSite,” which is passed to the “Data Send” block using a named connection.  The 
second block passes the attribute “Target” to the “Data Send” block labeled “Target.” 
The next block in sequence is a “Set Attributes (5)” block.  This block 
receives inputs from two “Input Random Number” blocks.  The “Input Random Number” 
blocks both select an input from a real, uniform distribution.  The numbers used for each 
of these distributions are based on a “steaming box” for the ship of 50 NM by 50 NM on 
the same grid used for launch site and target positions.  The “Set Attributes (5)” block 
assigns the attributes “ShipX” and “ShipY,” which are the x and y positions of the ship, 
respectively.  These attributes remain constant throughout the simulation because the 
ship’s movement relative to the movement of a BM was assumed to be irrelevant.  Once 
the items pass through the “Set Attributes (5)” block, they enter the “Detection” 
hierarchical block.  There are two exits from the “Detection” block.  One passes items 
through a “Count Items” block to the tracking hierarchical block.  The other sends 
nondetections to an “Exit” block.  The number of items that exit through this block are 
sent to the output Excel sheet using a “Data Send” block and are considered leakers.  The 
“Count Items” block is used to count the number of detections and is connected to a 
“Data Send” block to send the number of detections for each run to a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet. 
The right half of the preliminary model overview is depicted in Figure 35.  
The flow of items through this section is fairly simple.  “CurrentTime” is used in all of 
the hierarchical blocks for various calculations.  Items first enter the “Tracking” 
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hierarchical block.  The “Tracking” block has two exits: one for successful tracks and one 
for handoffs.  A handoff is determined using the attribute “TimetoEndofMC” and a 
decision block and can occur in any block from “Tracking” to “BDA.”  All handoffs from 
these hierarchical blocks are combined to a single path using a “Combine (5)” block and 
a “Combine” block which leads to an “Exit” block.  The number of items that enter this 
“Exit” block are sent to the output spreadsheet using a “Data Send” block.  If an item is 
not deemed a hand off while inside the tracking block, it is passed to the “Identification” 
hierarchical block.  The flow of items continues like this up to the “Engage” block.  The 
“Engage” block has three exits.  One exit is for handoffs.  The other two exits are for the 
results of engagements as determined in the “Engage” hierarchical block.  After the 
engagement block, the missiles pass through the “BDA” hierarchical block where they 
are either passed through to an exit, exit the system as handoffs, or are thrown back to the 
system using a “Throw” block. 
 
























Figure 35.  Extend Preliminary Model Overview Right Half 
Figures 36 and 37 are both from the dialog of a “Data Send” block.   
Figure 35 shows the “Data Send” tab.  As it can be seen from the dialog, the data is being 
sent to the Excel file titled “Bestscenario.PASR.railgun.eval.xls.”  This sheet was used 
for all scenarios involving the railgun and renamed after the data for each architecture 
scenario was recorded.  The second dialog shows the advanced settings tab.  As shown in 
Figure 37, the value was sent to Excel only at the end of each run to improve the speed of 
processing each run.  Also, the row the data was sent to was incremented every run 
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because neither the run nor column connector were connected.  The only exceptions to 
these settings are the “Data Send” blocks for launch site and target.  These variables 
required a separate calculation to be made and the data to be sent immediately since 
multiple numbers were sent during each run. 
 
Figure 36.  Extend Preliminary Model Sample Data Send Block Dialog 
 
Figure 37.  Extend Preliminary Model Sample Data Send Block Dialog, Advanced Tab 
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5.6.1.3.1 Launch Site Hierarchical Blocks.  For the preliminary 
system model there are three “Launch Site” blocks to account for the three launch sites 
used.  The purpose of the “Launch Site” blocks is to insert items (missiles) into the 
system and randomly assign them a target.  Figure 38 shows an overview of a  
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Figure 38.  Extend Preliminary Model Launch Site Hierarchical Block 
Items enter the system from the “Program” block.  The number of 
missiles from the “Program” blocks varied with the three different scenarios.  The only 
limitation of the block is that the missiles had to be launched at slightly different times or 
else they would all be assigned to the same target.  After the initial launch, the missiles 
are assigned the attribute “LaunchTime” using the system variable “CurrentTime.”  
“LaunchTime” is used to hold the time each individual missile is launched so this value 
can be used throughout the system model.  Once a missile has been assigned its 
“LaunchTime,” it passes through a series of “Select DE Output” blocks to establish the 
target toward which that particular missile is fired.  For the preliminary system model, all 
targets had equal probability.  Once the target is determined, the missiles are passed to 
the “Impact Site” hierarchical block that corresponds to that target.  The “Impact Site” 
blocks inside the “Launch Site” blocks are slightly different than the one depicted in 
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Figure 34.  They have one additional block that sets the attribute “Target” that is later 
used to send the missiles to the proper “Impact Site” hierarchical block.  After being 
assigned the proper “Target” attribute and passing through the “Impact Site” block, the 
missiles are recombined into a single path and exit the “Launch Site” block. 
Impact Sites Hierarchical Block 
There are a total of 18 different “Impact Site” blocks.  Each launch 
site/impact site block has a unique block.  The purpose of the “Impact Site” blocks is to 
update the position of the missile based on the attribute “FlightTime.”  “Impact Site” 
blocks are located throughout the model, anywhere the missile position needs to be 






























Figure 39.  Extend Preliminary Model Impact Site Hierarchical Block 
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The first block in the “Impact Site” Block is a get attribute block that pulls out the 
attribute “FlightTime.”  The value of this attribute is then added to the constant 39 
because in the Excel sheets, the data for the missile’s position starts in row 39.  After 
“FlightTime” is added to 39, the number is rounded to the nearest whole number 
automatically by the “Data Receive” blocks because there are only integer rows within 
Microsoft Excel.  The column connector for each “Data Receive” block, other than the 
“TimetoEndofMC” block, tells the “Data Receive” block in which column to look.  The 
“TimetoEndofMC Data Receive” block has the row and column inside the block since 
both remain constant throughout the entire time of flight of the missile.  A sample  
“Data Receive” block dialog is shown in Figure 40.  As can be seen from the dialog, the 
block is pulling data from the file “BM Launch Site 1.xls” and the worksheet  
“Impact Site 1.”  The file contains six separate worksheets for the corresponding six 
trajectories from launch site 1.  Also shown in the dialog is the row and column from 
where the data came.  The last time data was pulled from this sheet it came from row 79, 
column 19.  Once the data is pulled from the Excel worksheets, it is assigned as attributes 
using a “Set Attributes (5)” block.  After the attributes are set, the items are passed back 
to the hierarchical level above the “Impact Site” block. 
 
Figure 40.  Extend Preliminary Model Sample Data Receive Block 
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5.6.1.3.2 Detection Hierarchical Block.  The “Detection” 
hierarchical block receives items after they enter the system from the “Launch Site” 
hierarchical blocks.  The purpose of this block is to model the time delays, radar range 























































Figure 41.  Extend Preliminary Model Detection Hierarchical Block Left Third 
The first input to the “Detection” hierarchical block is missile 
launches.  This input consists of the items that represent missiles.  The other input is the 
system variable “CurrentTime,” which is used for various calculations and decisions.  
Once the items enter the “Detection” block, they pass through a “Select DE Output” 
block.  This block splits the items between two paths based on the probability of false 
alarm.  Items that are deemed false alarms based on the probability exit the “Select DE 
Output” block through output “a.”  These items pass through a “Set Attribute” block that 
sets the attribute “False Alarm” to 1.  Once this attribute is set, the items are combined 
using a “Combine” block.  After the combine block, the items pass through a  
“Get Attribute” block to retrieve the value of “False Alarm.”  This value is then passed to 
a “Decision (2)” block.  The “Decision (2)” block uses the attribute “False Alarm” to 
108 
determine which path to pass items through.  Items that are deemed false alarms are 
passed to the “NoPath.”  These items then go through an “Activity” block to delay the 
system.  These items then exit the system and the number is sent to the output data sheet.  
After the “Decision (2)” block, there is a combine block.  This block joins the items from 
the “Decision (2)” block and items that pass through the loop for items that are not 
detected.  This other path can be seen at the top of Figure 41.  This path consists of a 
“Queue” block and an “Activity” block connected to a “Input Random Number” block.  
The “Activity” block represents the satellite’s sweep rate.  The input to the block is a 
normal distribution.  The mean and standard deviation of this block were varied  
with scenario. 
The next block in the linear sequence is a “BM Trajectories” 
hierarchical block.  After the “BM Trajectories” block is a “DE Equation” block.  This 
“DE Equation” block is shown in Figure 42.  As can be seen in the figure, it is calculating 
“ShipRange,” which is the distance from the ship to the missile, and assigning it as an 
attribute.  The range is calculated using Pythagorean’s theorem, assuming a linear path to 
the missile. 
 
Figure 42.  Extend Preliminary Model Range to Missile Calculation 
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After the range is calculated, the items pass through a  
“Get Attribute” block.  This block gets the value of the attribute “Zposition,” which is the 
height of the BM as calculated in the threat trajectory spreadsheets.  After the  
“Get Attribute” block, the items are passed to a “Decision (2)” block.  This  
“Decision (2)” block is shown on the right side of Figure 41 and the left side of  
Figure 44.  This block determines whether the missile is within range of the ship’s 
sensors or just the satellites.  Inputs to this block include the range from the ship to the 
missile, height of the missile, maximum range, and detection height.  Maximum range is 
based on the type of radar and scenario.  Detection height is a constant based on using the 
radar range equation, at maximum range.  If the missile is above the detection height and 
within the detection range it is passed to the ship’s sensors.  Otherwise, it is sent to the 
satellites to be detected.  The dialog for the “Decision (2)” block for the sensor system is 
shown in Figure 43. 
 













































































































Figure 44.  Extend Preliminary Model Detection Hierarchical Block Middle Third 
The flow of items after the “Decision (2)” block is shown in  
Figure 44.  As seen Figure 44, items that leave through the “Yes” path of the “Decision” 
block are passed to a “Select DE Output” block.  This block determines whether the 
missile is detected by the satellites.  It is based on the probability of a missed detection by 
the satellites.  If an item is missed, it enters the loop that is shown in Figure 41, where it 
is delayed by the satellite’s sweep rate.  Once it is delays, it reenters the flow of items via 
a “Combine” block.  If the missile is detected, it is passed to a “Queue FIFO” block 
before being passed to an “Activity, Multiple” block where time is increased based on the 
detection delay for the satellite.  After the block is delayed, it enters a “DE Equation” 
block that determines the time from launch to detection for the satellite system and sends 
the results to a “Mean & Variance” block.  This block calculates the mean satellite 
detection time and sends it to the data output sheet.  The item then enters another  
“Queue FIFO” block before it goes through an “Activity, Multiple” block.  This block 
delays the item to simulate the delay that would occur while the satellite is processing the 
detection.  After the “Processing Delay” block, the items enter another queue before 
being passed to another “Activity, Multiple” block.  This block is in place to simulate the 
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delay that occurs while the satellites transmit the detections to the ship and other BMD 
assets.  The results of the “Processing Delay” and “Comms. Delay” blocks are added and 
sent to a “Mean & Variance” block.  The average of the results is sent to the data output 
sheet via a “Data Send” block.  The items then enter the “Combine” block that can be 
seen on the right side of Figure 44 and the left side of Figure 46. 
Items that exit the “Decision (2)” block through the “No” path are 
sent to the ship’s sensors.  They first pass through a “Combine” block, where they are 
combined with items that are not detected on a particular look.  After the “Combine” 
block, the items pass through a “Select DE Output” block.  This block routes items based 
on the ship’s probability of detections.  Items that are detected exit the block through path 
“a.”  Items that are not detected exit through path “b.”  Nondetections pass through a  
“Queue, FIFO” block and an “Activity, Multiple” block to account for the sweep rate of 
the ship’s radar.  After nondetections are delayed, they enter the “Combine” block seen 
on the left of Figure 44, where they are combined with items that have just entered the 
ship’s detection range.  If the items exit the “Select DE Output” block through the “a” 
path, they enter a “BM Trajectories” hierarchical block.  After the “BM Trajectories” 
block, items pass through a “Get Attribute” block.  This block retrieves the value of the 
attribute “EndofMC,” which is the time from launch to the end of the BM’s midcourse 
phase.  The items then pass through a “DE Equation” block that calculates missile flight 
time.  The values of “EndofMC” and “FlightTime” are both passed to a decision block.  
The “Decision (2)” block determines if the missile is still within the boost to midcourse 
phases as shown in Figure 45. 
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Figure 46.  Extend Preliminary Model Detection Hierarchical Block Right Third 
Figure 46 is the final third of the “Detection” Hierarchical block.  
The “Combine” block on the left side of the block is the same “Combine” block as the 
one on the right side of Figure 44.  After the “Combine” block, the items enter a  
“Queue, FIFO” block before entering an “Activity, Multiple” block, where they are 
delayed.  This delay is in place to account for the time it takes for the ship to process its 
own detections or those communicated from the satellites.  The detection time is sent to a 
“Mean & Variance” block, where the mean is extracted and sent to the output sheet via a 
“Data Send” block.  Once the data is sent, the items reenter the highest level of the model 
on the right side of the “Detection” block as seen in Figure 44. 
113 
BM Trajectories Hierarchical Block 
The BM Trajectories Hierarchical Block was used in several places 
throughout the model.  The purpose of the block is to divide the missiles based first on 
launch site and then on target to update the x, y, z positions of the BMs using the threat 
model Excel sheets.  An overview of a “BM Trajectories” hierarchical block is shown in  











Figure 47.  Extend Preliminary Model BM Trajectories Hierarchical Block 
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Figure 48.  Extend DE Equation Flight Time calculation 
The first block in this hierarchical block is a “DE Equation” block 
that calculates the current time of flight of the BM using the missile’s launch time and 
current system time.  As can be seen in Figure 48, “FlightTime” is the name given to the 
equation result and assigned as an attribute, which is calculated using the values 
“CurrentTime,” which is a system variable, and “LaunchTime,” which is assigned as an 
attribute in the “Launch Site” hierarchical blocks.  The next block in the flow is a 
“Decision (5)” block, which is used to separate the missiles in order to send them to the 
proper “Site” hierarchical block.  As is shown in Figure 49, the attribute “LaunchSite,” 
which is assigned upon missile launch, is used to correctly divide the missiles. 
Once the missiles go through the “Site” hierarchical blocks, they 
are recombined into a single path and passed back to the hierarchical level above the  
“BM Trajectories” hierarchical block. 
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Figure 49.  Extend Decision (5) Block for Separating Missiles by Launch Site 
Site Hierarchical Blocks 
There are three site blocks, one for each launch site, in each “BM 
Trajectories” hierarchical block.  The overall purpose of the “Site” block is to first split 
the missiles based on their impact site to properly update the missile position.  An 













Figure 50.  Extend Preliminary Model Launch Site Hierarchical Block 
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 Objects are passed into the “Site” hierarchical blocks after being 
separated by launch site in the “BM Trajectories” hierarchical block.  The two “Decision 
(5)” blocks are used to separate the missiles based on their impact site.  The syntax is 
very similar to the “Decision (5)” block shown in Figure 50.  In these blocks, the attribute 
“Target,” which is assigned upon missile launch, is utilized to separate the missiles.  The 
next blocks are the “Impact Site” blocks.  Once the missiles pass through the “Impact 
Site” blocks, they are recombined into a single path and passed back to the “BM 
Trajectories” block. 
5.6.1.3.3 Tracking Hierarchical Block.  The “Tracking” 
hierarchical block receives items that are deemed to be successfully detected by the 
“Detection” hierarchical block.  The purpose of this block is to simulate the time delays 
and probabilities associated with establishing a successful track on a BM.  Figure 51 









































Figure 51.  Extend Preliminary Model Tracking Hierarchical Block Left Half 
Items that enter the “Tracking” hierarchical block have already 
been detected.  The first block they pass through is a “Set Attribute” block.  This block 
sets the attribute “DetectionTime,” which is later used to determine the time to formulate 
a track.  After the “Set Attribute” block, items enter a “Combine” block.  The “Combine” 
block merges these items with items that were determined to be lost tracks.  The next 
block in sequence is a “Select DE Output” block.  This block determines which items 
become dropped tracks.  Dropped tracks enter a loop, where they pass through a  
“Queue, FIFO” block and an “Activity, Multiple” block.  This loop is in place to simulate 
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the time to reacquire a lost track.  Tracks that are not lost enter a “BM Trajectories” 
hierarchical block, where the missile’s position is updated.  After the “BM Trajectories” 
block, the items pass through a “Get Attribute” block. 
This block retrieves the value of the attribute “EndofMC” and 
passes it to a “Decision (2)” block seen on the right side of Figure 51 and the left side of 
Figure 52.  The next block in sequence is a “DE Equation” block, which updates the 
missile’s time of flight and stores its value in the attribute “FlightTime.”  The result of 
this equation is also passed to the “Decision (2)” block seen on the right side of Figure 51 
and the left side of Figure 52.  The “Decision (2)” block determines whether the missiles 
are still within their boost to midcourse phase.  The blocks seen at the bottom of  
Figure 51 are used to send the average time to end of midcourse to the data output sheet.  
The value of the attribute “EndofMC” is passed to the variable name “End Midcourse.”  
This value then enters a “Mean & Variance” block, which passes the value of mean to a 







































Figure 52.  Extend Preliminary Model Tracking Hierarchical Block Right Half 
The continuation of the tracking phase is seen in Figure 52.  Items 
that are determined to be past the midcourse phase exit the “Tracking” block as handoffs.  
Items that still have not completed the midcourse phase enter a “Queue, FIFO” block.  
These items then pass through a series of “Activity, Multiple” and “Queue, FIFO” blocks.  
These blocks represent the delays associated with formulating a track, processing that 
track, and communicating the track to other assets.  Once the items are delayed, the time 
to formulate a track is calculated based on the system time and the attribute  
“Detection Time.”  This value is then sent to a “Mean & Variance” block, which passes 
the value to the data output sheet using a “Data Send” block.  The items then leave the 
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“Tracking” block on the right side before entering the “Identification” hierarchical block 
as seen on the left side of Figure 52. 
5.6.1.3.4 Identification Hierarchical Block.  The “Identification” 
hierarchical block receives items that have already been established as tracks.  The 
purpose of this block is to simulate the delay associated with identifying a track.   
































Figure 53.  Extend Preliminary Model Identification Hierarchical Block 
Items that enter the “Identification” hierarchical block have already 
been established as tracks.  The first block these items pass through is a  
“BM Trajectories” hierarchical block, where the missile’s position is updated.  The next 
block is a “Get Attribute” block that retrieves the value of the attribute “EndofMC” and 
passes this attribute to a “Decision (2)” block.  The items then pass through a  
“DE Equation” block that updates the attribute “Flight Time” and passes its value to the 
“Decision (2)” block.  The “Decision (2)” block determines whether these items have 
passed the midcourse phase.  If the missile is past its midcourse phase, it exits the 
“Identification” hierarchical block as a handoff.  Otherwise, it is passed to a  
“Queue, FIFO” block.  After exiting the “Queue, FIFO” block, the items enters an 
“Activity, Multiple” block to delay the item, simulating the delay that occurs while 
identifying a track.  The delay time is passed to a “Mean & Variance” block that passes 
the mean to a “Data Send” block, which sends the Identification delay to the data output 
sheet.  After the time is incremented, the items exit the “Identification” block on the right 
side as seen in Figure 53. 
5.6.1.3.5 Threat Evaluation Hierarchical Block.  The “Threat 
Evaluation” hierarchical block receives items that have already been identified.  The 
purpose of this block is to prioritize missiles based on the percentage of their boost 
through the midcourse phase they have completed.  This prioritization is done assuming 
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Figure 54.  Extend Preliminary Model Threat Evaluation Hierarchical Block Left Half 
Items that enter the “Threat Evaluation” block have already been 
identified.  The first block these items pass through is a “Combine” block.  This block 
merges items that have just been identified with items from a “Catch” block.  The 
“Catch” block receives items from a “Throw” block that is in the “BDA” hierarchical 
block.  The items that it receives are missiles whose BDA is unknown or bad.  Items then 
pass through a “BM Trajectories” hierarchical block to update the missile’s position.  
Items then pass through the sequence of block to determine whether they have passed the 
midcourse phase.  Items that have not completed the midcourse phase enter a  
“DE Equation” block.  This block calculates the percentage of their path to the end of the 
midcourse that the missiles have completed.  The next block in sequence is a  
“Decision (5)” block that separates items based on the percentage of the boost through 
midcourse phases the missile has completed.  There are five priority levels broken into 
increments of 20%.  For example, 20%-40% is a Priority 4.  The dialog from the first 
“Decision (5)” block is shown in Figure 55.  Two blocks were used rather than one 
because of the limited number of characters that can be typed into the dialog.  Once items 
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are split based on the percentage of their engagement window that they have completed, 
they pass through a set priority that establishes the priority from 1 to 5, depending on 
which path they follow.  The items then enter the “Combine(5)” block seen on the left 
side of Figure 56. 
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Figure 56.  Extend Preliminary Model Threat Evaluation Hierarchical Block Right Half 
After an item’s priority is set, they pass through a “Combine (5)” 
block to be merged into a single path.  The next block items enter is a “Queue, Priority.”  
This block is similar to a “Queue, FIFO” block, except items with a higher priority or 
lower number jump to the front of the line.  After the queue, items pass through an 
“Activity, Multiple” block to delay the items, simulating the time it takes to prioritize 
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threats.  The average threat evaluation time is sent to a “Mean & Variance” block that 
sends the mean to the data output sheet.  Once the data is sent, the items exit the  
“Threat Evaluation” block on the right as can be seen in Figure 57. 
5.6.1.3.6 Weapons Pairing Hierarchical Block.  The “Weapons 
Pairing” hierarchical block receives items that have been prioritized.  The purpose of the 
block is to simulate the delays that occur while pairing a threat with the proper weapon.  































Figure 57.  Extend Preliminary Model Weapons Pairing Hierarchical Block 
Items enter the “Weapons Pairing” hierarchical block after passing 
through the “Threat Evaluation” block.  The first few blocks they enter is the sequence of 
blocks that determines if the missile is still within the engagement window.  Items that 
are deemed handoffs exit the block.  Items that are still within the boost to midcourse 
phase enter a “Queue, Priority” block before entering an “Activity, Multiple” block.  The 
“Activity, Multiple” block delays the items to account for the time that occurs while 
pairing a target with a weapon.  The time delay is sent to a “Mean & Variance” block, 
which sends the mean to the output data sheet.  Then, the items exit the  
“Threat Evaulation” block on the right, as can be seen in Figure 57. 
5.6.1.3.7 Engagement Hierarchical Block.  The “Engagement” 
hierarchical block receives items that have passed through the “Weapons Pairing” block.  
The purpose of this block is to simulate the delays and probabilities that occur for a  



































































Figure 58.  Extend Preliminary Model Engagement Hierarchical Block 
As can be seen on the left side of Figure 58, there are three input 
blocks that feed into the blocks.  From the bottom, the first input is the system variable 
“CurrentTime” is input to be used in various calculations.  The next input is a  
“Constant” block representing the speed of the interceptor in kilometers per second.  The 
top input is where the “Engagement” block receives items after they pass through the 
“Weapons Pairing” block.  Once items enter the “Engagement” block, they enter a  
“BM Trajectories” block where the missile’s position is updated based on the attribute 
“FlightTime.”  Following the “BM Trajectories” block is a “Get Attribute” block that 
retrieves the value of the attribute “EndofMC.”  The next block in sequence is a  
“DE Equation” block that calculates the range from the ship as seen in Figure 58.  The 
next “DE Equation” block calculates the engagement time and assigns it as an attribute 
titled “EngageTime.”  The equation is a simple distance divided by speed calculation.  
Although the model would have been more accurate if the relative velocity of the 
interceptor and missile was used, the calculation would have added unnecessary 
complexity to the model and yielded minimal change.  Missiles traveling away from the 
ship would have taken longer to intercept and those heading toward the ship would take 
less time.  Since for half of the targets the missile was heading toward the ship, the 
average time would be somewhere in between.  Therefore, it is safe to assume a simple 
distance over speed approximation. 
After the engagement time is set, items pass through a  
“Change Attribute” block.  The “Change Attribute” block changes the attribute 
“EngageTime.”  This attribute is changed to account for the ballistic trajectory of a 
railgun round or the time a directed energy weapon must remain on target.  For the 
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missile and railgun interceptors, the block is multiplicative.  For the laser, it adds the time 
the laser must be held on the missile for a kill.  After the “Change Attribute” block, items 
pass through a “DE Equation” block, which calculates the missile’s flight time.  The 
result of the equation and the value of the attribute “EndofMC” are passed to a  
“Decision (2)” block that determines whether the missile is still within the engagement 
window.  This block is slightly different than the other “Decision (2)” blocks that 
determine whether items are still within midcourse.  The dialog for the block is seen in 
Figure 59.  Handoffs exit the block and subsequently exit the model. 
 
Figure 59.  Extend Preliminary Model within Midcourse Decision Block Dialog 
Missile’s that are still within the engagement window are passed to 
a “Queue, Priority” block.  The next block is an “Activity, Delay (Attributes)” block.  
This block delays the items based on the attribute “EngageTime.”  One problem with the 
block is that only one item can be delayed at a time so key performance indicators are 
likely worse than they really would be.  However, since all architectures experienced the 
same conditions, the overall results were not affected.  Once items have been delayed for 
the time it takes for an engagement, they pass through a “Count Items” block.  This block 
counts the number of engagements and passes the data to a “Data Send” block, which 
sends the data to the output sheet.  After the “Count Items” block, items enter a  
“Select DE Output” block.  This block routes items based on a random number input 
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representing probability of kill.  Items that leave through output “a” exit the 
“Engagement” block on the top output and are considered kills.  Items that exit through 
output “b” pass through a “Count Items” block.  This block counts the number of failed 
engagements and passes the number to a “Data Send” block that sends the number to the 
data output sheet.  After the “Count Items” block, these items exit the  
“Engagement” block through the middle output. 
5.6.1.3.8 BDA Hierarchical Block.  The “BDA” hierarchical block 
receives items that have been “engaged.”  The purpose of this block is to simulate the 
delays and probabilities that occur while assessing the damage done to a target.   













































Figure 60.  Extend Preliminary Model BDA Hierarchical Block Left Half 
As can be seen in Figure 60, the “BDA” block receives three 
inputs.  The first input is the current system time in the variable “CurrentTime.”  The 
other two inputs are both item inputs that come from the “Engage” block as seen in 
Figure 59.  The top input are missiles that have been determined to have been killed by 
the interceptor.  These items then pass through a “Select DE Output” block.  This block 
accounts for the probability that given a kill, the BDA will actually be good.  A small 
percentage of the time, a BDA can be unknown.  In this case, an unknown BDA is the 
same as a bad BDA, so these items get combined with items that have been deemed 
misses.  Items that are considered kills and that leave output “a” from the  
“Select DE Output” block pass through a “Set Attribute” block.  This block sets the 
attribute “BDA” to 1.  Misses and kills that leave output “b” from the “Select DE Output” 
block are combined using a “Combine” block.  These items then pass through a  
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“Set Attribute” block that sets the attribute “BDA” to 0.  After the attribute “BDA” is set, 
the items are combined to a single path using a “Combine” block. 
After the items are combined, they enter a “Queue, FIFO” block 
before entering an “Activity, Multiple” block.  The “Activity, Multiple” block delays the 
items to account for the time it takes to conduct a BDA.  The delay for each item is sent 
to a “Mean & Variance” block, which sends the mean to a “Data Send” block.  The  
“Data Send” block sends the mean time to conduct BDA to the data output sheet.  Once 
the item is delayed, it passes through a “Get Attribute” block.  This block retrieves the 
value of the attribute “BDA” and passes its value to the “Decision (2)” block to its right, 
as seen in Figure 60.  The “Decision (2)” block routes items based on the value of the 
attribute “BDA.”  The dialog for the block is seen in Figure 61. 
 
Figure 61.  Extend Preliminary Model BDA Decision 
As can be seen from the dialog, items whose “BDA” attribute is 
equal to 1 or the item was killed and the BDA is good leave through the “YesPath.”  
These items then exit the block and subsequently the system. Items that leave through the 
“NoPath” are passed to a “BM Trajectories” block, where the missile’s position is 

























Figure 62.  Extend Preliminary Model BDA Hierarchical Block Right Half 
Items enter a “Get Attribute” block after passing through the  
“BM Trajectories” block seen in Figure 60.  After this, the items pass through a  
“DE Equation” block that updates the attribute “FlightTime.”  The next “DE Equation” 
block calculates the time left to reengage.  Its dialog is seen in Figure 63.  The result of 
this equation is sent to a “Mean & Variance” block that passes the mean to a “Data Send” 
block.  The “Data Send” block sends the mean time to reengage to the data output sheet.  
After items exit the “DE Equation” block that calculates time to reengage, the items enter 
a “Decision (2)” block.  The “Decision (2)” block determines if items are still within the 
engagement window.  Items that are determined to be handoffs exit the “BDA” block and 
subsequently exit the system.  Items that are still within the midcourse phase are sent to a 
“Throw” block.  This block routes items without using a connector.  This particular 




Figure 63.  Extend Preliminary Model Time to Reengage Calculation 
5.6.1.4 Outputs 
Microsoft Excel was used to record the outputs of the Extend system 
model.  Data was sent directly from Extend to Excel using “Data Send” blocks.  These 
blocks were very useful as they eliminated the need to copy and paste the data from 
Extend for the various attributes.  Each basic architecture (i.e., missile with phased array 
radar) had its own output sheet.  Once the results were recorded in Excel, the sheets were 
renamed to reflect the detailed architecture/scenario combination, including interceptor 
speed or type for the directed energy weapon. 
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Outputs from the system model included: 
• Number of BM threats simulated 
• Number of detections 
• Number of nondetections 
• Number of false alarms 
• Number of handoffs 
• Number of engagements 
• Number of failed engagements 
• Mean nonorganic time to detect 
• Mean time delay in detection relay 
• Mean time to process detection 
• Mean organic detection time 
• Mean track formulation time 
• Mean time to ID 
• Mean threat prioritization time 
• Mean weapons pairing time 
• Mean engagement time 
• Mean weapons pairing time 
• Mean time to conduct BDA 
• Mean time to end of BM midcourse 
• Launch site 
• Target 
• Mean time available for reengagement 
These outputs were used to calculate several values of interest including: 
• Probability of engagement given a detection 
• Probability of kill given an engagement 
• Probability of detection 
• Probability of false alarm 
• Probability of missed detection 
• Probability of handoff 
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These values were used as system MOEs, along with mean engagement 
time and mean time available for reengagement.  
5.6.1.5 Shortcomings 
One of the major problems with the preliminary round of simulation is that 
no preferred system architecture was determined.  The original purpose of the 
preliminary simulation was to choose a preferred system architecture.  However, no radar 
stood out because all missiles were detected by nonorganic assets.  This problem was 
resolved during the refinement of the system model.  Another shortcoming of the 
preliminary model is that the detection height is based solely on the maximum detection 
range.  In reality, this approximation would not be accurate.  The actual height at which a 
missile would be detected would vary with range.  This problem was also resolved in the 
refined system model.  The next major problem with the simulation was that a spurious 
termination in Extend interrupted the simulation infrequently.  Although this error did not 
affect the results, it slowed the simulation because a user had to click “Ok” to make the 
simulation continue. 
There were two other shortcomings that were never resolved.  First, there 
was no actual modeling of the sensor network.  It was only modeled as a series of 
decisions, time delays, and probabilities.  A more accurate representation would include 
modeling a sensor network as it would interact in reality, including the orbits of the 
satellite sensors.  However, such a model never became readily available during the 
course of this project.  Modeling the intercept suffered from the same shortcoming.  It 
was modeled only as a probability of kill, velocity, maximum engagement range, and 
maximum engagement height. 
5.6.1.6 Refinement Plan 
In the next round of modeling, the shortcomings were fixed or attempted 
to be fixed.  The first planned change to the model was to make the necessary changes to 
the inputs to essentially eliminate the nonorganic assets so a preferred radar could be 
selected.  The next change that was planned for the system model was to add the 
calculation of the radar range equation based on the range of the ship to the missile to 
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determine detection height.  Another planned change to the system model was to make 
the necessary changes for multiple ships to operate together.  Another planned refinement 
was to be able to input the ships, target, and launch site positions using latitude and 
longitude.  Neither of these changes was made to the refined model; however, they were 
both added in some manner to the final system model.  Modeling the interceptor and 
sensor network were also planned.  However, neither of these was fully completed.  The 
interceptor was never modeled, but rather a probability of kill per salvo was established 
to compare the missile and railgun systems. 
5.6.1.7 Model Evolution 
The system model originally started as a model for the commit stage.  It 
consisted simply of a series of blocks representing the delays and probabilities associated 
with the detect to engage sequence.  There were no inputs based on missile position.  The 
original purpose of the model was to determine how fast an interceptor had to be in order 
to intercept the BM.  After determining that this method would not work, the model 
slowly became an entire system model.  The first step in its evolution was determining 
how to receive data from an Excel spreadsheet.  This was done fairly easily using  
“Data Receive” blocks.  After determining how to input data from Excel, scenarios were 
developed to use for BM trajectory calculations.  Since the BM trajectory calculations 
were based on distance in kilometers, a grid had to be laid on a map containing launch 
site and target locations.  The map can be seen in Figure 64.  The launch sites are the red 
circles in the middle of the map.  Targets are spread around the launch sites and 
represented by blue circles.  The area represented in the map is a fictitious threat area.  
The diameter of the circle is 7,000 km and represents the maximum range of the threat 
missile.  The target and launch site positions were determined using an x, y coordinate 
system.  The target and launch site z positions or altitude have an insignificant impact on 







Figure 64.  Google Earth Map of Launch Sites and Targets74 
Each launch site was given its own Excel workbook with six sheets.  The 
model was then linked to receive data from these sheets everywhere throughout that was 
necessary.  Once Extend and Excel were linked, the single model evolved into six 
models, one for each architecture, to speed the simulation process.  These six models 
were tested to make sure everything worked properly.  After the debugging of the models 
were completed, the Notebook feature of Extend was utilized to make changing variables 
quick and easy.  An Extend notebook is like a large dialog box containing any variable 
that is placed in it using the clone tool in Extend.  Labels were added to keep variables 
straight.  The boxes that are cloned are linked to the block in the Extend model so 
changing the value in the notebook changes a value in the block to which it is linked.  
The notebook feature was utilized to change the different variables as they were degraded 
from the best case scenario to the worst case scenario.  The system model was further 
refined after the initial simulations. 
                                                 
74 Google Earth.  Copyright 2006.  Image modified (centered over Middle East) on 5 May 2006. 
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5.6.2 Preliminary Simulation Results 
 After the model was assembled and tested, it was ready for simulation and 
analysis, which was done iteratively.  As more testing was done, more insights were 
gained from the simulations, which necessitated refinement of the models.  It was not 
expected that the models would only be run through once and then testing would be done.  
The preferred architecture was expected to be selected after validation and three rounds 
of simulation and analysis.  During the initial simulations, the directed energy alternatives 
were eliminated due to poor performance in the seven critical measures of performance.  
Tables 17 and 18 list the metrics and their results from the first 18 trials that became the 
eliminating factors for the directed energy alternatives. 
In order to fully evaluate all of the architecture combinations in each of the 
scenarios, 36 trials were conducted.  The run profile which enumerates the trial number 
and order that each architecture is run is depicted in Table 16.  In order to achieve a high 
level of statistical confidence and mitigate any outliers or spurious results in the test, each 
trial completed 500 runs of the simulation.  This is a total of 18,000 runs for the 
preliminary phase of simulation and analysis.  An unexpected point of contention was the 
time needed to run all of the 36 trials.  The problem came with running the more stressing 
scenarios.  The best case trials ran rather quickly (only a few seconds per run) and the 
most likely scenario ran acceptably fast (approximately 30 seconds per run), but the worst 
case scenarios took anywhere from 5 to 9 hours per trial.  In addition to its poor 
performance, this factored into the elimination of the directed energy alternatives from 
the worst case scenario testing with the skin-of-the-ship radar. 




# of BM threats 
simulated 
# of BM failed 
engagements 
Mean track formulation time 
(sec) 
Mean time to conduct 
BDA (sec) 
# of BM detections Mean non-organic time to detect (sec) 
Mean time to identify threat 
(sec) 
Mean time for 
reengagement (sec) 
# of BM nondetections Mean time delay in detection relay (sec) 
Mean threat prioritization 
time (sec) 
Mean time to end of BM 
midcourse (sec) 
# of BM false alarms Mean time to process detection (sec) 
Mean weapons pairing time 
(sec) Launch Site 
# of BM handoffs Mean organic detect time(sec) 
Mean interceptor engagement 
time (sec) Target 
# of BM engagements    
Table 14.  Direct Outputs of the Extend System Model 
The model’s outputs were computed for each of the 500 runs within each of the 
36 architecture-scenario trials.  They were then used to compute the critical measures of 
performance as described in Figure 65. 
Although many of the outputs were determined within the model, some were also 
fixed inputs to the model. 
# of BM threats simulated – Total number of threat missiles fired from any launch site to 
any location.  This was a predetermined input to the model that varied by scenario. 
# of BM detections – Of the total number of threat missiles fired, this is the amount 
actually detected by the organic or inorganic sensors.  This was calculated in Extend 
based on threat missile range and altitude from the ship and the radar’s capability. 
# of BM nondetections – This is the complement to actual detections above.  It is just the 
total detections subtracted from the total threat missiles fired. 
# of BM false alarms – This  summed the per trial number of times a threat missile was 
falsely detected.  It was an initial input to the model, entered in order to get a more 
realistic, less than optimal system performance. 
# of BM handoffs – A hand-off is the passing of firing responsibility onto an asset with 
higher probability of kill.  This was determined through several phases of the Extend 
model.  The model determined whether or not the interceptor could engage the threat 
missile once the radar had detected it.  If the interceptor could not engage it or was able 
to engage it, but failed to intercept and destroy the threat missile, the model would 
consider this a handoff. 
# of BM engagements – This represented the number of times the interceptor was able to 
engage, but not necessarily destroy the threat missile after the radar detects the  
threat missile. 
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# of BM failed engagements – This metric summed the number of interceptors that 
engage the threat missile, but did not destroy it. 
Mean nonorganic time to detect (sec) – Time after threat missile launch until the 
inorganic, satellite detection occurs.  This is determined from the model for each trial. 
Mean time delay in detection relay (sec) – This time accounts for the transmit time from 
the nonorganic detection entity to the engaging asset. It was also an input to the model.  It 
is very small, but included for accuracy. 
Mean time to process detection (sec) – Time for detecting asset to process detection data 
through onboard computer. 
Mean organic detect time (sec) – Time after threat missile launch until the organic, 
shipboard detection occurs.  This is determined from the model for each trial. 
Mean track formulation time (sec) – Time to determine a track of threat missile after 
positive detection occurs.  This was a varying input to the model. 
Mean time to identify threat (sec) – Time to identify contact after detection and track is 
gained.  This was also an input to the model. 
Mean threat prioritization time (sec) – Time to queue contact with other hostile contacts 
to provide the best probability of kill once identification occurs.  It was an input to  
the model. 
Mean weapons pairing time (sec) – Time to determine and transmit to the asset with the 
highest probability of kill based on interceptor capability, asset location, and threat 
missile track.  It was also an input to the model. 
Mean interceptor engagement time (sec) – Interceptor time from launch to intercept or 
miss of the threat missile.  This metric was calculated from the model based on  
time-distance equations. 
Mean time to conduct BDA (sec) – Time after calculated intercept of threat missile and 
interceptor until battle damage assessment is determined.  This was also an input to  
the model. 
Mean time available for reengagement (sec) – This metric is determined by subtracting 
the detection through BDA output from the time to end of midcourse.  It gives an insight 
as to whether the interceptor will have time to reengage or how much time will be left if 
handed off. 
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Mean time to end of BM midcourse (sec) – Time from threat missile launch until end of 
midcourse.  This is determined in the threat missile model implemented in Excel and 
passed to Extend. 
Launch Site – This identifies which of the three launch sites the threat missile is coming 
from.  It was a random pick from the model as to which launch site would produce a 
threat missile. 
Target – This identifies which of the six targets the threat missile is going to.  This was 
also chosen at random from the model. 
The model outputs were used either directly to evaluate the model or combined to 
make probabilities or critical time evaluations.  In order to evaluate the competing 
architectures, seven critical MOPs were computed in order to distinguish the most 
feasible architecture of radar and weapon.  These critical MOEs are listed in Table 15 and 
derived from the system outputs in Table 14. 
Probability of engagement given a detection P(engage | detection) 
Probability of detection P(detect) 
Probability of kill given an engagement P(kill | engagement) 
Probability of false alarm P(false alarm) 
Probability of handoff given a detection P(handoff | detection) 
Time from detection to BDA T (detectÆBDA) 
Time left to reengage after first cycle T(reengage) 
Table 15.  Architecture Measures of Performance 
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Figure 65.  Derivation of Effectiveness Metrics 
These metrics represent the top level performance specifications.  The results of 
these parameters from the first iteration of simulations are graphically summarized in 
Figures 66 through 72.  The graphs include information on each of the architectures for 
each of the scenarios for a particular critical measure of performance as denoted in the 
title of the graph. 
In doing the simulations sequentially according to Table 16, analysis was able to 
be done after every group of six simulations were completed.  Once all of the PASR 
simulations were completed, analysis of those determined the DEWs to be eliminated 
from the remaining SOTSR simulations.  Each graph contains at least two architectures 
with no results, primarily the DEWs paired with the SOTSR.  This is attributed to its poor 
performance and run times in the initial testing with the phased array radar.  Barring all 
other results, the DEW interceptors achieved the results in Tables 17 and 18. 
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BEST case scenario PASR SOTSR 
6 km/s Missile (M) 1 19 
8 km/s Missile (M+) 2 20 
8 km/s Railgun (R|) 3 21 
10 km/s Railgun (R+) 4 22 
Particle Beam 5 23 
Free Electron 6 24 
MOST LIKELY scenario PASR SOTSR 
6 km/s Missile (M) 7 25 
8 km/s Missile (M+) 8 26 
8 km/s Railgun (R|) 9 27 
10 km/s Railgun (R+) 10 28 
Particle Beam 11 29 
Free Electron 12 30 
WORST case scenario PASR SOTSR 
6 km/s Missile (M) 13 31 
8 km/s Missile (M+) 14 32 
8 km/s Railgun (R|) 15 33 
10 km/s Railgun (R+) 16 34 
Particle Beam 17 35 
Free Electron 18 36 
Table 16.  Preliminary Simulation Run Profile 
Particle Beam BEST MOST LIKELY 
P (engage) 0.0547 0.0185 
Max Engagement Range 500 km 500 km 
Max Engagement Height 200 km 200 km 
Table 17.  Particle Beam Eliminating Simulation Results 
Free Electron BEST MOST LIKELY 
P (engage) 0.0535 0.0234 
Max Engagement Range 500 km 500 km 
Max Engagement Height 2,000 km 2,000 km 
Table 18.  Free Electron Eliminating Simulation Results 
The poor performance of the DEWs was directly related to their short lethal 
ranges.  The DEWs’ lack of ability to engage the threat made it an infeasible alternative 
for BMD and was therefore eliminated from any further testing since probability of 
engagement for the each weapon type is independent of radar.  Table 19 defines the 
legend of symbols and abbreviations used in the MOE graphs in Figures 66 through 72. 
M 6 km/s Missile Interceptor 
M+ 8 km/s Missile Interceptor 
R 8 km/s Railgun Interceptor 
R+ 10 km/s Railgun Interceptor 
PB Particle Beam DEW 
FE Free Electron DEW 
PASR Phased Array Shipboard Radar
SOTSR Ship-of-the-Ship Radar 
Table 19.  Graph Subscript Key 
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Probability of engagement given a detection, Figure 66, evaluates the ability of 
each weapon system to engage the threat missile once the radar detects it.  These 
preliminary results were only partially beneficial.  In one respect, they showed that the 
directed energy alternatives were poor performers in terms of their ability to engage the 
threat missiles; conversely, it did not provide a breakout between the other interceptor 
alternatives.  The poor performance of the DEWs lead to the elimination of these 
interceptors from further testing.  Engaging the threat missiles less than 5% of the time is 
infeasible and does not meet specification.  Further testing will be done to yield definitive 
results between the railgun and missile alternatives.  A breakout in probability of 
engagement for the weapon systems should follow a breakout in probability of detection 
for the radars.  If the SOTSR detects the threat missile from a greater range, it should 
follow that the interceptors with the greatest range will have a higher probability  
of engagement. 
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Figure 66.  P (engage | detection) vs. Architecture 
Figure 67 depicts the systems overall probability of detection, P(detect).  Initially, 
it appears that both radars performed perfectly; however, when reviewing the preliminary 
model, it revealed that the shipboard radars rarely made a detection at all.  In fact, it was 
the inorganic, space-based sensors that detected it every time.  This will be a point of 
refinement for additional modeling.  In order to get a breakout between radar systems for 
the probability of detection, the inorganic sensors were eliminated from the model.  This 
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left only the shipboard radars to detect a threat missile, and therefore differentiated them 
in terms of performance. 
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Figure 67.  P(detect) vs. Architecture 
The probability of kill, as depicted in Figure 68, was an initial input into the 
model, so this graph only confirms that the model is producing the correct results.  The 
probability of kill for the missile interceptors and railgun interceptors were initialized at 
0.8, the free electron DEW to 0.9, and the particle beam DEW to 0.95.  These values are 
based on recommendations of technical experts and research.75  These results are verified 
above in the probability of kill graph. 
                                                 
75 Gerald Brown, Matthew Carlyle, and Douglas Diehl, eds., “A Two Sided Optimization for Theater 
Ballistic Missile Defense,” Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
2005, pp. 745-762. 
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Figure 68.  P(kill | engagement) vs. Architecture 
Much like the evaluation of the probability of kill, probability of false alarm, as 
depicted in Figure 69, was also a fixed input to the model that remained constant through 
all scenarios and architectures.  Though it is obvious that the weapon would not have an 
effect on probability of false alarm, it is not obvious that the radar would not have an 
effect on this parameter.  It was determined from technical experts working with current 
phased array radars, that 0.02 was an acceptable level for false alarm.  After speaking 
with Dr. David Jenn, the designer of the SOTSR, he predicted that the addition of the 
SOTSR would yield no significant impact on the overall false alarm rate of the radar 
sensor system. 
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Figure 69.  P (false alarm) vs. Architecture 
The probability of handoff, as depicted in Figure 70, is a function of both weapon 
and radar capability.  The radar, firstly, must be able to detect the threat missile.  Without 
a detection, the weapon will not engage the target.  However, extending the detection 
range with the SOTSR, does not affect the probability of handoff because even though a 
detection is made from a greater range, the detection range of the SOTSR is greater than 
the maximum engagement range of any of the intercepts.  However, in the case of the 
DEWs, their lethal range was so short that the radar was able to detect and maintain a 
track on the threat missile, but rarely did the threat missile come within a close enough 
proximity for the free electron or particle beam weapons to engage it.  This also led to the 
elimination of the DEW from further testing. 
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Figure 70.  P (handoff) vs. Architecture 
The detect through BDS metric, as depicted in Figure 71, measures the total time 
each architecture takes from the time of detection of a threat missile to process the data, 
determine a firing solution, engage the threat missile, and conduct BDA.  The results 
show that as the velocity of the interceptor increases, the time to complete this cycle 
decreases, as to be expected.  Among scenarios, as the severity of the scenario increased, 
the cycle time increased as well.  This was due to the positioning of the various launch 
sites and target areas in addition to the fact that there are many more threat missiles 
launched with each increasing scenario.  The DEW performed extremely well according 
to this metric.  The weapon engages at the speed of light, so the engagement portion of 
the detect to engage cycle is virtually 0.  However, due to its short lethal range, it 
remained an infeasible alternative for BMD. 
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Figure 71.  Detect to BDA Time vs. Architecture 
This MOP, as shown in Figure 72, evaluates each architecture by the time left 
after a full cycle of detection through BDA until the end of threat missile midcourse.  
This gives insight to an architecture’s ability to reengage the target or handoff to an asset 
with higher probability of destroying the threat missile.  This metric yielded a few 
obvious trends among the various architectures. 
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Figure 72.  Reengagement Time vs. Architecture 
First, as the weapon’s speed and range increase, the time left to reengage also 
increases.  This is to be expected since it will take less time for the interceptor to engage 
the target.  This, however, was not the case with the directed energy interceptors.  This 
can be attributed to the interceptors’ short lethal engagement range.  Though the DEWs 
engage at the speed of light, the threat missile rarely comes within their lethal range, and 
once it finally does, the threat missile is near the end of midcourse. 
Secondly, as the scenario becomes more stressing, the time left to reengage 
decreases.  This is due to the fact that system performance is degraded with increasing 
stress to the scenario as a result of more missile tracks and less than optimal 
environmental conditions.  In fact, as shown in the worst scenario, only the faster railgun 
round had any time to reengage the threat missile. 
Third, with the greater detection range the SOTSR provides, it seems feasible that 
the architectures including the SOTSR would have greater reengagement times; however, 
as evident from the above graph, they do not.  This leads to a point of refinement for 
retesting in order to generate a breakout between the radars’ performance.  This was 
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accomplished by reevaluating the technical parameters and inputs for the SOTSR with 
Dr. Jenn. 
 Although many of the results from the first iteration of modeling and analysis 
proved to be inconclusive and did not produce a breakout between competing 
architectures, there was a tremendous amount of value that came from it as well.  As a 
result of the poor performance of the DEWs, 4 of the initial 12 architectures were 
eliminated.  This allowed for more focus to be brought to the remaining architectures 
during the second iteration.  Secondly, it made points of refinement evident in order to 
get a breakout between the weapon and radar options.  Lastly, the results verified where 
the model was working correctly and also where changes needed to be made. 
 Upon refinement, the model allowed the remaining competing architectures to be 
evaluated against each other using the metrics derived in Figure 65.  The refinement 
included more accurate detection ranges, the removal of inorganic detection sensors, 
performance characteristics in degraded states for the competing radar systems, and 
terminal guidance consideration for the remaining interceptor alternatives. 
5.7 REFINED DATA 
5.7.1 Refined System Model 
 The preliminary system models were refined after the initial tests due to their 
shortcomings and failure to produce a preferred system architecture.  One of the major 
changes to the model was to the nonorganic inputs.  The satellite probability of detection 
was made 0, essentially eliminating the satellites.  Without satellites the ship would be 
operating independently, so the radar calculations in Extend needed to be improved.  For 
the phased array radar, a block was added to calculate detection height based on the radar 
range equation.  The SOTSR model was improved by adding separate range calculations 
for the SOTSR and cued phased array radar, as well as separate delays for detection.  The 
other change that occurred was with the interceptor inputs.  Rather than trying to input a 
likely probability of kill for a single shot, an overall probability of kill for a salvo was 
used.  The same scenarios were used for the refined system model.  The refined system 
model was successful in producing a preferred architecture and more closely reflected 
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reality than the preliminary system model.  Figure 72-1 shows an overview of the refined 
system model.  Outputs remained exactly the same as the preliminary model.  The only 
change to the environmental factors was the elimination of the best case scenario.  The 
decision variables changed to reflect the elimination of the DEW as a possible 
architecture. 
 
Figure 72-1.  Refined System Model 
5.7.1.1 Inputs 
A major change to the results of the refined model came from changing 
various inputs.  The inputs needed to be changed in order to determine a preferred 
architecture.  In the previous round of simulation, the satellites detected every missile 
before the ship could, so no preferred radar was determined.  For this round of 
simulations, the satellites were essentially eliminated by making their probability of 
detection equal to 0.  Detection ranges were also changed to reflect the new radar 
calculations.  The SOTSR ranges were estimated using AREPS.  Multifunctional phased 
array ranges were calculated based on the current SPY-1B system.  The cued phased 
array range was increased to reflect the range increase from focusing the radar energy in 
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a given direction.  Together, the change in inputs allowed a preferred radar to be chosen.  
For the refined model, only the most likely and worst case scenarios were used. 
5.7.1.1.1 Nonorganic Characteristics.  The nonorganic 
characteristics, which focused on the satellite capabilities, were changed to eliminate the 
satellites.  The inputs were still necessary as the satellites were left in the model.  The 
biggest change was making the satellites’ probability of a missed detection 1, so they 
would never detect the missile.  Table 20 shows the nonorganic inputs to the refined 
system model. 
 Best Case Most Likely Worst Case 
Model Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
P(Sat Missed Det) 1 n=1 1 n=1
Sat Sweep Rate 8 1 10 2
Detection Delay for Satellite 3 0.5 10 2
Max. Target Detected at a time, Sat Only 100   100   
Processing Delay for Sat 1 0.5 3 1
Max. Processed at a time (Sat Only) 1,000   1,,000   
Comms Delay for Sat 1 0.02 2 0.1




1,000   1000   
Table 20.  Refined System Model Nonorganic Asset Inputs 
5.7.1.1.2 Organic Characteristics.  Most organic characteristics 
were left the same for the refined round of simulation.  Changes were made to the 
detection ranges for the multifunctional phased array radar to reflect the difference in 
range between cued and noncued phased array radar.  The SOTSR range was changed 
based on inputting the conformable radar characteristics into AREPS.  Tables 21 and 22 
show the PASR and SOTSR inputs to the refined system model, respectively. 
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 Best Case Most Likely Worst Case 
Model Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Ship Detection Range (km) 730   730  
P(Sensor System Detection) 0.9 n=1 0.85 n=1
Sweep Rate for System 12 6 15 6
P(False Alarm) 0.02 n=1 0.02 n=1
Detection Delay for Ship 4 1 8 2
Max. targets simultaneously detected 1,000   1,000  
Processing Delay for system 1 0.2 2 0.5
Max. targets processed at a time 1,000   1,000  
Tracking Stage Mean SD Mean SD 
P(keeping track) 0.9 n=1 0.9 n=1
Time to reacquire track 6 2 7 2
Tracking Delay 2 0.5 3 0.7
Max. Simultaneous Tracks 1,000   1,000  
Track Processing Delay 1 0.5 2 0.5
Max. Simultaneous Tracks Processed 1,000   1,000  
Communicate Tracks Delay 1 0.5 2 0.5
Max. Tracks Communicated at Once 1,000   1,000  
Identification Inputs Mean SD Mean SD 
Identification Delay 4 0.5 6 1
Max. Targets Simultaneously Identified 1,000   1,000  
Threat Evaluation Inputs Mean SD Mean SD 
Priority 1% to Mid Course 20      
Priority 2% to Mid Course 40      
Priority 3% to Mid Course 60      
Priority 4 % to Mid Course 80      
Threat Evaluation Delay 6 1 7 1.5
Weapons Pairing Inputs Mean SD Mean SD 
Delay for Weapons Pairing 2.5 0.4 3.5 0.6
Max. Targets Paired at a Time 1   1  
BDA Stage Mean SD Mean SD 
Time to Conduct BDA 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01
Max. Simultaneous BDAs 1,000   1,000  







0.9 n=1 0.9 n=1
Table 21.  Refined System Model PASR Inputs 
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 Best Case Most Likely Worst Case 
Model Inputs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
SOTSR Range 1,500  1,500  
P(SOTSR Missed Detection) 0.1 n=1 0.15 n=1
SOTSR Detection Delay 10 2 15 3
PASR Cued Range (km) 970  970  
P(Sensor System Detection) 0.95 n=1 0.9 n=1
Sweep Rate for System 12 6 15 6
P(False Alarm) 0.02 n=1 0.02 n=1
Detection Delay for Ship 4 1 6 1
Max. targets simultaneously detected 1,000  1,000  
Processing Delay for system 1 0.2 2 0.5
Max. targets processed at a time 1,000   1,000   
Tracking Stage Mean SD Mean SD 
P(keeping track) 0.9 n=1 0.9 n=1
Time to reacquire track 6 2 7 2
Tracking Delay 2 0.5 3 0.7
Max. Simultaneous Tracks 1,000  1,000  
Track Processing Delay 1 0.5 2 0.5
Max. Simultaneous Tracks Processed 1,000  1,000  
Communicate Tracks Delay 1 0.5 2 0.5
Max. Tracks Communicated at Once 1,000  1,000  
Identification Inputs Mean SD Mean SD 
Identification Delay 4 0.5 6 1
Max. Targets Simultaneously Identified 1,000  1,000  
Threat Evaluation Inputs Mean SD Mean SD 
Priority 1% to Mid Course 20     
Priority 2% to Mid Course 40     
Priority 3% to Mid Course 60     
Priority 4% to Mid Course 80     
Threat Evaluation Delay 6 1 7 1.5
Weapons Pairing Inputs Mean SD Mean SD 
Delay for Weapons Pairing 2.5 0.4 3.5 0.6
Max. Targets Paired at a Time 1  1  
BDA Stage Mean SD Mean SD 
Time to Conduct BDA 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01
Max. Simultaneous BDAs 1,000  1,000  








0.9 n=1 0.9 n=1
Table 22.  Refined System Model SOTSR Inputs 
The conformable SOTSR was validated using the Advanced 
Refractive Effects Prediction System (AREPS).  The AREPS program was provided by 
the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).  The program is 
commonly used by the U.S. Navy to predict the performance of radars.  Radar 
characteristics are entered into the program, along with geographic location, weather, 
target characteristics, and the host platform. 
Using data provided by TDSI students a conceptual radar was 
modeled in the AREPS program, Figure 73.  The radar was titled Conformable  
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version 2 (CF2).  A notional threat missile was entered into the system, Figure 74.  It was 
necessary to input a threat missile in order to test the system performance.  The ship 








Figure 74.  AREPS Threat Editor Screenshot 
Platform (SABR) Characteristics
 
Figure 75.  AREPS Platform Editor Screenshot 
The output of the system can be seen in Figure 76, which shows 
what was predicted.  A line of sight detection area is shown by the area in red.  The area 
in red is a probability of detection greater than 0.80.  By running the cursor over the red 
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region it the probability of detection is mostly greater than 0.99.  This validates the 
calculated predictions. 
Standard Day 4/3 Projection
 
Figure 76.  AREPS Probability of Detection of SABR System 
5.7.1.1.2 Interceptor Inputs.  The interceptor inputs used for the 
refined system model are shown in Table 23. 
      
Most 

























Missile 6 km/s Multiply by 1 sec 0.95 0.95 1,800 750 1,800 750 
Missile 8 km/s Multiply by 1 sec 0.95 0.95 2,400 1,000 2,400 1,000
Railgun 8 km/s Multiply by 1 sec 0.95 0.95 2,200 1,000 2,200 1,000
Railgun 10 km/s Multiply by 1.12 secs 0.95 0.95 
Not Used for 
Refined Model
4,400 2,000 4,400 2,000
Table 23.  Refined System Model Interceptor Inputs 
To calculate the overall probability of kill, it was assumed that all 
shots are statistically independent of each other.  Therefore, the probability of kill for a 
given salvo, assuming every shot has an equal probability of kill, can be calculated using 
the equation nPsskkP )1(1)( −−= , where n = the number of shots per salvo.76  Tables 24 
and 25 show a table of theoretical probabilities of single shot kill and the number of 
                                                 
76 Daniel H. Wagner, W. Charles Mylander, and Thomas J. Sanders, Naval Operations Analysis,  
3rd Ed., Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1999, pp. 133-134. 
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rounds in a single salvo to achieve the desired probability of kill for a missile and railgun 
system, respectively. 
  Most Likely Stressed 
Missile Pssk 
# of Missiles Required to 
Achieve > 0.95 
Probability of Kill 
# of Missiles Required to 
Achieve > 0.95 Probability 
of Kill 
0.7 3 3 
0.8 2 2 
0.9 2 2 




Table 25.  Refined System Model Table of Pssk vs. Railgun Rounds to Acieve P(k) > 0.95 
5.7.1.2 Refinements for Subcomponents 
The system model was kept nearly the same for the second round of 
simulation.  The only changes that occurred were in the inputs, as highlighted previously, 
and to the “Detection” hierarchical block.  The PASR model was changed so it included a 
more accurate determination of whether a missile is detectable by a ship.  The SOTSR 
model was modified to include separate time delays and range calculations for the 
conformal hull radar and the cued phased array radar. 
5.7.1.2.1 PASR.  The change to the phased array model included 
the addition of a “DE Equation” block to more accurately calculate the detection height 
of the radar and adding another determination of whether to hand off the missile.  These 
changes improved the model by making the detection more realistic. 
Detection Hierarchical Block Changes 
The purpose of this section is to highlight the changes made to the “Detection” 
block.  The changes are shown in Figure 77. 
  Most Likely Stressed 
Rail Gun Pssk # of Rounds Required # of Rounds Required 
0.4 6 6 
0.5 5 5 
0.6 4 4 
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Figure 77.  Refined System Model Changes to Detection Hierarchical Block 
 Figure 77 highlights the section of the Extend model that was modified during the 
refined phased of modeling.  Changes are highlighted in yellow.  The first change can be 
seen on the left side of Figure 77.  This change added a determination of whether the 
missiles are still within the engagement window.  In the preliminary model, this was not 
necessary because the satellites detected every missile well before it reached the end of 
midcourse.  However, without the satellites in place, the missiles would get stuck in an 
infinite loop if they were never in range of the ship’s radar.  The highlighted “Decision” 
block passes items that have completed their midcourse phase to a “Combine” block, 
where they are combined with other leakers and exit the system.  The other change to the 
model was the addition of the “DE Equation” block highlighted in yellow.  The dialog for 
this block is shown in Figure 78.  The block calculates the height at which the ship’s 
radar can detect the missile at a given range.  The equation is derived from the radar 
range equation 2121 **3/8**3/8 hRhRRR EarthEarth +=+ .  This change made the 
actual time at which the missile was detected more accurate than the preliminary model 




Figure 78.  Refined System Model Phased Array Radar Detection Height 
5.7.1.2.2 SOTSR.  It was necessary to change the skin of the ship 
radar models to more accurately reflect the behavior of the conformal radar.  First, the 
conformal radar range is line of sight, so a “DE Equation” block needed to be added for 
this calculation.  Also, the conformal radar cannot track the missile, so the ship’s phased 
array radar must detect the missile after being cued by the conformal hull radar.  
Therefore, the same sequence of blocks as discussed for the phased array radar had to  
be added. 
Detection Stage 
The purpose of this section is to highlight the changes made to the 
“Detection” block for the skin-of-the-ship conformal radar combined with the phased 
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array radar.  Figure 79 shows the changes made to include the SOTSR in the refined 
system model. 
 
Figure 79.  Refined System Model SOTSR Detection Block Addition of Conformal Radar 
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 The changes made to the “Detection” block to account for the 
SOTSR are shown in Figure 79, highlighted in yellow.  One change that was made that is 
not highlighted is the addition of a determination of whether the missile is still within the 
midcourse phase.  The change for the conformal radar is the same as was discussed in 
PASR section.  The “Decision (2)” block is seen on the left side of Figure 79.  The first 
change to account for the conformal radar is the “DE Equation” block to calculate the 
radar line of sight range from the ship to the missile.  This was done using the equation 
shown in Figure 80.  This equation is normally written as 21 *17*17 hhRLOS += , 
where h1 and h2 are both in meters.  However, since the height of the missile, the variable 
“Zposition,” is in kilometers, this height must be multiplied by 1,000 to convert to 
meters.  h1 is the height of the ship’s radar.  The next block in sequence is the  
“Decision (2)” block that receives the input from the “DE Equation” blocks for range 
from the ship to the missile and line of sight range, as well as a constant input of the 
radar’s maximum detection range.  The dialog for the “Decision (2)” block is shown in 
Figure 80. 
 
Figure 80.  Refined System Model SOTSR within Range Decision 
 Items that are determined to be within range of the SOTSR exit the 
“Decision (2)” block through the “No” path.  Items that are not yet within range exit 
through the “Yes” path where they are sent to the blocks simulating satellite detection.  
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After missiles are within range of the conformal radar, they enter a “Select DE Output” 
block that determines whether they are detected.  Items that are not detected are passed to 
the satellites.  Items that are determined to be detected enter an “Activity, Multiple” block 
as seen on the right side of Figure 80.  This block accounts for the delay time that would 
occur for the conformal radar to detect a missile.  After items exit the  
“Activity, Multiple” block, they are passed to the “Combine” block as seen on the left 
side of Figure 81. 
 
Figure 81.  Refined System Model SOTSR Radar Line of Sight Range 
 Items enter the “Combine” block seen on the left side of Figure 82 
after being delayed for the conformal radar to detect them.  These items then pass through 
the series of blocks that determine whether the missile is still within the engagement 
window.  Missiles that still have completed their midcourse phase exit through the “No” 
path of the “Decision (2)” block and are considered leakers.  Items that exit through the 
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“Yes” path are still within the engagement window and are sent to the “DE Equation” 
block seen on the right side of Figure 82 and left side of Figure 83. 
 
Figure 82.  Refined System Model Phased Array Section Left Half 
 
Figure 83.  Refined System Model Phased Array Section Right Half 
The bottom of Figure 83 shows where items that are considered 
leakers exit the “Detection” block.  Items that are still within midcourse as determined by 
the “Decision (2)” block are passed to a “DE Equation” block.  This block calculates the 
range from the missile to the ship.  The blocks highlighted in yellow are used to 
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determine when the missile is within range of the phased array radar.  Items that are 
within range enter a “Select DE Output” block that routes items based on the probability 
of detection of the cued phased array radar.  Items that are not detected go through a loop 
where they are delayed by the radar’s sweep rate before being recombined using the 
“Combine” block seen in Figure 82 with items that have passed through the “Activity, 
Multiple” block seen in Figure 79. 
5.7.1.3 Improvements 
The refinement phase of modeling improved the models in several ways.  
First, the determination of radar range was changed to more accurately reflect reality.  
Second, the conformal radar was combined with a phased array radar.  Since the 
conformal radar cannot track targets, it cues the phased array radar on the same ship so it 
can focus on the direction of the detection.  Therefore, it was necessary to add delays for 
both of these detections as well as determinations of when the missile is in range of both 
radars.  The other major change during the refined phase of modeling came with the 
inputs.  The satellites were essentially eliminated so the refined phase of modeling 
produced a preferred architecture. 
5.7.2 Refined Data Analysis 
A boxplot is a graphical representation of the data’s mean, median, and first and 
third quartile.  The circled cross in each set is the representation of the data mean.  The 
top line of the box represents the lower limit of the top quartile of the data, the middle 
line represents the median of the data, and the bottom line is the lower limit of the third 

















Boxplot of P(detect) vs Radar
 
Figure 84.  Boxplot of P(detect) vs. Radar 
The Kruskal-Wallis analysis, Figure 85, compares the medians for each data set, 
and gives the statistical likelihood as to whether a statistically significant difference exists 
between systems.  The P-value is used to determine whether the systems are the same.  
Since the P-value < alpha (which is the default 0.05 in this case) the null hypothesis of 
equal means is rejected, which supports the alternative hypothesis of unequal means.  
This indicates that the two systems have a statistically significant difference. 
 Kruskal-Wallis Test: P(detect) versus Radar 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on P(detect) 
 
Radar  N Median Ave Rank       Z 
PASR  8 0.4095           4.5  –3.36 
PASR+SOTSR 8 0.5088         12.5    3.36 
Overall               16 8.5 
 
H = 11.29  DF = 1  P = 0.001 
 
Figure 85.  Kruskal-Wallis Test:  P(detect) vs. Radar 
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The one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)77 results, Figure 86, compare the 
means of each data set.  There are two important aspects in this analysis, the ANOVA  
p-value and the Fisher Confidence Interval, which is a graphical representation of the 
difference between the systems, using a 95% confidence interval.  For the ANOVA, since 
the P-value < alpha (which is the default 0.05 in this case) the null hypothesis of equal 
means is rejected, which supports the alternative hypothesis of unequal means.  This 
indicates that the two systems have a statistically significant difference.  For the Fisher 
CI, if the confidence interval includes zero, than it cannot be said with 95% confidence 
that there is a difference between the systems.  In this data set, the interval does not 
include zero, so the conclusion is that with 95% confidence there is a difference between  
the systems.78 
 One-way ANOVA: P(detect) versus Radar  
 
Source  DF        SS        MS      F      P 
Radar    1  0.031922  0.031922  80.75  0.000 
Error   14  0.005534  0.000395 
Total   15  0.037456 
 
S = 0.01988   R-Sq = 85.22%   R-Sq(adj) = 84.17% 
 
 
                            Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                            Pooled StDev 
Level      N     Mean    StDev  ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
PASR       8  0.41808  0.02605  (----*----) 
SOTSR+PASR 8  0.50742  0.01058                                (----*----) 
                            ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
                                0.420     0.450     0.480     0.510 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.01988 
 
 
Fisher 95% Individual Confidence Intervals 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Radar 
 
Simultaneous confidence level = 95.00% 
 
 
Radar = PASR subtracted from: 
 
Radar         Lower   Center    Upper  ------+---------+---------+---------+-
-- 
SOTSR+PASR  0.06801  0.08933  0.11065                           (------*-----
) 
                                       ------+---------+---------+---------+-
-- 
                                            0.000     0.035     0.070     
0.105  
Figure 86.  One-Way ANOVA:  P(detect) vs. Radar 
                                                 




Figure 87 represents the probability of handoff by the system, looking at each 
combination of weapon and radar.  A lower P(handoff) is desirable, because handoff 
implies that the system failed.  The graphical representation is the same as in the previous 
boxplot.  By this metric, the SOTSR radar system is typically better than the PASR 
system.  Within each radar system, the railgun outperforms the missile and, in both cases, 






















Boxplot of P(hand off | detection) vs Radar, Weapon
 
Figure 87.  Boxplot of P(handoff | detection) vs. Radar, Weapon 
Figure 88 represents the probability of engagement based solely on radar system.  
The SOTSR system is clearly the top performer in this metric, as it has 100% P(engage), 














Boxplot of P(engage) vs Radar
 
Figure 88.  Boxplot of P(engage) vs. Radar 
The Kruskal-Wallis analysis, Figure 89, of the medians of P(engage) for each 
radar system, shows a statistically significant difference between the P(engage) for the 
radars.  From the respective boxplot, it is the SOTSR+PASR system which is the better 
performer, with a median of 1.00. 
 Kruskal-Wallis Test: P(engage) versus Radar 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on P(engage) 
 
Radar          N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
PASR           8  0.8921       4.5  –3.36 
SOTSR+PASR     8  1.0000      12.5   3.36 
Overall       16               8.5 
 
H = 11.29  DF = 1  P = 0.001 
 
Figure 89.  Kruskal-Wallis Test:  P(engage) vs. Radar 
The one-way ANOVA of P(engage) for the radar system shows,  
Figure 90, with 95% confidence, that the two systems are not the same.  The P(engage) of 
the SOTSR+PASR shows it to be the better system. 
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 One-way ANOVA:  P(engage) versus Radar 
 
Source  DF       SS       MS      F      P 
Radar    1  0.06083  0.06083  36.00  0.000 
Error   14  0.02366  0.00169 
Total   15  0.08448 
 
S = 0.04111   R-Sq = 72.00%   R-Sq(adj) = 70.00% 
 
 
                          Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                          Pooled StDev 
Level       N    Mean   StDev   -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
PASR        8  0.8767  0.0581   (-----*------) 
SOTSR+PASR  8  1.0000  0.0000                            (-----*-----) 
                                -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
                               0.850     0.900     0.950     1.000 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.0411 
 
 
Fisher 95% Individual Confidence Intervals 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Radar 
 
Simultaneous confidence level = 95.00% 
 
 
Radar = PASR subtracted from: 
 
Radar         Lower   Center    Upper  -------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
SOTSR+PASR  0.07923  0.12331  0.16740                      (-------*------) 
                                       -------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
                                           0.000     0.060     0.120     0.180  
Figure 90.  One-Way ANOVA:  P(engage) vs. Radar 
This boxplot in Figure 91 represents the P(kill) for each radar, with the data set 
including all weapon systems.  In this example, the PASR + SOTSR system has a large 












Boxplot of P(kill) vs Radar
 
Figure 91.  Boxplot of P(kill) vs. Radar 
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The Kruskal-Wallis analysis, Figure 92 shows that the P-value > alpha (which is 
the default 0.05 in this case), so there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
of equal means, and the alternative hypothesis of unequal means cannot be supported, 
therefore there is no statistically significant difference between the systems. 
 Kruskal-Wallis Test:  P(kill) versus Radar 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on P(kill) 
 
                      Ave 
Radar          N  Median  Rank      Z 
PASR           8  0.9481   8.4  -0.11 
SOTSR+PASR     8  0.9458   8.6   0.11 
Overall       16           8.5 
 
H = 0.01  DF = 1  P = 0.916 
 
Figure 92.  Kruskal-Wallis Test:  P(kill) vs. Radar 
The ANOVA for the radar systems is shown in Figure 93.  The results show that 
the P-value > alpha (which is the default 0.05 in this case), so there is insufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of equal means, and the alternative hypothesis of 
unequal means cannot be supported.  This indicates that the two systems do not have a 
statistically significant difference.  Although they have different means, the differences 
are not statistically significant with 95% confidence.  Looking at the simultaneous 
confidence level of the means of each system, it shows a confidence interval overlap 
between the two systems, meaning that they cannot be said to be different with  
95% confidence. 
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One-way ANOVA:  P(kill) versus Radar 
 
Source  DF         SS         MS     F      P 
Radar    1  0.0000112  0.0000112  0.28  0.604 
Error   14  0.0005606  0.0000400 
Total   15  0.0005718 
 
S = 0.006328   R-Sq = 1.97%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00% 
 
 
                            Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                            Pooled StDev 
Level       N     Mean    StDev  ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
PASR        8  0.94499  0.00748  (---------------*---------------) 
SOTSR+PASR  8  0.94667  0.00491        (---------------*---------------) 
                                 ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
                                     0.9420    0.9450    0.9480    0.9510 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.00633 
 
 
Fisher 95% Individual Confidence Intervals 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Radar 
 
Simultaneous confidence level = 95.00% 
 
 
Radar = PASR subtracted from: 
 
Radar           Lower    Center     Upper  -------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
SOTSR+PASR  -0.005109  0.001677  0.008463      (----------------*----------------) 
                                           -------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
                                               -0.0040    0.0000    0.0040    0.0080 
  
Figure 93.  One-Way ANOVA P(kill) vs. Radar 
Figure 94 represents the probability of false alarm, based on the radar system 






















Boxplot of P(false alarm) vs Radar
 
Figure 94.  Boxplot of P(false alarm) vs. Radar 
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The Kruskal-Wallis analysis, Figure 95 shows that the P-value > alpha (which is 
the default 0.05 in this case), so there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
of equal means, and the alternative hypothesis of unequal means cannot be supported, 
therefore there is no statistically significant difference between the systems. 
Kruskal-Wallis Test:  P(false alarm) versus 
Radar 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on P(false alarm) 
 
                       Ave 
Radar          N   Median  Rank      Z 
PASR           8  0.01917   8.8   0.21 
SOTSR+PASR     8  0.01700   8.3  -0.21 
Overall       16            8.5 
 
H = 0.04  DF = 1  P = 0.834  
Figure 95.  Kruskal-Wallis Test:  P(false alarm) vs. Radar 
The ANOVA, Figure 96, shows that the P-value > alpha (which is the default 0.05 
in this case), so there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of equal means, 
and the alternative hypothesis of unequal means cannot be supported.  This indicates that 
the two systems do not have a statistically significant difference.  Although they have 
different means, the differences are not statistically significant with 95% confidence. 
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 One-way ANOVA:  P(false alarm) versus Radar 
 
Source  DF         SS         MS     F      P 
Radar    1  0.0000012  0.0000012  0.10  0.758 
Error   14  0.0001666  0.0000119 
Total   15  0.0001678 
 
S = 0.003450   R-Sq = 0.70%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00% 
 
 
                              Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                              Pooled StDev 
Level       N      Mean     StDev  ----+---------+---------+---------+----- 
PASR        8  0.019125  0.003187      (-----------------*----------------) 
SOTSR+PASR  8  0.018583  0.003694  (-----------------*----------------) 
                                   ----+---------+---------+---------+----- 
                                     0.0165    0.0180    0.0195    0.0210 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.003450 
 
 
Fisher 95% Individual Confidence Intervals 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Radar 
 
Simultaneous confidence level = 95.00% 
 
 
Radar = PASR subtracted from: 
 
Radar      Lower     Center     Upper 
SOTSR  -0.004241  -0.000542  0.003158 
 
Radar         -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
SOTSR+PASR    (-----------------*------------------) 
              -+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
            -0.0040   -0.0020    0.0000    0.0020 
 
Figure 96.  One-Way ANOVA:  P(false alarm) vs. Radar 
In Figure 97, this boxplot, which measures time elapsed from detection of the 
missile launch to BDA, uses seconds as the unit of time.  The boxplots follow the same 
format as the previous plots, and show the PASR system as the better of the two systems, 



























Boxplot of Detect to BDA Time vs Radar
 
Figure 97.  Boxplot of Detect to BDA Time vs. Radar 
The Kruskal-Wallis analysis of the Detect to BDA time metric for each radar 
system is shown in Figure 98.  Since the P-value < alpha (which is the default 0.05 in this 
case) the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected, which supports the alternative 
hypothesis of unequal means.  This indicates that the two systems have a statistically 
significant difference. 
 Kruskal-Wallis Test: Detect to BDA Time versus Radar  
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Detect to BDA Time 
 
Radar          N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
PASR           8   105.9       5.9  -2.21 
SOTSR+PASR     8   131.2      11.1   2.21 
Overall       16               8.5 
 
H = 4.86  DF = 1  P = 0.027 
 
Figure 98.  Kruskal-Wallis Test Detect to BDA Time vs. Radar 
The ANOVA and Fisher CI test is shown in Figure 99.  For the ANOVA, since 
the P-value < alpha (which is the default 0.05 in this case) the null hypothesis of equal 
means is rejected, which supports the alternative hypothesis of unequal means.  This 
indicates that the two systems have a statistically significant difference.  For the Fisher 
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CI, the interval does not include zero, so the conclusion is that with 95% confidence there 
is a difference between the systems, with the Phased Array radar performing better than 
the SOTSR. 
 One-way ANOVA:  Detect to BDA Time versus Radar  
 
Source  DF    SS    MS     F      P 
Radar    1  2657  2657  7.65  0.015 
Error   14  4859   347 
Total   15  7516 
 
S = 18.63   R-Sq = 35.35%   R-Sq(adj) = 30.73% 
 
 
                         Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                         Pooled StDev 
Level       N    Mean  StDev  ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
PASR        8  110.55  15.81  (---------*--------) 
SOTSR+PSAR  8  136.32  21.08                   (---------*--------) 
                              ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
                                  105       120       135       150 
 
Pooled StDev = 18.63 
Fisher 95% Individual Confidence Intervals 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Radar 
 
Simultaneous confidence level = 95.00% 
 
 
Radar = PASR subtracted from: 
 
Radar       Lower  Center  Upper    +---------+---------+---------+--------- 
SOTSR+PSAR   5.79   25.77  45.75                 (---------*---------) 
                                    +---------+---------+---------+--------- 
                                  -20         0        20        40 
 
Figure 99.  One-Way ANOVA:  Detect to BDA Time vs. Radar 
The boxplot of Detect to BDA time measures the time metric in seconds  
(Figure 100).  The boxplot elements are the same for this graph as before, but now the 
metrics are being measured against the different weapon systems, instead of radar, so 
there are four boxplots, instead of two.  Based on this graph, by the Detect to BDA time 
metric, the improved railgun weapon system is the best system, followed by the original 


























Boxplot of Detect to BDA Time vs Weapon
 
Figure 100.  Boxplot of Detect to BDA Time vs. Weapon 
The Kruskal-Wallis analysis is shown in Figure 101.  Since the P-value < alpha 
(which is the default 0.05 in this case) the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected, 
which supports the alternative hypothesis of unequal means.  However, because there are 
four systems, it cannot be determined which one is different by using the results of this 
test, just that there is a statistical difference between at least one of the systems  
and the rest. 
 Kruskal-Wallis Test:  Detect to BDA Time versus Weapon 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Detect to BDA Time 
 
Weapon    N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
M         4   151.4      14.3   2.79 
M+        4   118.3       7.5  -0.49 
R         4   119.9       7.8  -0.36 
R+        4   104.1       4.5  -1.94 
Overall  16               8.5 
 
H = 8.93  DF = 3  P = 0.030 
* NOTE * One or more small samples 
 
Figure 101.  Kruskal-Wallis Test:  Detect to BDA Time vs. Weapon 
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For the ANOVA, Figure 102, since the P-value < alpha (which is the default 0.05 
in this case) the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected, which supports the alternative 
hypothesis of unequal means.  This indicates that one of the systems has a statistically 
significant difference from the others.  For the Fisher CI, if the confidence interval 
includes zero, than it cannot be said with 95% confidence that there is a difference 
between the systems.  The Fisher Confidence Intervals between each system has more 
information about which systems are different from each other.  Looking at the 95% 
confidence interval of the missile mean, subtracted from other weapon systems means, 
the missile is statistically different in the Detect to BDA time metric from all other 
weapon systems.  Next, looking at the differences with the improved missile weapon 
system, it is not statistically different from the railgun and improved railgun system.  
Finally, looking at the railgun system, it is not statistically different from the improved 
railgun system.  Overall, the improved railgun is different than the missile, and would be 
the preferred system. 
174 
 One-way ANOVA:  Detect to BDA Time versus Weapon 
 
Source  DF    SS    MS     F      P 
Weapon   3  4614  1538  6.36  0.008 
Error   12  2902   242 
Total   15  7516 
 
S = 15.55   R-Sq = 61.39%   R-Sq(adj) = 51.74% 
 
 
                         Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                         Pooled StDev 
Level  N    Mean  StDev  ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
M      4  151.29  19.45                         (--------*-------) 
M+     4  118.58  15.12         (-------*--------) 
R      4  118.61  14.68         (-------*--------) 
R+     4  105.25  12.05  (--------*-------) 
                         ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
                             100       120       140       160 
 
Pooled StDev = 15.55 
 
 
Fisher 95% Individual Confidence Intervals 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Weapon 
 
Simultaneous confidence level = 81.57% 
 
 
Weapon = M subtracted from: 
 
Weapon   Lower  Center   Upper  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
M+      -56.67  -32.71   -8.76      (-------*-------) 
R       -56.64  -32.68   -8.73      (-------*-------) 
R+      -70.00  -46.04  -22.08  (-------*-------) 
                                ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                                 -60       -30         0        30 
 
 
Weapon = M+ subtracted from: 
 
Weapon   Lower  Center  Upper  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
R       -23.93    0.03  23.99                 (-------*-------) 
R+      -37.28  -13.32  10.63             (-------*-------) 
                               ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                                -60       -30         0        30 
 
 
Weapon = R subtracted from: 
 
Weapon   Lower  Center  Upper  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
R+      -37.31  -13.35  10.60             (-------*-------) 
                               ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                                -60       -30         0        30 
 
Figure 102.  One-Way ANOVA:  Detect to BDA Time vs. Weapon 
This boxplot measures P(kill | engagement) for each weapon, Figure 103.  
Because it is a conditional P(kill) based on engagement, it is testing the effectiveness of 
each weapon alone and not the system as a whole.  For this metric, a higher number is 
desirable.  Based on this, the improved railgun outperforms the other systems, followed 




















Boxplot of P(kill|engagement) vs Weapon
 
Figure 103.  Boxplot of P(kill | engagement) vs. Weapon 
The Kruskal-Wallis analysis of each weapon system P(kill | engagement),  
Figure 104 shows that the P-value > alpha (which is the default 0.05 in this case), so there 
is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of equal means, and the alternative 
hypothesis of unequal means cannot be supported., so the systems do not have a 
statistically significant difference. 
 Kruskal-Wallis Test:  P(kill|engagement) versus Weapon 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on P(kill|engagement) 
 
Weapon    N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
M         4  0.8663       7.3  -0.61 
M+        4  0.8853       8.8   0.12 
R         4  0.9044       7.5  -0.49 
R+        4  0.9182      10.5   0.97 
Overall  16               8.5 
 
H = 1.17  DF = 3  P = 0.760 
 
* NOTE * One or more small samples 
 
Figure 104.  Kruskal-Wallis Test:  P(kill | engagement) vs. Weapon 
The ANOVA for P(kill | engagement) is shown in Figure 105.  Since the P-value 
> alpha (which is the default 0.05 in this case) there is insufficient evidence to reject the 
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null hypothesis of equal means, and the alternative hypothesis of unequal means cannot 
be supported.  This indicates that the two systems do not have a statistically significant 
difference.  Although they have different means, the differences are not statistically 
significant with 95% confidence. 
 One-way ANOVA:  P(kill|engagement) versus Weapon 
 
Source  DF       SS       MS     F      P 
Weapon   3  0.01015  0.00338  0.58  0.639 
Error   12  0.07002  0.00584 
Total   15  0.08017 
 
S = 0.07639   R-Sq = 12.66%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00% 
 
 
                          Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                          Pooled StDev 
Level  N    Mean   StDev  --+---------+---------+---------+------- 
M      4  0.8499  0.1170  (-------------*-------------) 
M+     4  0.8822  0.0793       (-------------*-------------) 
R      4  0.9010  0.0467          (-------------*-------------) 
R+     4  0.9177  0.0343             (-------------*-------------) 
                          --+---------+---------+---------+------- 
                          0.780     0.840     0.900     0.960 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.0764 
 
 
Fisher 95% Individual Confidence Intervals 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Weapon 
 
Simultaneous confidence level = 81.57% 
 
 
Weapon = M subtracted from: 
 
Weapon     Lower   Center    Upper  -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
M+      -0.08537  0.03232  0.15000        (-----------*-----------) 
R       -0.06656  0.05113  0.16882          (-----------*-----------) 
R+      -0.04986  0.06783  0.18551            (-----------*-----------) 
                                    -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
                                      -0.10      0.00      0.10      0.20 
 
 
Weapon = M+ subtracted from: 
 
Weapon     Lower   Center    Upper  -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
R       -0.09887  0.01881  0.13650       (-----------*-----------) 
R+      -0.08218  0.03551  0.15320         (-----------*----------) 
                                    -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
                                      -0.10      0.00      0.10      0.20 
 
 
Weapon = R subtracted from: 
 
Weapon     Lower   Center    Upper  -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
R+      -0.10099  0.01670  0.13438       (-----------*----------) 
                                    -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
                                      -0.10      0.00      0.10      0.20 
 
Figure 105.  One-Way ANOVA:  P (kill | engagement) vs. Weapon 
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5.7.3 Main Effects Plots 
Using the MINITAB program, the team analyzed the Main Effects of the system 
model.  This was done by investigating the Main Effects Plot for the following main 
effects:  Scenario, Radar, and Weapon.  The Main Effects Plot uses the shift in data mean 
to measure the impact of an aspect of the system model on a chosen response metric.79 
The Main Effects Plot looks at the mean shift of different data sets for each 
metric.  In this case, the metric used to measure data sets is Detect to BDA time  
(Figure 106).  The mean of each data set is used, and lower numbers are desirable.  First, 
the Main Effects Plot looks at the impact each scenario has on the metric.  The stressed 
scenario requires more mean time for Detect to BDA time.  Looking at radar, the SOTSR 
system requires a greater mean Detect to BDA time than the PASR system.  Finally, 
looking at each weapon, the missile requires the most time, followed by the improved 
































Main Effects Plot (data means) for Detect to BDA Time
 
Figure 106.  Main Effects Plot (data means) for Detect to BDA Time 
                                                 
79 MINITAB, 14th Ed., “Analysis of Variance,” Help-to-Go Files, http://www.minitab.com/ 
support/docs/re114/helpfiles/statistics/AnalysisOfVariance.pdf 
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The main effects plot uses the same main effects as the above plot, this time to 

























Main Effects Plot (data means) for P(kill)
 
Figure 107.  Main Effects Plot (data means) for P(kill) 
Like the above main effects plots, scenario, radar, and weapon are used as to 
measure the difference in mean of a metric; in this case, P(false alarm) with smaller 





























Main Effects Plot (data means) for P(false alarm)
 
Figure 108.  Main Effects Plot (data means) for P(false alarm) 
179 
This main effects plot measures the means of each main effects data set for 
P(engage) (Figure 109).  With this metric, a higher number is more desirable, with 1.0 






















Main Effects Plot (data means) for P(engage)
 
Figure 109.  Main Effects Plot (data means) for P(engage) 
The main effects plot measures the metric of P(handoff) for the scenario, radar, 
and weapon main effect, as before (Figure 110).  In this metric, lower numbers are more 

























Main Effects Plot (data means) for P(hand off)
 
Figure 110.  Main Effects Plot (data means) for P(handoff) 
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The metric for this main effects plot is P(detect), with higher numbers being more 


























Main Effects Plot (data means) for P(detect)
 
Figure 111.  Main Effects Plot (data means) for P(detect) 
5.7.4 Interaction Plots 
Interaction Plots are a tool to look for interactions between effects in the system 
model.  This is done because interactions between factors can have an influence on the 
data analysis, by introducing combinations of factors that need to be accounted for when 
looking at metrics.  Interaction plots show that the impact that two different effects have 
on a response MOE to determine if the effects interact or are completely independent.  If 
the plot lines are not parallel, that shows an interaction between effects.  Completely 



















Interaction Plot (data means) for P(detect)
 
Figure 112.  Interaction Plot (data means) for P(detect) 
In the case of P(detect), there is interaction among all of the effects; between 


















Interaction Plot (data means) for P(engage)
 
Figure 113.  Interaction Plot (data means) for P(engage) 
182 
In the case of P(engage), there is interaction among all of the effects; between 


















Interaction Plot (data means) for P(hand off)
 
Figure 114.  Interaction Plot (data means) for P(handoff) 
In Figure 114, the interaction plot looks at the interactions between scenarios, 
radars, and weapons on the metric of P(handoff).  There is no clear interaction between 




















Interaction Plot (data means) for P(kill)
 
Figure 115.  Interaction Plot (data means) for P(kill) 
In Figure 115, the interaction plot looks at the interactions between scenarios, 
radars, and weapons, on the metric P(kill).  These plots reveal interactions between 



















Interaction Plot (data means) for P(false alarm)
 
Figure 116.  Interaction Plot (data means) for P(false alarm) 
In Figure 116, the interaction plot looks at the interactions between scenarios, 
radars, and weapons, on the metric P(false alarm).  In this instance, there is a clear 



















Interaction Plot (data means) for Detect to BDA Time
 
Figure 117.  Interaction Plot (data means) for Detect to BDA Time 
In Figure 117, the interaction plot looks at interactions between scenarios, radars, 
and weapons on the metric Detect to BDA Time.  In this metric, there are no clear 
interactions between factors. 
5.7.5 Conclusion 
The data analysis supports the conclusion that SOTSR + PASR radar is superior 
to PASR individually, as well as the conclusion that the R+ interceptor system is the 











Detect to BDA (sec) 
PASR 0.418 0.877 0.945  111 
SOTSR + PASR 0.507 1.00 0.947  136 
M    0.850 151 
M+    0.882 118 
R    0.901 118.6 
R+    0.918 105 
Table 26.  Data Analysis Summary 
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5.8 SENSITIVITY AND TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS 
The ANOVA and boxplots give insight into which combination of weapon and 
radar suite would yield the best performance when evaluated against the critical MOE.  
However, the main purpose of the SABR project study is not to specify the “best” 
system, but to identify a sensitivity around a set of “best” solutions in order to provide 
useful information for future system development direction.  Therefore, a sensitivity and 
trade-off analysis must be done in order to identify those variables that impact the 
system’s overall performance with the greatest magnitude. 
 Since there are 18 factors, based upon the number of MOEs in the entire BMD 
simulation model, and each one has 2-3 levels, there are 218 to 318 different combinations 
possible to assess a full factorial experimental design.  Therefore, some model order 
reduction had to be accomplished.  From the first iteration of modeling and analysis, the 
system performed almost perfectly for every architecture because the parameters input to 
the model were set for very high performance, and as a result did not stress the system 
enough.  Accordingly, the first set of eliminations came by eliminating the  
Best Case scenario.  Thirteen of the factors that changed within the model were some 
form of scenario-based time delay.  These were determined to be of lesser importance in 
the decision making as to the architecture configuration.  These, as well as weapon 
velocity and probability of false alarm, were eliminated, leaving only P (detection | in 
range), Weapon Range, and Radar Range as the primary factors.  Probability of false 
alarm was eliminated because it is a fixed parameter in the model that yielded no 
significant variability between simulations in the first and second iterations of 
simulations.  Weapon velocity was eliminated because it was directly proportional to the 
weapon range.  As the weapon’s velocity increased, so did its range, thereby yielding no 
added value to the analysis.  The time delays associated with each scenario would 
ultimately dictate the system’s overall Probability of Detection and the Detect to BDA 
time.  The Detect to BDA MOE was the summation of all time delays associated with the 
model.  From the first and second iteration of modeling and analysis, it was determined 
that over 90% of the time that accounts for the Detect to BDA metric is spent in 
interceptor flight time.  This makes the time delays of the detection, identification, and 
tracking phases very minor when compared to the interceptor flight time.  This flight time 
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is evaluated in the weapon range and Detect to BDA MOE.  As discussed previously, the 
weapon range is proportional to weapon velocity and weapon velocity directly dictates 
the weapon’s time of flight.  Since 90% of the Detect to BDA metric is interceptor flight 
time, the results directly reflect each interceptor’s speed as well as mean range from the 
targets.  These factors, and their corresponding high and low levels, are depicted in 
Figure 118. 
 
Figure 118.  Factor Names and Levels 
 The sensitivity analysis was assessed using Minitab and is depicted in a seies of 
Pareto charts.  The Pareto charts in Figures 119-123 represent the relative importance that 
the various main and interaction effects have on each of the MOEs.  Any effect extending 
past the red line has a statistically significant impact on the titled MOE.  This assists in 
determining which effects drive an MOE to change and, therefore, allow for the focus of 
the design to be more efficient and effective, in order to understand the impact of factors 

















Pareto Chart of the Standardized Effects
(response is P(detect), Alpha = .05)
 
Figure 119.  Pareto Chart for P(detect) 
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 The Pareto chart in Figure 119 reveals that radar range has, by far, the greatest 
effect on changing the system’s overall Probability of Detection.  The strong leverage of 
radar range on the probability of detection given that the threat missile comes within 
range, P(detect | in range), of the radar is obvious since the in-range probability of 
detection will have a direct effect on the system’s overall Probability of Detection.  This 
result verifies that, indeed, the ability to detect the threat missile is driven by the radar 


















Pareto Chart of the Standardized Effects
(response is P(engage | detection), Alpha = .05)
 
Figure 120.  Pareto Chart for P(engage | detection) 
 Figure 120 depicts radar range as the overwhelming effect for the probability of 
engagement given a detection.  It is important to note that it is radar range, not weapon 
range that dictates the level of change of engage ability.  Weapon range and the 
interaction between weapon and radar range cannot necessarily be ignored.  Though not 
determined to be statistically significant to the effect of probability of engagement, they 
are very close.  Clearly, the interceptor cannot be ignored when designing a BMD 




















Pareto Chart of the Standardized Effects
(response is P(kill|engagement), Alpha = .05)
 
Figure 121.  Pareto Chart of P(kill | engagement) 
 Figure 121 maintains the trend of radar range being depicted as the driving effect 
in each of the metric’s ability to perform.  Like P(engage | detection) above, probability 
of kill given an engagement, is dictated largely by the radar’s range.  However, weapon 
range and its interaction with radar range are very close to having a significant impact.  


















Pareto Chart of the Standardized Effects
(response is P(hand off | detection), Alpha = .05)
 
Figure 122.  Pareto Chart of P(handoff | detection) 
 Figure 122 yields some interesting results.  In the case of probability of handoff 
given a detection, there a four effects that were determined to have a significant impact 
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on the system’s ability to destroy the threat missile without handing off.  The Pareto 
reveals that weapon range, radar range, probability of detection, and the interaction 
between radar range and probability of detection to all have a significant effect on the 
performance of handoffs.  This makes it more difficult to focus on a factor in order to 
minimize the number of handoffs.  This is also a expected result since the ability for the 
ship to handoff hinges on whether or not it detects it.  So probability of detection is a 
reasonable factor to impact this metric.  Again, radar range and weapon range are 
determined to be important factors.  This is due to the range limitations the ranges of 



















Pareto Chart of the Standardized Effects
(response is Detect to BDA Time, Alpha = .05)
 
Figure 123.  Pareto Chart of Detect through BDA Time 
 Figure 123 shows a slightly different result than has been seen in the previous 
MOEs.  The Pareto chart shows radar range to be the driving factor to change the 
detection through a BDA metric.  Also of significant importance is the radar’s range.  
Both of these are fairly close in magnitude and account for a vast majority of the effect 
on the cycle time of the system.  In order to minimize the system’s engagement cycle 
time, the weapon and radar ranges must be the primary design considerations.  This also 
addresses the engagement speed of the interceptor weapon, however, since the weapon 
range increases with increased weapon velocity, it follows that the interceptor speed must 
also be designed to minimize the detect to BDA time. 
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 The sensitivity analysis shows through every Pareto chart that radar range is the 
controlling and limiting factor to the performance of each metric, and that weapon range 
is also important, but rarely statistically significant.  This is due to the fact that radar 
range is always less than interceptor range, even at its lowest level, as noted in  
Figure 118.  As long as the interceptor requires cueing and track data from the organic, 
ship based sensors, the radar range will be the constraining factor of the system.  
However, if the interceptors are able to receive cueing and track data from inorganic, 
space based sensors, then weapon range will become the limiting factor.  Therefore, with 
the exception of probability of handoff, in order to optimize each of the measures of 
performance, radar and weapon range must be adjusted before probability of detection.  
These significant effects to MOE performance are summarized in Table 27.  For a  
time-distance problem such as missile defense, the faster and farther these ranges can be, 
the better the measures of performance will be.  These factors will continue to mature and 
be limited by time and technological advancement. 







Radar Range X X X X X 
Weapon Range    X X 
Prob. Detection if in Range    X  
Radar Range and Prob. Detection X   X  
Table 27.  Significant Effects for MOE performance 
5.8.1 Trade-Off Analysis 
 From the sensitivity analysis, the most influential factors for each of the MOEs 
were revealed.  The trade-off analysis seeks to adjust those factors in order to find an 
optimal set of levels that satisfies the systems requirement as well as the customer’s 
needs, including cost. 
 Figures 124 and 125 depict contour plots of each P(kill | engagement) and 
P(handoff | detection) for the system.  These plots verify the same results as sensitivity 
analysis in terms of an MOE’s sensitivity to a change in factor level, but allow the user to 
pick any value for two of the three metrics and determine how well the MOE is met for 
those two values.  Those plots with virtually straight vertical or horizontal shades indicate 
that MOE is fairly insensitive to a change in of the respective factors. 
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 Figure 124 depicts a contour plot for the probability of kill given an engagement 
MOE.  The three graphs show the combinations of the three factors against how well 
probability of kill performs for any two values of radar range, weapon range, or 
probability of detection, while the different colors represent different achievable values of 





































Contour Plots of P(kill|engagement)
 
Figure 124.  Contour Plot of P(kill | engagement) 
The “Weapon Range*Radar Range” graph shows that probability of kill is fairly 
sensitive to a change in either weapon range or radar range.  However, it is more 
responsive and can get better overall performance by maximizing the radar range.  The 
decision to design to either radar range or weapon range will be a factor of cost and 
achievable technology. 
Figure 125 depicts a contour plot for the probability of hand off given a detection 
MOE.  As in the P(kill) contour plot, these three graphs also show the combinations of 
the three factors against how well probability of handoff performs for any two values of 
radar range, weapon range, or probability of detection.  This metric appears much more 
sensitive to a change in the three factors with probability of kill.  Probability of handoff is 
sensitive to a change in all three factors.  This was also noted in the sensitivity analysis to 
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be affected by radar and weapon range, probability of detection, as well as an interaction 
between radar range and probability of detection.  For example, the system will perform 
with a probability of handoff of 0.03-0.06 with a probability of detection of 0.875 and a 
weapon range of 3,000 km.  However, it will take an increase in weapon range to  
4,500 km to achieve a probability of hand off of <0.03, whereas it would only require an 
increase in probability of detection to 0.9 to achieve a probability of handoff of <0.03 for 
the same weapon range of 3,000 km.  This shows that the probability of handoff is fairly 







































Contour Plots of P(hand off | detection)
 
Figure 125.  Contour Plot of P(handoff | detection) 
To show the utility of the contour plots, the chart for P(kill | engagement) in 
Figure 126 will be used to determine some tradeoffs for the system’s effectiveness in 
terms of probability of kill, while trading off performance in radar and weapon range.  If 
a weapon range of 3,000 km can be achieved with a radar range of 1,200 km, the system 
will respond with a P(kill) of 0.875.  However, if a higher Pk is needed, a stakeholder 
could choose to trade 500 km of weapon range (weapon range = 2,500 km) for a gain of 
100 km in radar range in order to achieve a P(kill) of 0.9.  Any set of weapon and  
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radar ranges that intersect in the second shade of green, as noted in the chart legend, will 
yield a P(kill) of 0.9.  This method works for all MOEs and the factors that drive their 
performance.  This information can then be applied to cost to determine whether or not a 
level of performance is technically and financially feasible to the designer  
and stakeholder. 
 
Figure 126.  Contour Plot of P(kill | engagement) Against Radar and Weapon Range 
5.8.2 Cost Analysis 
 Contour plots are a very useful tool for top-level decision makers to quickly 
understand how the MOE output responses change.  The value added is that stakeholders 
can interactively determine the impact of increasing or decreasing the factors without 
having to run simulation cases.  These plots allow for stakeholders to determine which 
factors are worth investing in and which are not.  This trade-off analysis confirms the 
conclusions of the sensitivity analysis—that the radar and weapon range are the 
influencing factors to the MOPs.  They must be the factors to design to and invest in 
when the shipboard BMD platform comes to fruition. 
 Unlike this project, the world of design and fabrication is constrained by financial 
means and stakeholder interest.  Understanding the most influential factors and the 
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tradeoffs associated with them now allows the real constraint on money to be applied to 
them.  Designing the best possible technically performing system is almost never an 
option, but designing the best performing system for the money is.  In Table 28 and 
Figure 127, the tradeoffs between cost and MOE for each architecture are depicted.  
Using the table and figure allows a designer or stakeholder to pick a level of performance 
from the contour plots and determine whether or not it is financially feasible to design the 
system.  These plots are based on the costing figures in the Cost Estimation section of 
this report and are summarized in Table 28.  These cost figures also include a cost figure 
for a surplus of 100 rounds for each weapon architecture, rather than only the cost of a 
single round.  This gives a more feasible cost figure to analyze with the other components 
of the overall architecture.  The estimates also include the developmental, construction, 
and fitting costs for each architecture component. 
Architecture Weapon Cost ($M) 
100 Target Cost 
($M) 




PASR w/ 6km/s Missile (M) $0.41 $41.00 $40.00 $81.00
PASR w/ 8km/s Missile (M+) $11.30 $1,130.00 $40.00 $1,170.00
PASR w/ 8km/s Railgun (R) $0.03 $9.00 $40.00 $49.00
PASR w/ 10km/s Railgun (R+) $0.06 $18.00 $40.00 $58.00
SOTSR w/ 6km/s Missile (M) $0.41 $41.00 $130.00 $171.00
SOTSR w/ 8km/s Missile (M+) $11.30 $1,130.00 $130.00 $1,260.00
SOTSR w/ 8km/s Railgun (R) $0.03 $9.00 $130.00 $139.00
SOTSR w/ 10km/s Railgun (R+) $0.06 $18.00 $130.00 $148.00
Table 28.  Architecture Cost Estimates 
 Figure 127 is formatted to show Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) as a 
tradeoff of P(kill | engagement).  CAIV takes a cost-based approach to designing.  Rather 
than designing to a level of performance and paying what is needed, the CAIV approach 
designs to a cost and gets the best possible performance for the money.  Figure 127 
shows that the 8km/s missile (M+) is always the most financially undesirable option due 
to its high unit cost, and also depicts the dominated architectures for the probability of 
kill metric.  A dominated architecture is essentially getting less performance for the cost.  
It is depicted by any point that is right and below any other point.  Although the 6 km/s 
missile (M) and the railgun (R and R+) architectures are close in performance and cost, 
































Scatterplot of P(kill|engagement) vs Total Cost
 
Figure 127.  CAIV Plot for P(kill | engagement) 
 In terms of performance and cost, the 10 km/s railgun, in addition to the SOTS-
assisted PASR (R+ and SOTSR), is the most feasible and efficient architecture. 
5.9 SUMMARY OF REFINED DATA 
The results from the “Refined Data” stage of this project charts the course for the 
remainder of the SABR project.  Going into this stage of the project, six different 
“Alternative Architectures” were considered (Figure 128). 
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A (MS) B (DE) C (RG)
X (Radar 1) AX BX CX
Y (Radar 2) AY BY CY
MS = Missile Radar 1 = Phased Array Radar 
DE = Directed Energy Radar 2 = Skin-of-the-ship Radar 







Figure 128.  Proposed Alternative Architectures 
Based on data results, the DEW is eliminated.  This was due to high cost and 
relatively short effective ranges. 
The missile and railgun interceptors show very similar performance 
characteristics.  Additionally, the radars have been compared.  In this case, the 
performance of the SOTSR complementing a PASR was shown to be superior to the 
stand-alone PASR. 
The final preferred architecture selected for further analysis is the railgun 
interceptor supported by the SOTSR detection system, architecture CY.  The remainder 
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6.0 SYSTEM SYNTHESIS AND EVALUATION 
6.1 SYSTEM SYNTHESIS/FINAL ARCHITECTURE 
 All of the preliminary modeling data was analyzed in order to find the most 
effective radar and weapon that could be paired together to meet the needs and 
requirements of the SABR project BMD system.  Data analysis allowed the team to 
conceptualize a final BMD architecture utilizing a SOTSR assisted phased array radar in 
conjunction with a railgun weapons system, and model it against several different 
scenarios that could substantiate plausibly feasible emerging threats.  In this section, 
detail will be provided into the development of the final preferred architecture, the 
plausible emerging threat scenarios, and the modeling entailed.  This section also covers 
cost comparisons between current BMD systems and the SABR project’s preferred final 
architecture, and the resulting analysis of the performance of the preferred architecture in 
the different emerging threat scenarios. 
6.1.1 Final Architecture 
The final system chosen consists of a Multifunction Phased Array Radar 
(MFPAR), a SOTSR, and a ship-based railgun weapon system. 
The ship’s MFPAR will be able to provide dedicated search, track and fire control 
and missile guidance capabilities simultaneously, which will contribute to the BMD 
mission of the ship.  By itself, the MFPAR will have a detection range of 772 km in 
surveillance mode, and a maximum range of 971 km when in tracking mode.  However, 
the ship’s radar will not entirely depend on the MFPAR; that system is augmented with a 
SOTSR, which may consist of up to 1,200 elements on the hull of the ship, and has the 
potential to increase the detection range of a 10 m2 object to over 2,000 km.  In addition 
to all the organic sensors, there will be nonorganic land- and space-based radar systems 
that will provide early cueing to the system. 
The second main part of the system is the interceptor, or the railgun launcher, 
which is also ship-based.  The railgun must be capable of launching 12-16 guided rounds 
per minute, with 2-kg rounds achieving a velocity of 10 m/s, with a range of over  




In light of the multitude of threat nations, terrorist organizations, and other 
credible factions that pose a plausible BM threat to the United States and its allies, and 
their deployed forces, four BMD scenarios were developed to encompass the following 
realistic factors: 
• Number of launch sites at various ranges and bearings from deployed 
BMD ships 
• Number of targets at various ranges and bearings from deployed  
BMD ships 
• Number of BMs simultaneously in flight (which include BM quantities 
greater and less than the BMD ship’s probable simultaneous  
engagement capability) 
• Environmental conditions 
• BM flight profiles in relation to deployed BMD ships (closing, crossing, 
and tail-chase) 
• Geographic challenges (mountain ranges, straits, peninsulas, gulfs, etc.) 
• Approximation of operational “hot spots” as context for scenarios 
 The purpose of the scenarios is to place the conceptual system in 
simulated operational situations to “flex” system capability and measure the effectiveness 
of the basic concept of operations (CONOPS) (operational employment) of the system. 
6.1.2.2 Four Scenarios 
 Four scenarios were developed for systems evaluation.  The first scenario, 
or Functional Scenario, was developed to test system functionality.  Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 
were developed to test the system or system of systems under operational circumstances.  
These last three scenarios are titled East Asian, Middle Eastern, and Sea Base defense 
scenarios, respectively. 
 6.1.2.2.1 Functional Scenario.  This scenario was developed to test 
the functionality of the conceptual BMD system.  Operational employment is three ships 
providing defense for six known targets from three known launch sites.  The ships are 
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strategically placed in a central location in relation to the launch and target sites.  Targets 
include five land targets and one sea target.  BM launch sites, intended impact sites 
(targets), and ship position are shown in Figure 129 (launch site indicators, targets, and 
ship sizes are not to scale). 
 
Figure 129.  Functional Scenario 
 In each salvo (model run) any combination of one, two, or all 
launch sites can fire approximately 23-33 BMs (totaling 70-100 BMs in simultaneous 
flight) to various targets.  Each salvo is independent of one another and inventories of 
both BMs and interceptor rounds are replenished prior to start of each successive salvo.  
The number of active launch sites, BMs launched per launch site, and ultimate targets of 
launched BMs are random to eliminate any learning curve of the system. 
 Table 29 indicates the distances between launch and target sites in 








measured using an automatic grid position, a manual measurement grid position, and 
using Great Circle routes. 
Launch Site Target Site Auto Grid Manual Grid Great Circle 
1 1 2,161.672 2,132.640 2,141.945 
1 2 1,429.823 1,424.710 1,427.418 
1 3 1,986.790 1,984.950 1,991.373 
1 4 1,162.730 1,160.315 1,164.738 
1 5 2,328.557 2,360.620 2,373.016 
1 6 2,853.415 2,782.797 2,805.627 
2 1 2,427.037 2,384.060 2,397.220 
2 2 1,712.534 1,707.360 1,712.096 
2 3 1,744.141 1,742.610 1,746.540 
2 4 955.684 947.780 948.215 
2 5 2,061.024 2,084.370 2,092.536 
2 6 2,746.064 2,660.590 2,679.474 
3 1 2,421.748 2,401.520 2,415.164 
3 2 1,364.752 1,362.280 1,365.666 
3 3 2,160.889 2,153.250 2,161.870 
3 4 907.029 917.090 917.530 
3 5 2,119.986 2,173.339 2,184.021 
3 6 2,513.877 2,457.440 2,472.357 
Table 29.  Functional Scenario Distances (km) 
6.1.2.2.2 East Asian Scenario.  This scenario, the first of three 
operational scenarios, was developed to test the performance capability of the conceptual 
BMD system in a scenario that encompassed a large waterspace area, large, simultaneous 
threat salvos, and several potential maximum effective range intercepts.  Operational 
employment is a three-ship defense system providing defense of seven known targets 
from four known launch sites.  The ships are strategically placed in locations to provide 
overlapping defense in relation to the launch and target sites.  All targets in this scenario 
are land targets.  BM launch sites, intended impact sites (targets), and ship position are 
shown in Figure 130 (launch site indicators, targets, and ship sizes are not to scale). 
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Figure 130.  East Asian Scenario 
In each salvo (model run) all launch sites can fire between 57 and 
65 BMs (totaling 240-260 BMs in the air simultaneously) to specific targets.  Each salvo 
is independent of one another and inventories of both BMs and interceptor rounds are 
replenished prior to start of each successive salvo.  The number of BMs launched per 
launch site (between 57 and 65), and the ultimate targets of launched BMs are random to 
eliminate any learning curve of the system. 
 Table 30 indicates the distances between launch and target sites in 
kilometers.  To improve accuracy for input into the threat model, distances were 
measured using an automatic grid position, a manual measurement grid position, and 
using Great Circle routes.  Distances highlighted in red are designated as the shortest 
reaction time launcher and target combinations, and thus are the most difficult  
detect-to-engage sequences. 
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Launch Site Target Site Auto Grid Manual Grid Great Circle 
1 1 1,611.742 1,690.990 1,611.035 
1 2 3,475.494 3,451.970 3,405.054 
1 3 849.619 937.210 849.447 
1 4 1,135.681 1,177.310 1,108.834 
1 5 1,116.763 1,157.410 1,090.879 
1 6 1,056.145 1,078.160 1,071.448 
1 7 3,028.255 3,052.050 3,007.245 
2 1 1,360.600 1,360.880 1,362.233 
2 2 3,374.904 3,280.050 3,318.491 
2 3 657.942 660.960 660.545 
2 4 1,225.276 1,212.680 1,213.105 
2 5 1,216.998 1,205.660 1,206.048 
2 6 1,332.569 1,356.360 1,357.062 
2 7 2,732.730 2,686.892 2,711.900 
3 1 1,444.208 1,447.106 1,447.603 
3 2 3,475.570 3,382.450 3,420.985 
3 3 756.184 760.930 760.536 
3 4 1,310.217 1,295.760 1,296.461 
3 5 1,300.114 1,286.680 1,287.339 
3 6 1,366.793 1,385.257 1,385.787 
3 7 2,795.313 2,753.660 2,774.782 
4 1 1,375.289 1,373.650 1,375.062 
4 2 3,328.402 3,233.140 3,266.544 
4 3 636.832 641.259 637.387 
4 4 1,125.625 1,118.683 1,110.571 
4 5 1,115.613 1,110.138 1,101.952 
4 6 1,223.411 1,256.272 1,250.100 
4 7 2,777.406 2,726.177 2,756.448 
Table 30.  East Asian Scenario Distances (km) 
6.1.2.2.3 Middle Eastern Scenario.  This scenario, the most 
demanding of the three operational scenarios, was developed to test the performance 
capability of the conceptual BMD system in a scenario that encompassed a small water 
space area; large, simultaneous threat salvos; and several potential medium to smallest 
effective range intercepts.  Operational employment is a three-ship defense system 
providing defense of eight known targets from six known launch sites.  The ships are 
strategically placed in locations to provide overlapping defense in relation to the launch 
and target sites.  All targets in this scenario are land targets.  BM launch sites, intended 
impact sites (targets), and ship position are shown in Figure 131 (launch site indicators, 
targets, and ship sizes are not to scale). 
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Figure 131.  Middle Eastern Scenario 
 In each salvo (model run) all launch sites can fire approximately 
40-50 BMs (totaling 240-300 BMs in the air simultaneously) to specific targets.  Each 
salvo is independent of one another and inventories of both BMs and interceptor rounds 
are replenished prior to start of each successive salvo.  The number of BMs launched per 
launch site (between 40 and 50), and ultimate targets of launched BMs are random to 
eliminate any learning curve of the system. 
Table 31 indicates the distances between launch and target sites in 
kilometers.  To improve accuracy for input into the threat model, distances were 
measured using an automatic grid position, a manual measurement grid position, and 








reaction time launcher and target combinations, and thus are the most difficult  
detect-to-engage sequences. 
Launch Site Target Site Auto Grid Manual Grid Great Circle 
1 1 1,451.547 1,578.468 1,442.516 
1 2 1,203.500 1,211.261 1,202.395 
1 3 1,093.840 1,049.571 1,091.083 
1 4 866.853 727.920 857.023 
1 5 1,793.452 1,634.848 1,759.823 
1 6 2,304.953 2,218.898 2,338.155 
1 7 892.602 789.904 882.472 
1 8 1,390.988 1,296.666 1,376.429 
2 1 1,601.480 1,635.130 1,638.151 
2 2 583.448 583.160 582.990 
2 3 454.574 458.185 452.556 
2 4 860.336 881.999 876.670 
2 5 1,705.401 1,725.200 1,729.044 
2 6 2,422.570 2,518.980 2,533.057 
2 7 488.765 489.185 489.100 
2 8 827.366 816.893 818.047 
3 1 1,983.822 1,965.348 1,960.237 
3 2 1,629.029 1,637.840 1,640.933 
3 3 1,373.551 1,381.400 1,382.876 
3 4 649.764 630.770 630.346 
3 5 1,435.413 1,386.278 1,364.919 
3 6 1,791.073 1,803.986 1,788.087 
3 7 1,001.983 998.814 1,000.540 
3 8 1,526.691 1,515.887 1,519.725 
4 1 1,264.747 1,325.200 1,326.556 
4 2 534.887 539.260 539.120 
4 3 979.246 982.140 982.540 
4 4 1,765.458 1,771.530 1,775.918 
4 5 2,561.466 2,583.640 2,599.715 
4 6 3,321.397 3,407.858 3,432.290 
4 7 1,326.463 1,319.915 1,329.084 
4 8 1,372.958 1,374.433 1,379.641 
5 1 1,577.122 1,597.338 1,592.571 
5 2 903.408 903.172 903.285 
5 3 741.584 739.457 739.327 
5 4 714.491 719.305 719.007 
5 5 1,633.788 1,626.536 1,629.482 
5 6 2,261.837 2,329.951 2,340.534 
5 7 569.161 556.153 561.757 
5 8 1,043.613 1,023.463 1,030.452 
6 1 1,105.882 1,127.565 1,122.327 
6 2 922.732 926.750 927.109 
6 3 994.214 997.654 997.915 
6 4 1,180.276 1,181.687 1,182.249 
6 5 2,104.779 2,095.242 2,097.504 
6 6 2,704.112 2,755.248 2,759.466 
6 7 993.896 985.912 992.900 
6 8 1,383.381 1,370.503 1,378.815 
Table 31.  Middle Eastern Scenario Distances (km) 
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6.1.2.2.4 Sea Base Defense Scenario.  This scenario, the last of 
three operational scenarios, was developed to test the performance capability of the 
conceptual BMD system in a scenario that placed the system in defense of an inbound 
Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).  Operational 
employment is a single ship defense (in a picket position) system providing defense of an 
inbound strike group from a single, known launch site.  The BM launch site, intended 
impact area and ship position are shown in Figure 132 (launch site indicators, targets and 
ship sizes are not to scale). 
 
Figure 132.  Sea Base Defense Scenario 
In each salvo (model run) the launch site can fire approximately 
30-50 BMs at the strike group target.  Each salvo is independent of one another and 
inventories of both BMs and interceptor rounds are replenished prior to start of each 
successive salvo. 
 Table 32 indicates the distance between the launch and target sites 








measured using an automatic grid position, a manual measurement grid position, and 
using Great Circle routes. 
Launch Site Target Site Auto Grid Manual Grid Great Circle 
1 1 1,162.730 1,160.315 1,164.738 
Table 32.  Sea Base Defense Scenario Distances (km) 
6.1.3 Final Modeling and Simulation Analysis Results 
 In the third and final iteration of simulation and analysis results, only the final 
design architecture’s capabilities were tested in response to various geographical tactical 
scenarios.  The previous simulative analysis determined which architecture performed the 
best among only the competing architectures.  From the first two rounds of simulation 
and analysis, the 10 km/s railgun interceptor used in conjunction with the skin-of-the-ship 
assisted phased array radar was determined to perform the best against the technical 
performance measures.  Therefore, this is the architecture being tested in this last 
iteration of simulation and analysis.  
This final round of simulations determined how the most capable architecture 
from the previous two iterations of analysis performed in four different scenarios.  The 
scenarios and simulations were devised to simulate and test the robustness and limits of 
the final architecture to a gambit of different situations and test the system’s capabilities.  
These scenarios are unclassified approximations to the Major Combat Operations (MCO) 
scenarios used by the DoD for tactical and strategic planning.  They were deemed 
Functional, East Asian, Middle Eastern, and Sea Base, and are geographically depicted in 
Figures 129-132.  The positioning of the launch sites and targets in each of the scenarios 
created overhead, tail-chase, and head-on intercept situations to test the final architecture.  
This last iteration of the model also incorporated three sea-based platforms in the  
East Asian and Middle Eastern scenarios, as opposed to the single ship capabilities tested 
in the first two iterations of simulations.  The introduction of three ships will serve to 
provide a more realistic operational battle group implementation to the scenarios.  The 
Functional and Sea Base scenarios only simulated one ship.  For the Functional scenario 
it was to assess the capabilities of a single ship system.  It is called Functional because it 
is the baseline test of the final architecture and closely approximates the Stressed scenario 
used in the first and second iterations of modeling.  The Sea Base only simulated one ship 
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so that the vulnerability and the defensive capability of a single platform could  
be evaluated. 
An additional change to the final round of modeling that had a significant affect 
on the analysis results is the reinstitution of the inorganic detection sensor network from 
the first iteration of modeling and analysis.  This increased the probability of detection 
two fold from the second iteration modeling when only the organic radar sensors were 
utilized for threat missile detection. 
The final iteration of simulations were conducted much like the first two rounds, 
but only run through 100 runs rather than 500 from iterations one and two.  By the final 
round of simulations, the errors had been corrected in the model and the results were no 
longer yielding large variances.  Therefore, fewer trials were needed to mitigate outliers 
in the data.  Also, all of the competing architectures were eliminated which condensed 
many of the variables to the model. 
Figures 133-140 show the results of the final iteration of simulative analysis.  
Each graph compares the four stressing scenarios to each of the eight metrics used to 
evaluate the architectures among one another as well as each of the architecture’s mission 
success to a given set of conditions or scenarios.  The metrics are the same metrics used 
to evaluate the architectures in the second iteration of analysis, and are listed in  
Table 33. 
Probability of engagement given a detection P(engage | detection) 
Probability of detection P(detect) 
Probability of kill given an engagement P(kill | engagement) 
Probability of false alarm P(false alarm) 
Probability of hand-off given a detection P(handoff | detection) 
Time from detection to BDA T(detectÆBDA) 
Time left to reengage after first cycle T(reengage) 
Table 33.  Architecture Measures of Performance 
The probability of detection, P(detect) in Figure 133, determines the proportion of 
threat missiles detected by either organic (SOTS + PAS radars) or nonorganic (satellite) 
assets.  In the second iteration of simulations, the nonorganic assets were removed from 
the simulations to obtain a more accurate assessment of the radar architectures’ 
performances.  In this final iteration of simulations, the nonorganic assets were 
reinstituted to simulate a realistic, network-centric, future battlefield.  The conformal plus 
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phased array radars performed very well in all four scenarios.  The radars performed 
perfectly in the functional scenarios and virtually the same in the other three.  With 
respect to the Asian, Middle Eastern, and Sea Base scenarios, they did not report  
100% detection because of minimum detection range and height constraints of the threat 
missile and random error.  First, a threat missile cannot be detected below a certain height 
or beyond a certain range.  These specifications are summarized in Section 6.1.3 of this 
report.  Secondly, in order to simulate a more realistic operational situation, the model 
was set to induce a rare, random error that would cause the detection assets to not detect 
an airborne threat missile.  Due to the random nature of this error, it did not occur in the 

























Figure 133.  P(detect) 
 Probability of engagement, P(engage) in Figure 134, evaluates what percentage of 
the threat missiles the architecture is able to positively identify and fire at.  This does not 
address whether the engagement was successful or failed; that is addressed in another 
metric.  The Functional and Sea Base scenarios were responded to with 100% 
engagement.  The distance from the ship to the threat missile is never greater than the 
railgun’s maximum engagement range, and is therefore able to engage it every time in the 
Functional scenario.  In the Sea Base scenario, the threat missiles were always headed 



























Figure 134.  P(engage) 
 The Middle Eastern and Asian scenarios resulted in a lower performance of 
engagement.  This is due almost exclusively to the sheer number of airborne threat 
missiles.  The Asian scenario simulated anywhere from 230 to 260 airborne threat 
missiles and the Middle Eastern scenario simulated anywhere from 250 to 300.  The 
system saturated at approximately 150 airborne threat missiles.  Therefore, anything more 
than that and the system would not be able to engage it. 
 Probability of kill given an engagement, P(kill | engagement) in Figure 135, 
assesses the proportion of threat missiles destroyed by the railgun interceptor that are also 
detected and engaged.  The graph shows that the results among scenarios are virtually the 
same.  Since it is impossible to know the achievable probability of kill for a conceptual 
system without building and live fire testing it, a requirement of 90% probability of kill 
given an engagement was programmed into the model.  Although 90% is high when 
compared to analogous weapon systems, it is feasible due to the devastation that would 
ensue should it fail.  This metric, therefore, gives a feasible, yet conservative, 
performance to the model and simulation results.  The graph thus verifies that the system 


























Figure 135.  P(kill | engagement) 
 Probability of handoff given a detection, P(handoff | detection) in Figure 136, 
assesses the system’s inability to successfully engage and destroy the target.  A handoff is 
the passing of intercept responsibility to a more capable asset if the sea-based platform is 
unable to engage or destroy the threat missile by the end of threat missile midcourse.  A 
handoff can only occur if there is an initial detection; otherwise, the system does not 
know the threat missile is actually airborne.  In the Functional and Sea Base scenarios, 
the handoff rate was very low because no threat missiles were ever out of range of the 
ship’s detectable or lethal range and there were few threat missiles compared to the  
Asian and Middle Eastern scenarios—70 to 100 threat missiles in the Functional scenario 
and 30 to 50 in the Sea Base scenario.  However, in the Asian and Middle Eastern 
scenarios, the rate of handoff is much greater because of the high volume of airborne 




























Figure 136.  P(handoff | detection) 
 Handoffs are not system failures, however.  If the threat missile can be handed 
off, it has at least been detected and is therefore known about.  If the ship is unable to 
engage or neutralize the missile, the intercept responsibility can be passed on to a more 
capable intercept asset.  This way, the threat missile remains queued in the missile 
defense network and maintains the chance of being intercepted.  This makes it a very 
worthy platform in the network of missile defense assets.  Figure 136 also shows the 
effects of system saturation in the Asian and Middle Eastern scenarios.  Once the  
sea-based assets continued to detect, but could no longer engage airborne targets due to 
weapon firing rate limitations, the system would hand them off to the Automated Battle 
Management System to be reallocated to an asset with a higher probability of kill. 
 Probability of false alarm, P(false alarm) in Figure 137, is the metric that 
evaluates how many threat missile detections are made when there is no threat missile 
present.  Like P (kill | engagement) discussed above, with only a conceptual system there 
is no real way of determining the achievable probability of false alarm.  As shown in the 
graph, all four scenarios depict close to the same results for false alarm rate.  This is due 
to the fact that it was a predetermined metric in the model.  It serves to induce realistic, 
operational error into the system and allow for a more conservative performance of the 
system.  In the model, probability of false alarm is 0.02 with a standard deviation of 1.  
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This is a relatively high standard deviation, but it is feasible due to the multitude of 
internal and external variables that can contribute to a false alarm.  Adverse weather 
conditions, atmospheric effects, different threat missile characteristic, and contacts with 
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Figure 137.  P(false alarm) 
 Recording this metric allowed for verification of the model’s output.  It was 
derived from current analogous radars systems and from Dr. David Jenn’s technical input 
for the conformal SOTSR.80 
 The Mean Time Available for Reengagement (Figure 138) depicts the time the 
system has left to engage the threat missile should it fail to destroy it during the first 
engagement.  It is determined by subtracting the time for the system to initially detect the 
threat missile, engage it, and conduct BDA on it from the total flight time of the ballistic 
threat missile through end of midcourse.  Depending on the threat missiles’ location in 
relation to the ship and the radar’s ability to maintain a lock on the threat missile, this 
amount of time may be enough to reengage or it may not be.  If it is not enough time to 
reengage the threat missile, the Automated Battle Management System will hand 
engagement responsibility off to a more capable intercept platform.  The Functional 
scenario had a much higher available time to reengage because the sea-based assets were 
                                                 
80 David Jenn, “Wirelessly Networked Opportunistic Digital Array Radar,” Mechanical Engineering 
Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005, p. 1-37. 
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positioned in such a way that when the threat missile broke its minimum detectable 
height it was near the closest point of approach to the ship, thereby lessening the actual 

































Figure 138.  Mean Reengagement Time 
 The Sea Base scenario exhibited a lesser reengagement time because the threat 
missile was always headed directly for the ship and therefore lessened the time of flight 
of the BM as well as its window of engagement.  The Asian and Middle Eastern 
scenarios are even lower due to the vast number of launch sites and targets, as seen in the 
geographical scenario diagrams in Figures 130 and 131.  Since the metric is recorded as a 
mean, there are some threat missiles that have much longer flight time than others and 
therefore averages out to the results in the above mean reengage time graph. 
 Mean Time until the End of Ballistic Missile Midcourse (Figure 139) measures 
the time from the threat missile launch until it reaches the end of midcourse.  It addresses 
the total window that the threat missile can be engaged by the sea-based asset.  Any 
engagement after the end of midcourse will have to be handed off to another engagement 
asset capable of terminal flight engagement.  This metric is also analogous to threat 
missile launch range.  The Sea Base scenario has only one launch site and one target.  It 
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simulated the shortest threat missile flight path and therefore has the shortest flight time.  
The Asian, Functional, and Middle Eastern scenarios have a multitude of launch sites 
firing at several targets at varying ranges.  This metric is also an average of all of the 
threat missiles launched within each scenario.  This metric is the basis in determining 
time left to reengage and optimal ship placement. 
 



























Figure 139.  Mean Time to End of BM Midcourse 
Mean time for the missile defense system to detect, engage, and conduct BDA on 
the threat missile is recorded in the graph in Figure 140.  The results of this are highly 
dependent on the position of the ship and the flight path of the threat missile.  This is 
reflected in the varying results in each of the scenarios.  In the case of the  
Sea Base scenario, since the threat missile was fired directly at the ship, the engagement 
cycle was very short.  The Functional scenario also exhibited a short engagement cycle 
time because of the ships’ placement in the battle space.  Once the threat missiles were 
detected, they were near the closest point of approach to the ships and therefore yielded a 
short engagement cycle time.  The Asian and Middle Eastern scenarios produced longer 
engagement cycle times because many of the engagements were tail-chase situations and 
therefore took longer and increased the average of the recorded metrics. 
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Figure 140.  Mean Detect to BDA Time 
 The analysis concludes that the final architecture of the 10 km/s railgun weapon 
with the skin-of-the-ship assisted phased array radar is a very valuable and formidable 
asset to the layered missile defense network.  It performed excellently in the Functional 
and Sea Base scenarios, handing off only 1% in the Sea Base scenario, engaging 100% of 
the threat missiles, and maintaining a 90% kill ratio.  The Asian and Middle Eastern 
scenarios also performed well.  Though the handoff ratio was between 40% and 60%, the 
salvo of threat missiles was unrealistically high, topping out at 300 airborne threat 
missiles.  The usefulness of these scenarios was to determine when the system would 
saturate and more assets would be needed.  From the predetermined metrics and scenario 
variables, the system saturated at approximately 150 airborne targets.  Even though the 
system was unable to engage any threat missiles after that, it still served as a detection 
and tracking asset to other capable intercept platforms. 
6.2 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
6.2.1 Overview 
A weapon or weapon system is defined in the context of the tactics, techniques, 
and procedures that govern its employment.  In the field of sea-based BMD, CONOPS 
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development is a unique challenge, in that this is a very new and still developing form  
of warfare. 
 The CONOPs proposed by the SABR team are a derivative of existing  
anti-air warfare (AAW) tactics employed by Naval units.  Vessels equipped with the 
SABR system are looked at as long-range picket vessels, whose mission is to detect, 
track, and intercept a target at the earliest possible point, as far from friendly forces, or 
friendly territory, as possible.  With this in mind, the SABR team proposes a deployment 
construct similar to that currently used by the Navy’s Strategic Deterrent Submarine 
Force.  American BM submarines (SSBNs) deploy as single, self-sufficient units, and 
operate autonomously within large areas of open ocean.  If necessary, these submarines 
can launch their weapons and return to the cover of depth with little concern  
for counterattack. 
 While a surface vessel can never hope to have the same advantages of stealth that 
are inherent to a submarine, the concept of a vessel able to deploy and operate as a  
self-sufficient unit for several months at a time are ideal for the SABR concept.  SABR 
vessels would be able to operate away from the Strike Group and Sea Base for extended 
periods of time, positioning themselves in an optimum location to counter the expected 
BM threat. 
 Where possible, the SABR group proposes a deployment of up to three  
BMD-capable surface assets to a theater of potentially hostile BM action.  These vessels 
are linked electronically to each other and to nonorganic sensor systems.  With this  
sea-based defense perimeter established, these vessels will be capable of early detection 
and engagement of enemy missiles.  The precise stationing of assets is based on 
calculations involving a variety of factors. 
6.2.2 CONOPS Validation 
6.2.2.1 Ship Placement 
The locations of intercepting assets have a crucial effect on their 
performance.  Thus, optimizing ship placement will contribute to the success of the 
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interception mission.  The Brown et al. JOINT DEFENDER model81 serves as a basic 
reference for how to optimize ship placement.  A brief, intuitive explanation of their 
approach is presented here. 
For each possible BM attack launched from specific site to specific target, 
there is an optimal position that will maximize the probability of success for interception.  
For example, examine a worst case in which the asset is located too far, and the attacking 
BMs are out of range.  Range affects many parameters:  the probability of detection, the 
probability of hit, the time to target, and thus, the number of shoot-look-shoot salvos and 
the number of simultaneous interceptions (Table 34). 












Range to Target X X X X 
Angle to Trajectory X X   
Medium Between Ship and Target X    
Table 34.  Performance Factors Affected by Ship Placement 
For each possible asset placement program, there is a performance measure  
(such as expected number of leaking missiles or probability of leak) for each of the 
possible attacks.  The placement itself cannot ignore other operational considerations 
such as force security and logistics, thus the positioning of the assets is limited to specific 
areas.  As the enemy attack plan is unknown, the planner should take into account many 
possible scenarios and decide how to weigh them. 
Another issue is the role of enemy intelligence and the enemy’s capability to 
reprogram their attack, such that SABR ship location is taken into account. 
Taking all these factors into account allows optimization of the ship placement for 
the predicted scenarios, as shown in Brown.  The factors taken into account by  
JOINT DEFENDER are: 
• System performance as function of placement scheme in terms of 
probability of negation (other MOEs can be used instead).  This 
performance may be calculated or evaluated by engineering tools or 
simulations, which take into account all performance parameters, such as 
                                                 
81 Brown et al., “A Two Sided Optimization for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense,”  
Operations Research, Vol. 53, No. 5, 2005, pp. 745-763. 
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probability of detection, probability of hit, probability of kill, etc., of a 
specific placement in a specific scenario. 
• Operational limitation on the possible placement coordinates. 
• Importance or likelihood of specific scenarios. 
• Enemy ability to reprogram their attack due to intelligence about 
defender’s defense scheme (two-sided optimization). 
6.2.2.1 Heuristics for Ship Placement 
6.2.2.1.1 Introduction.  Unfortunately, the reference optimization 
method requires a lot of input data, which is currently unavailable, and will not be always 
available for the planner.  A set of heuristics that will yield good ship placement is used 
instead.  The following set of assumption is required: 
• The attacks are identical in terms of likelihood, number of missiles, and 
importance of interception. 
• The damage of each attack is cumulative, i.e., the damage from three 
missiles hitting the same target is the same as the damage done by three 
missiles hitting three different targets.  Furthermore, this attribute holds 
even for large number (tens) of missiles.  This assumption doesn’t hold if 
the attacking missiles are relatively accurate and if spreading the attack 
induces larger difficulties on the defender (to rescue, evacuate,  
and recover). 
In this case, the ship placement problem reduces to a geometrical 
placement, in which the placement should optimize an objective function.  This objective 
function depends on the mission and the number of missiles that are expected to be 
launched from each site.  An attack scheme is defined to be the pair of a launch site and a 
target.  If each attack scheme is likely to involve large numbers of attacking missiles, 
such that the system is unlikely to engage all of the attacking missiles even once, the 
objective function is to maximize the total number of interception salvos, which will 
maximize the number of rounds the ship can fire in order to intercept the missiles, and 
thus minimize the expected number of leaking missiles.  If the attack is small relative to 
the intercepting force, then the chances are that the force will engage all the detected 
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missiles of each attack scheme, and thus the placement should maximize the number of 
attack schemes covered by the force. 
The large attack assumption holds if the force means are scarce, 
relative to the attacker’s potential arsenal.  A small attack can be assumed if there will be 
as many interceptors as needed relative to the possible attack. 
6.2.2.1.2 Heuristics.  For each scenario, potential placement 
patterns will be located by operational officers, taking into account operational 
constraints such as logistics and security.  Assume a cookie-cutter capability for the 
interceptors:  as long as the interception is within range, the probability of kill and 
detection probabilities are constant.  The range of the interception is not symmetrical 
around the ship due to the motion of the BM.  Nevertheless, for simplicity assume a 
circular effective range. 
For large attacks, ship placement should maximize number of 
salvos, thus should maximize the length of trajectories within the interception range, 
while minimizing distance to the trajectories.  These two opposing trends will induce an 
optimal position.  The number of salvos is proportional to one over the average distance 
to each trajectory, and proportional to the length of trajectory within range.  As long as 
the attack is still large (i.e., there are more BMs than BMs that can be intercepted), the 
force should be concentrated to cover the densest area of the scenario in terms of 
trajectory length, for example, in the Asian scenario as seen in Figure 141. 
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Figure 141.  Best Force Placement for Large Attack in Asian Scenario 
For small attacks (Figure 142) the number of trajectories in range 
should be maximized.  Additional force components should be placed in new positions, 
such as additional trajectories that will be covered.  In the case of the Asian scenario, all 
the trajectories are covered in the large attack scenario, yet a more balanced placement 




Figure 142.  Best Force Placement for Small Attack in Asian Scenario 
If the size of the attack is unknown, the large attack placement is 
more robust as it has clear advantage on the placement suggested for the small attack in 
the case of large attack. 
6.2.2.2 Number of Ships 
The number of available interception assets has an influence on the force 
deployment.  The number of ships needed can be extracted from the number of salvos 
needed to achieve an improvement in overall interception performance. 
For the high Single Shot Kill Probability (SSKP) attained by the  
SABR system, a single salvo per BM will yield very good results—on average, over 90% 
of the intercepted BMs will be intercepted.  More than two salvos will not improve the 
interception success significantly, as it becomes almost 100%. 
Using the simulation results regarding the operational scenarios, the 
average length of an interception salvo was 64 seconds for the Asian scenario and  
80 seconds for the Middle-Eastern scenario.  The average duration of interception 
window was 530 seconds for the Asian scenario and 500 seconds for the Middle Eastern 
scenario.  This is an average of 6-8 salvos by each ship.  The duration of each 
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engagement is assumed to be 3 seconds, resulting in an average of more than  
20 simultaneous engagements by each ship during the time of 64 seconds.  The result is 
that each ship can produce more than 120 engagements during an attack. 
If there are two salvos per BM in an attack, each ship can intercept  
60 BMs.  An attack will be small if it involves less than 60 BMs per ship in the defending 
force.  It will be large if it involves more than 120 BMs per ship in the defending force.  
The cases between these two are intermediate cases, in which the heuristics for ship 
placement are too rough to yield a good result, and more detailed optimization is  
then needed.  For example, assume that in the Asian scenario, 10 BMs can be fired in 
each attack scheme simultaneously.  If the hypothesis is that the attack is large, the force 
(single ship) is placed, as shown in Figure 141.  There are 25 attack schemes with  
250 BMs covered by the ship.  In this case, the attack will remain large even if the force 
includes two SABR systems.  The attack will be considered small for a force of more 
than four ships. 
When the attack is small, the force will intercept almost any detected BM, 
thus the performance is limited by the detection system.  When the attack is large, the 
force will intercept as many as it can, yet a significant number of missiles is likely to leak 
through the defense. 
6.3 SENSITIVITY OF FINAL ARCHITECTURE TO REQUIREMENTS 
6.3.1 Requirements Satisfaction 
 With a preferred final architecture developed it is important to understand not 
only that the BMD system meets all of the requirements of the SABR project, but if the 
requirements are constraining or can be related with respect to requirements.  The 
requirements are: 
• Rapidly deployable sea-based platform capable of prolonged operations. 
• Stable platform capable of operations in heavy seas. 
• Detect and track over the horizon BM launch and flight path. 
• Share real-time sensor, weapon, fire control, and BDA data among 
coalition forces. 
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• Prioritize threats and optimally pair assets with highest probability of kill. 
• Designate targets with a low probability of kill to other assets. 
These requirements were used to develop the MOEs and MOPs of the system, and 
also aided in the identification of the solution-neutral, top-level functions that  
were developed. 
 When developing the preferred architecture, all of the requirements and top-level 
functions had to be kept in mind.  Going through each of the requirements, the  
SABR team was able to verify that each requirement was meet in some way by the 
conceptualized BMD system.  Looking at requirements 1 and 2, the SABR project BMD 
system was developed to be placed on a sea-based platform, such as current ships.  These 
two requirements have been provided to a group of TSSE students to develop a platform 
capable of effectively employing the BMD system in a future project.  As for the third 
requirement, modeling showed that by incorporating a SOTSR with a MFPAR, early 
warning range could be extended to ~2,000 km and detection range could be increased 
~1,000 km, thus fulfilling requirement 3. 
 The bounding assumptions of the project stated that an automated battle 
management system exists on the sea based platform being used for BMD and that a CIX 
exists between all actors in the global IBMD System.  These two assumptions were 
crucial to the team being able to meet requirements 4, 5, and 6.  Using these bounding 
assumptions, the modeling group of the SABR team was able to create a model 
containing various parameters to incorporate the C2 process and communication 
exchange of the system.  All of the models were created using a three-ship force 
structure.  This allowed the team to analyze the interactions between the ships and the 
time delays involved.  This conceptualized system utilizes the sharing of all data from 
BM detection through BDA via the CIX.  Using this data-sharing capability, the ABMS 
can prioritize threats and pair the asset with the highest probability of kill to the threat, 
thus fulfilling the remainder of the requirements needed for the SABR project. 
6.4 COST ANALYSIS OF 2025-2030 SABR ARCHITECTURE 
 The following are rough cost estimates for the proposed architecture components, 
based on current data and source contacts.  Note that the directed energy option and 
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phased array radar were not included due to previous elimination from simulation results.  
The SM-3 missiles are launched via a standard MK-41 VLS, already outfitted on AEGIS 
surface ships.  Also, included in the platform cost (CG(X) design, Table 36, is the  
SPY-1B phased array radar, which will be used in conjunction with the SOTSR.  The 
estimate for the cost of a 20-kg, guided, railgun projectile was increased two-fold from 
the lower end, due to the price of miniaturization of guidance technology and other 
factors.  The power supply for the railgun interceptor was not estimated for cost due to 
the anticipated electric drive capability of U.S. Naval ships by the year 2025.  Estimates 
have shown that 94 2-kg, railgun salvos (four rounds) can be fired for the cost of one  
SM-3 missile salvo (two missiles).  Total system cost (with one year of operations with 
10 salvos; FY$2025) for an SM-3 interceptor-equipped platform is estimated to be  
$5.77 billion.  Total system cost (with one year of operations with 10 salvos; FY$2025) 
for a railgun interceptor-equipped platform is estimated to be $5.64 billion, for a savings 
of approximately $126 million (Table 35). 
 SM-3 Railgun 
Platform $3,439,360,000 $3,439,360,000 
Railgun $0 $140,000,000 
10 Salvos $226,000,000 $2,400,000 
1 Year of Operations $29,019,600 $29,019,600 
SOTSR $130,858,950 $130,858,950 
Total (FY$2006) $3,825,238,550 $3,741,638,550 
Inflation Index 1.5076 1.5076 
TOTAL (FY$2025) $5,766,929,638 $5,640,894,278 
Table 35.  Total System Cost Comparison with One Year of Operations (Base Year 2006). 
Phase Estimated Cost ($Billion, FY2003) Primary Basis of Estimate 
Detail Design 0.5 DD(X) estimate 
Basic Construction 0.8 Adjusted DD(X) estimate 
Electronics 0.6 Adjusted DD(X) estimate 
Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical Systems 0.1 DD(X) estimate 
Ordnance 0.6 Adjusted DD(X) estimate 
Other 0.2 DD(X) estimate 
Subtotal 2.3   
Change Orders 0.4 Percentage of production costs 
Total Production Cost 2.7   
TOTAL CG(X) COST 3.2   
Table 36.  Estimated Costs for CG(X) Production.82 
                                                 
82 Congressional Budget Office, “Transforming the Navy’s Surface Combatant Force,” Appendix:  
Cost Estimates for New Ships in the Navy’s 160-Ship Plan and CBO’s Option I, 2003. 
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6.4.1 Missile Interceptor (SM-3) 
Cost per missile:  $11.3 million (Block 1)83 
6.4.2 Railgun Interceptor 
Cost per mount:  $65-$75 million84 
Cost per guided projectile:  $30,000-$45,000 (20-kg round)85 
Cost per 2-kg guided projectile:  $60,000 (assuming increased miniaturization 
costs for technology) 
6.4.3 Skin of the Ship Radar (SOTSR) 
Based on a 7 April 2006 interview with Dr. David Jenn, Department of Electrical 
Engineering, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, the following is an 
estimate of individual components for the SOTSR system. The total is tallied in Table 37. 
• Individual Arrays: 
 Circuit board – $200 
 Radar element – $500 
 Total cost – $700 
• TR Module: 
 Modulator – $100 
 Demodulator – $100 
 DDS – $100 
 Wireless interface – $100 
 LNA – $500 
 Power amplifier – $5,000 
 Controller – $2,000 
 Sync circuit – $1,000 
 Beamformer and controller – $10,000 
                                                 
83 “The NTW Block 1 program was officially projected to cost $5.7 billion for just 80 SM-3 missiles 
(at $11.3 million per missile) on 4 ships” – Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Annual Report,  
FY 2000, Washington, D.C.:  United States Department of Defense, February 2001, p. V1-19. 
84 Data received from George M. Bates, Northrop Grumman Corporation, on 18 May 2006. 
85 Data received from George M. Bates, Northrop Grumman Corporation, on 14 April 2006. 
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 Small antenna – $50 
• Subtotal – $20,350 
 Individual Cost Quantity Subtotal 
Array $700 1,200 $840,000 
TR Module $20,350 1 $20,350 
Design Costs86 $50,000,000 1 $50,000,000 
Integration and Fabrication87 $80,000,000 1 $80,000,000 
TOTAL   $130,860,350 
Table 37.  SOTSR Costs 
6.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The characteristics given to any interceptor are crucial to a system’s overall 
performance and employability.  Whether it is the interceptor’s fly-out velocity or its 
overall ability to kill the target, they both contribute heavily to the system, but they are 
not the only factors affecting the system’s overall performance.  One of the primary 
factors is the system’s ability to track the BM threat.  The tracking capability of the 
system sets the upper limit of a system’s overall performance, regardless of the 
interceptor’s velocity or probability of single shot kill.  It simply will not allow the 
system’s overall performance to exceed the ability to track the target.  An interceptor’s 
ability to kill a target, how fast it can engage the target, and the salvo size to be fired are 
of primary concern when performing a trade-off analysis.  Each of these factors, either by 
themselves or in conjunction with any other factor, can bring significant improvements to 
the interceptor’s contribution to the system’s overall performance and must be balanced 
accordingly and planned in coordination with improvements to system tracking 
capabilities. 
6.5.1 Range Benefits of Increased Interceptor Velocities 
For any interceptor to be effective it must be able to attain a sufficient velocity to 
consummate an engagement within the desired range and altitude envelope.  This basic 
philosophy was used to compare the four modeled velocities plus an additional velocity, 
which was determined post modeling as necessary to accurately achieve the specified 
                                                 
86 Estimated from current analogous systems. 
87 Estimated from current analogous systems. 
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4,400 km maximum effective range of the interceptor.  The increase from 10.0 km/sec to 
10.6 km/sec provided little increase in the ship’s maximum allowable operating area and 
was subsequently not modeled. 
The ranges used in simulation were selected based on current capability and an 
estimated projection of future capability.  The SM-3 block 1 currently in flight test by the 
United States Navy is an interceptor missile with a near 4-km/sec velocity.  The block 1’s 
subsequent replacement, the SM-3 block 2, is expected to have a velocity approaching  
6 km/sec.88 
From these current and near future velocities, 8 km/sec and 10 km/sec were 
selected as possible future capability in interceptor velocity.  Upon finalization of the BM 
threat, model, and railgun interceptor model, 10.6 km/sec was added in this section of the 
report for comparative purposes only. 
Tables 38 and 39 show the BM threat ground range and the corresponding 
interceptor range radii from the end of boost, apex, and end of midcourse (terminal) 
positions along the BM threat trajectory.  The resulting down range and cross range 
points in Table 39 were used to plot the corresponding range rings for each of the 
corresponding interceptor velocities. 
 
Table 38.  Maximum Interceptor Launch Ranges (km) 
 
Table 39.  Ground Range for Boost, Apex, and Terminal Points Along 3,500 km BM  
Threat Trajectory 
                                                 
88 Jane’s Information Group, “RIM-66/-67/-156 Standard SM-1/-2 and RIM-161 Standard SM-3,” 
Jane’s Strategic Weapon System, http://www.janes.com, posted 7 April 2005. 
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Figure 143.  BM Threat Boost, Apex, and Terminal Positions with  
4-km/sec Interceptor Maximum Range Arcs 
At velocities of 4 km/sec, there is a very small area of overlap where a ship would 
be in a position to intercept the BM during all phases of its flight (Figure 143).  This 
would present a ship’s operating box approximately 535 km to 569 km, or 34 km 
beginning at 535 km down range from the launch site and 350 km on either side of the 
BM trajectory.  This velocity is not feasible for an effective BMD, since it requires the 
knowledge of the active BM launch site and the designated target along a maximum 
range flight path.  BMs that are capable of achieving burnout velocities similar to the  
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3.7 km/sec of the Taepo Dong 1 cannot be engaged if the threat missile launch creates a  
tail chase situation.89 
 
Figure 144.  BM Threat Boost, Apex, and Terminal Positions with  
6-km/sec Interceptor Maximum Range Arcs 
At velocities of 6 km/sec, the range circle that enables the intercept of the threat 
during its boost phase is completely within the other range circles giving a larger 
operating area to intercept the BM during all phases of its flight (Figure 144).  This 
would present a ship’s operating area within an approximate 800-km arc from the launch 
site.  This velocity seems to be feasible for an effective BMD.  However, its effectiveness 
is highly dependent on the direction of the BM launch.  With BMs, such as the  
                                                 
89 Dean A. Wilkening, “Airborne Boost-Phase Ballistic Missile Defense,” Science and Global Security, 
12:1-67, 2004, p. 61. 
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Taepo Dong 2, reaching burnout velocities of 5.0 km/sec, making a tail chase 
engagement very difficult and requiring the ship be relatively close to the launch site, 
since it requires the knowledge of the active BM launch site and the designated target 
along a maximum range flight path.90 
 
Figure 145.  BM Threat Boost, Apex, and Terminal Positions with  
8-km/sec Interceptor Maximum Range Arcs 
At velocities of 8 km/sec, the range circle that enables the intercept of the threat 
during its boost phase is completely within the other range circles giving a larger 
operating area to intercept the BM during all phases of its flight (Figure 145).  This 
would present a ship’s operating area within an approximate 1,100-km arc from the 
                                                 
90 Dean A. Wilkening, “Airborne Boost-Phase Ballistic Missile Defense,” Science and Global Security, 
12:1-67, 2004, p. 61. 
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launch site.  This velocity is feasible for an effective BMD.  Its effectiveness is less 
dependent on the direction of the BM launch and, even with BMs such as the  
Taepo Dong 2, a tail chase engagement is possible for an approximate 2,000-km  
tail chase. 
 
Figure 146.  BM Threat Boost, Apex, and Terminal Positions with  
10-km/sec Interceptor Maximum Range Arcs 
At velocities of 10 km/sec, the range circle that enables the intercept of the threat 
during its boost phase is completely within the other range circles, giving a larger 
operating area to intercept the BM during all phases of its flight (Figure 146).  This 
would present a ship’s operating area within an approximate 1,400-km arc from the 
launch site.  This velocity is feasible for an effective BMD.  Its effectiveness is less 
dependent on the direction of the BM launch and, even with BMs such as the  
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Taepo Dong 2, a tail chase engagement is possible for an approximate 3,000-km  
tail chase. 
 
Figure 147.  BM Threat Boost, Apex, and Terminal Positions with  
10.6-km/sec Interceptor Maximum Range Arcs 
At velocities of 10.6 km/sec, the range circle that enables the intercept of the 
threat during its boost phase is completely within the other range circles giving a larger 
operating area to intercept the BM during all phases of its flight (Figure 147).  This 
would present a ship’s operating area within an approximate 1,500-km arc from the 
launch site.  This velocity is feasible for an effective BMD.  Its effectiveness is less 
dependent on the direction of the BM launch and, even with BMs such as the  




Figure 148.  Interceptor Maximum Lunch Ranges for Boost, Apex, and  
Terminal Intercepts 
Analysis of each of the interceptor velocities and their respective maximum 
launch ranges show a linear relationship for each integer change in interceptor velocity, 
as shown in Figure 148 and Tables 40 and 41. 
 
Table 40.  Maximum Interceptor Launch Range Improvement (km) 
 
Table 41.  Range Improvement per 2 km/sec Gain 
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During engagements where time is the critical factor, the operating area gained by 
an increase in interceptor velocity provides a vital contribution to a ships capability to 
operate in a multimission environment. 
Table 42 represents approximated interceptor range arcs for various interceptor 
velocities.  The ranges shown for the 4-km/sec interceptor versus a BM fired at a target 
3,500 km from the launch site is not accurate if intercept of the threat is desired at any 
point along the BM’s trajectory.  As shown in Figure 143, there is little overlap of the 
interceptor range circles, therefore intercept along the entire trajectory for the 4-km/sec 
interceptor is not possible.  For the remaining interceptor velocities, these ranges provide 
an approximation for ship operating areas from known launch sites. 
 
Table 42.  Interceptor Range Arcs from BM Launch Site 
The 10-km/sec interceptor was ultimately selected through modeling and 
simulation as part of the overall conceptual design.  The ability of a ship to deliver a 
10km/sec interceptor against an intermediate-range BM threat brings with it the ability 
for that ship to have a patrol area within an arc of 1,400 km from a given launch site.  To 
put this distance into perspective, the maritime coastline of Iran is approximately  
1,500 km and its farthest land border from the Persian Gulf is approximately 1,300 km.  
A single ship fielding a 10-km/sec interceptor could feasibly be anywhere along the coast 
of Iran and intercept an intermediate-range BM fired at a target near it’s maximum range 
capability of 3,500 km and consummate an intercept of the threat missile at any point 
along its trajectory.  The 10-km/sec interceptor versus a minimum range launch allows 
for a ship to operate in an area within an arc of approximately 580 km from a given 
launch site, indicating that three ships may be necessary to cover the same coastal area, 
but lacks the over land coverage area. 
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6.5.2 Effects of Interceptor Probability of Single Shot Kill on  
Overall System Effectiveness 
The overall probability of kill for a given salvo, assuming that all shots are 
statistically independent of each other and have an equal probability of kill, can be 
calculated using the equation ( ) 1 (1 )nsskP k P= − − , where n is the number of shots per 
salvo and Pssk is the probability of single shot kill.91 
The overall probability of kill P(k) takes incorporates the conditional probability 
that the warhead has been detected and tracked and can therefore be represented as 
( ) 1 (1 )nwP kill track k= − − , where kw is the probability of a single shot killing  
the warhead. 
Defensive effectiveness can be calculated based on a Bernoulli trial problem 
where the probability, P(X), that attacking warheads, x, will penetrate the defense is 
given by the binomial distribution ( )( ) (1 ) W xxw wWP X k kx
−⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .  When X=0, the overall 
effectiveness of the defensive system can be determined and the binomial equation 
reduces to ( )(0) WwP k= . 
From ( ) ( ) ( )overallP kill P track P kill track= , ( ) 1 (1 )nwP kill track k= − − , and 
( )(0) WwP k=  the number of interceptors needed to achieve a given overall system 


















where P(0)=Overall system capability, Pw(track)=Probability of tracking the warhead, 
kw=Probability of killing the warhead, W=number of warheads, and n=number of 
interceptors needed.92  Figure 149 shows the number of interceptors needed for various 
                                                 
91 Daniel H. Wagner, W. Charles Mylander, and Thomas J. Sanders, Naval Operations Analysis Third 
Edition, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1999, pp. 133-134. 
92 Dean A. Wilkening, “A Simple Model for Calculating Ballistic Missile Defense Effectiveness,” 
Science and Global Security, Vol. 8:2, 1999, p. 205. 
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P(0) and Pw(track) values given a missile kw of 0.90 and a railgun kw of 0.60 versus a 
single warhead, W. 
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Figure 149.  Required number of interceptors, n, to achieve a desired P(0) at various Required values for Pw(track).
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During simulation, an overall effectiveness of 0.90 was desired and the 
corresponding salvo sizes were used given a probability of tracking the warhead of 0.95.  
These salvo sizes, in addition to the firing rate of the weapon system in Table 43, were 
then implemented into the required engagement time for each warhead.  The ranges and 
launch to end-of-midcourse times were averaged across all four final scenarios and used 
to approximate the maximum number of BMs (or warheads) that could be simultaneously 
in-flight and engaged by the system.  The average ranges and flight times are valid only 
under ideal conditions, where the missiles were launched along a trajectory as to pass 
over the defensive position.  However, the number of BMs obtained was used in the 
scenarios as the starting point to determine the saturation point of this system. 
 
Table 43.  Weapon Load 
To further define the overall system’s effectiveness sensitivity to the number of 
interceptors fired against BMs in flight, given a specified Pw(track) at various 
probabilities of killing the warhead (Pssk or kw), the equation 
( )( )(0) ( ) ( ) 1 1 Wnoverall w wP P kill P track k⎡ ⎤= = − −⎣ ⎦  was used to determine the system’s 
sensitivity and is shown in Figure 150. 
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Figure 150.  P(0) When Pw(track)=0.95, W=1 
The systems negation capability falls below 0.50 when Pw(track)=0.95 and 0.99 
when the number of warheads, W, exceeds 14 and 70, respectively, and is illustrated in  
Figures 151 and 152. 
 
Figure 151.  P(0) When Pw(track)=0.95, W=14 
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Figure 152.  P(0) When Pw(track)=0.99, W=70 
Figure 149 illustrates the systems overall capability when W=1 and 
Pw(track)=0.95.  With improvements in interceptor kw, there is the intuitive result of 
smaller salvo sizes.  The reduction of salvo size has cascading effects by reducing the 
overall cost per engagement, adding depth to the magazine, and increasing the total 
number of possible engagements by the weapon.  A key consideration to investing in an 
increased kw for the interceptors is that, regardless of the kw achieved by the interceptor, 
the overall system effectiveness, or negation capability, it can never exceed the system’s 
ability to track the warhead. 
Figure 153 and Table 44 demonstrate the relationship between salvo size and 
overall system effectiveness when W=1 and Pw(track)=0.999.  Pw(track) was set to 0.999 
in order to show the relationship at a P(0) of 0.99, recall that the overall system 
effectiveness can never exceed the system’s ability to track the warhead.  From  
Table 44, tradeoffs can be made between investing in an improvement of an interceptors 
kw or a sensors Pw(track) can be intuitively made based on the overlapping salvo sizes 




Figure 153.  Required Number of Interceptors, n, When Pw(track)=0.999, W=1 to Achieve a  
Desired P(0) 
 
Table 44.  Required Number of interceptors, n, When Pw(track)=0.999, W=1 to Achieve a  
Desired P(0) 
The systems sensitivity to different key aspects of an interceptor’s velocity and 
probability of single shot kill and the overall system effectiveness are obvious.  With 
higher velocities, the ability to defend a larger area from a larger area of patrol is a 
substantial benefit.  This benefit is especially noticed in regions of the world where large 
areas of water space are simply not available.  It has also been shown that the system’s 
overall capability can never exceed the system’s ability to track the BM warhead.  When 
an improvement in the system’s overall capability is desired, consideration must be made 
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to the resulting salvo size of that improvement and whether an increase in the system’s 
ability to track the warhead or improvement in the interceptor’s ability to kill the warhead 
is more beneficial; in some cases, improvement in both areas may be the most beneficial. 
6.6 RISK ASSESSMENT 
 In this study, the conceptual design involves technologies that are currently in 
early technology readiness levels (TRL) of TRL 2 (SOTS-conformable radar) and TRL 4 
(railgun and railgun projectile).93  Should the needs, requirements, and actual concept of 
the SABR design be actually pursued as system to be developed, a full risk assessment 
would be required. 
 Since the conceptual SABR system focuses only on technologies to meet future 
needs, the elements of risk factors related to system technologies are addressed.  The 
complications of personnel, production, and budget—normally significant 
considerations—would be accounted during future system development.  At the very 
least, indications of future risk assessments and mitigation plans can be described. 
 Since the focus of the SABR conceptual system is comprised of several key 
components integrated for the common purpose of BMD, the risk assessment includes 
only those relevant aspects taken in the context of the system as a whole.  To fully 
evaluate the potential risks of the system, each major individual component must be 
examined.  In the case of the SABR system, the major components include: 
• MFPAR 




• Railgun Projectile 
• Seaframe 
                                                 
93 TRL definitions taken from NASA, “ECS TRL Description,” http://ecs.arc.nasa.gov/other/TRL.htm, 
May 2006.  Specific TRL values for SOTSR and railgun systems were assigned by the SABR team. 
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 Each of these components require analysis to determine their total Risk Factor 
(RF) based on the probabilities of risks involved in the technology maturity (PM), 
complexity (PC), and dependency (PD) on the other component(s) of the system.  
Probabilities for each component are computed and assigned based on risk severity.  The 
values for these probabilities are on graduated scale between 0.1 and 0.9.  Each value 
corresponds to the TRL scale shown in Figure 154. 
TRL 9:  Actual system “operationally proven” through successful 
mission operations Thoroughly debugged software.  Fully 
integrated with operational hardware/software systems.  All 
documentation completed. Successful operational experience.  
Sustaining software engineering support in place. Actual system 
fully demonstrated. 
TRL 8:  Actual system completed and “operationally qualified” 
through test and demonstration (Simulated or Operational) 
Thoroughly debugged software.  Fully integrated with operational 
hardware and software systems.  Most user documentation, 
training documentation, and maintenance documentation 
completed.  All functionality tested in simulated and operational 
scenarios.  V&V completed. 
TRL 7:  System prototype demonstration in an operational 
environment Most functionality available for demonstration and 
test.  Well integrated with operational hardware/software systems.  
Most software bugs removed.  Limited documentation available. 
TRL 6:  System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a 
relevant environment (Simulated or Operational) Prototype 
implementations on full scale realistic problems.  Partially 
integrated with existing hardware/software systems.  Limited 
documentation available.  Engineering feasibility fully 
demonstrated. 
TRL 5:  Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant 
environment Prototype implementations.  Experiments with 
realistic problems.  Simulated interfaces to existing systems. 
TRL 4:  Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory 
environment Standalone prototype implementations.  Experiments 
with full scale problems or data sets. 
TRL 3:  Analytical and experimental critical function and/or 
characteristic proof-of-concept Limited functionality 
implementations.  Experiments with small representative data sets. 
Scientific feasibility fully demonstrated. 
TRL 2: Technology concept and/or application formulated Basic 
principles coded.  Experiments with synthetic data.  Mostly applied 
research. 
TRL 1: Basic principles observed and reported Basic properties of 
algorithms, representations, and concepts.  Mathematical 
formulations.  Mix of basic and applied research. 
Figure 154.  TRL Scale Description 
Explanations for each value assigned are outlined in the maturity, complexity, and 
dependency factor risk tables shown in Tables 45 through 47. 
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 Maturity Facor             
 (PM)        
magnitude MFPAR Conformable SOTS EW Radar ABMS CIX Railgun Railgun Projectile Seaframe 
0.1 (TRL 8&9)        
0.3 (TRL 7) Minor redesign      Minor redesign 




















0.9 (TRL 1&2)  State of the art  (further research required)      
Table 45.  Maturity Factor Risk 
  Complexity Factor             
  (PC)             
magnitude MFPAR Conformable SOTS EW Radar ABMS CIX Railgun Railgun Projectile Seaframe 
0.1 (TRL 8&9)        
0.3 (TRL 7) Minor increases  in complexity     












   





0.9 (TRL 1&2)  Extremely complex      
Table 46.  Complexity Factor Risk 
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 Dependency Factor             
 (PD)        
magnitude MFPAR Conformable SOTS EW Radar ABMS CIX Railgun Railgun Projectile Seaframe 
0.1 (TRL 8&9) Independent of  existing systems     
Independent of 
existing system   









    
0.5 (TRL 5&6) 








        
0.7 (TRL 3&4)               
0.9 (TRL 1&2)               
Table 47.  Complexity Factor Risk  
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 To determine the overall combined risk factor for the individual components of 
the SABR system, the following equation was used: 
 
Risk Factor (RF) = Pf + Cf – (Pf)(Cf), 
 
where Pf is the probability of failure and Cf is the consequence of failure.94  Further 
breaking down the equation 
 
Pf = a(PM) + b(PC) + c(PD), 
 
where a, b, and c are weighing factors whose sum equals one. 
 Consequence of failure breaks down in similar fashion: 
 
Cf = d(Ct) + e(Cc) + f(Cs), 
 
where Ct equals the consequence of failure due to technical factors, Cc equals the 
consequence of failure due to changes in cost, and Cs equals the consequence of failure 
due to changes in the schedule.  As with Pf, d, e, and f are weighing factors whose sum 
equals one. 
 Since the SABR system is conceptual in nature and is not in production, Cf equals 
zero as there are no changes in technical factors, no cost changes, and no schedule to be 
ahead or behind of.  As such, the final equation used to determine the risk factors for the 
SABR system is 
 
Risk Factor (RF) = a(PM) + b(PC) + c(PD). 
 
 Using weighing factors for Maturity Factor (a), Complexity Factor (b), and 
Dependency Factor (c) of 0.25, 0.55, and 0.2, respectively, individual risk factors for 
each SABR component can be computed by substituting the corresponding values from 
the previous risk tables.  Based on this, Table 48 shows the calculated risk factors  
by component: 
                                                 
94 Defense Systems Management College, Systems Engineering Management Guide,  
Fort Belvoir, VA, 1986, in B. Blanchard and W. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 3rd ed., 
Upper Saddle River:  Prentice-Hall, 1998, p. 658. 
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Railgun Projectile 0.31 
Seaframe 0.26 
Table 48.  Calculated Risk Factors 
 Having determined the risk factors of each component of the SABR system, each 
value is then applied to risk analysis and reporting flow chart to determine the best course 
of action for risk management should the system be developed beyond the conceptual 




Figure 155.  Risk Analysis and Reporting Procedure Flow Chart 
 Following this chart, Table 49 shows the risk levels for each SABR component. 
Risk Levels by Component   
MFPAR LOW RISK 
Conformable SOTSR HIGH RISK 
ABMS MEDIUM RISK 
CIX MEDIUM RISK 
Railgun MEDIUM RISK 
Railgun Projectile MEDIUM RISK 
Seaframe LOW RISK 
Table 49.  SABR System Component Risk Levels 
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 Should the SABR system be developed as system for production, it is 
recommended that risk reports and risk abatement plans be made for all system 
components except for the Seaframe and the MFPAR.  Risk management for these two 
components can be managed under regular program reviews.  Special attention should be 
given to both the Conformable SOTSR and interceptor components, as they are probably 
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS/CLOSING REMARKS 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS 
 There are many critical factors and takeaways from this integrated BMD study.  
Aside from the SE processes, analysis of alternatives, model formulation, simulation 
runs, simulative analysis, cost analysis, and CONOPS, the following items are the ground 
truths of the study. 
Organic sensors (even state-of-the-art sensors, such the conformable SOTS early 
warning radar) can only detect 50%-60% of launched BMs, at best. 
Nonorganic sensors are essential to the detection and tracking of threat BMs.  
Combined with the organic sensors of the seaframe, BMs are detected nearly 100% of the 
time, regardless if there are 1 or 300 in flight simultaneously. 
The most critical aspect of BMD is time.  The faster a threat BM is detected, the 
faster that information travels to all players in the coordinated BMD, the faster 
engagement (C2) decisions can be made, and the faster an interceptor can be employed 
(and reemployed, if required).  Improvements in any or all of these aspects, and the time 
it takes to conduct BDA, can only improve the probability of kill. 
A CIX is critical to share all detection, identification, tracking, fire control (FC), 
and C2 information between all players in the BMD network.  Inability to provide this 
critical information denies each player in the BMD network a common operational 
picture (COP) and ability to perform an intercept if they are determined to be the optimal 
asset for the engagement. 
An ABMS is key to ensuring that the best player in the BMD network takes the 
“optimal shot” based on engageability, weapon system readiness and availability, and 
location of the player.  This type of decision making aid reduces the amount of critical 
thinking required by BMD commanders (if he/she is “in the loop”) and reduces the time 
table between detection and interceptor employment. 
In the absence of nonorganic sensors, a combination of radars and sensor systems 
performs better than any individual sensor alone.  The combination of the conformable 
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SOTS early warning radar and the MFPAR outperformed the MFPAR on its own by 
detecting an average of 10%-12% more of the total BMs in a threat salvo.95 
Speed of the interceptor is critical aspect of BMD.  Increased speed has direct 
correlation to probability of kill given an engagement and also to the probability of 
reengagement if required.  Speed is also a critical enabler for engagement of BM threats 
that are not closing the general position of the BMD player.  High speed projectiles 
expand the engageability window against crossing and tail-chase ballistic missile threats. 
A multiple railgun system placement on the seaframe is the ideal configuration 
that combines the highest performance,96 deepest magazines, with the lowest cost  
of operation. 
Sea-based BMD is the first line of defense anywhere in the world.  A  
SABR-enabled ship can be quickly moved into theatre, operate in international waters, 
and provide a credible defense against short- to intermediate-range BMs for the  
United States, U.S. forces, coalition partners, and friendly nations.  Such flexibility would 
alleviate the burden on land and air based interceptors by providing a first-response 
ballistic missile negation percentage (% of BMs destroyed of the total threat salvo) of 
43%-58% for a salvo up to 300 short- to intermediate-range BMs simultaneously.97  
Though this percentage appears small, the reality is that there are only a handful of 
nations that could coordinate a simultaneous BM salvo of this magnitude.  It is far more 
likely that the missile launches would be staggered and smaller threat salvos and/or BMs 
launched in succession only improve these percentages.  On the remote chance that a 
simultaneous 300-BM salvo can be launched, the negation percentage can be increased to 
approximately 90% by adding an additional SABR system ship to the 50-NM radius 
operating area of each ship originally on station.98  Using the original three-ship 
                                                 
95 Based on results from the second iteration of simulations where nonorganic sensors had a probability 
of detection (P(d)) of zero. 
96 Based on the probability of kill given engagement (P(k | e)). 
97 Based on the probabilities of engagement (P(e)) multiplied by the probabilities of kill given 
engagement (P(k | e)) for the Middle Eastern and East Asian scenarios using a three-ship defense. 
98 Since the SABR model places a ship anywhere inside a 50-NM radius operating area, the addition of 
another ship inside this operating area would reflect the same as adding two more railguns and an 
additional magazine of 1,200 rounds.  Based on this assumption, a linear association can be made from the  
150 simultaneous missile saturation point and increase it to a 300 simultaneous missile saturation point. 
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operational employment, a simultaneous threat salvo of approximately 150 BMs or less 
provides a negation percentage of approximately 90%. 
7.2 OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Due to limited scope of this study, as well as time constraints, this study has only 
begun to tap the information available in the realm of BMD.  Using the report as a basis 
for future studies, there is great potential for further research to be done in this field, both 
within NPS and from outside groups. The studies done by team SABR are just one of 
many studies concerning BMD, with plenty of opportunity for further research to be done 
by one of many organizations. 
The TSSE group (located at NPS), which team SABR worked closely with during 
the development of a system, will be able to take specifications of radar and weapons 
systems, assess feasibility, adjust parameters as necessary, and design a seagoing 
platform capable of BMD. 
In addition to TSSE, the students from TDSI, who are currently attached to NPS, 
will remain in Monterey working on thesis research after the completion of the SABR 
project.  Working on individual theses, they will have the opportunity to further research 
in systems radar, interceptors, or operational research.  From outside NPS, there are 
several agencies that may use the research of team SABR, and build on it. 
The MDA, which is the successor to the SDI program initiated by  
President Regan, exists to “Develop and field an integrated BMDS capable of providing a 
layered defense for the homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies against BMs of all 
ranges, in all phases of flight.”99  With such a mission statement, it is easy to see how 
such an agency might be interested in the research done thus far, and with the resources 
available to them, they will be able to build on, and greatly expand, what has already 
been done. 
In addition to the above-mentioned MDA, further research could, and probably 
will be done by the U.S. Navy.  As an integral part of the Sea Shield concept, BMD, 
specifically from a sea-based platform, is the interest of the Navy.  This is addressed in 
                                                 
99 Missile Defense Agency Mission, http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/aboutus.html 
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the 2003 Naval Transformational Roadmap:  “Efforts in ballistic missile defense will 
provide a completely new sea-based capability.”100 
                                                 
100 Headquarters, Department of the Navy, Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003. 
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APPENDIX A:  QUALITY FUNCTION DEPLOYMENT HOUSE OF QUALITY 
 Requirements/Capabilities (How's)
R




 capable of operations in         
heavy seas
D
etect and track over the horizon ballistic m
issile 
launch and flight path 
Share real-tim
e sensor, w





ong coalition forces. 
Prioritize threats and optim
ally pair assets w
ith 




 probability of kill to 
other assets  
Needs (What's) Weights
Protect coalition partners from ballistic missile threat 0.27273 0.273 3 1 9 9 9 9
Operate independent of Nation State territorial boundaries 0.09091 0.091 9 1 9 0 0 0
Employ over a wide range of environmental conditions 0.13636 0.136 9 9 9 3 3 3
Assimilate into the Integrated Layered BMD system 0.09091 0.091 0 0 9 9 9 9
Interoperate with coalition partners 0.13636 0.136 0 0 0 9 9 9




Weighted Performance 3.1 4.0 7.8 7.4 7.4 7.4 37.0
Percent Performance 0.085 0.109 0.210 0.199 0.199 0.199
0.00
0.15
1 2 3 4 5 6
 


























ber of days of sustained operations
Probability of detection
Probability of false alarm
Probability of correct identification 
Probability of kill 
M
ax num
ber of targets sim
ultaneously tracked 




ide sensor coverage 




) function operational 
M
ax num





ber of successful BD
A
's (good or bad) 














ber of designated target files passed 




















Rapidly deployable sea based platform capable 
of prolonged operations 0.085 0.085 9 9 9 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Stable platform capable of operations in               
heavy seas 0.109 0.109 1 9 9 1 0 0 9 0 0 1 9 1 0 1
Detect and track over the horizon ballistic 
missile launch and flight path 0.210 0.210 9 3 0 9 9 9 9 9 3 3 1 9 3 3
Share real-time sensor, weapon, fire control, and 
BDA data among coalition forces. 0.199 0.199 1 0 0 3 3 3 9 9 9 9 3 9 9 9
Prioritize threats and optimally pair assets with 
highest probability of kill 0.199 0.199 1 3 0 9 9 9 9 9 1 9 9 9 9 9
Designate targets with a low probability of kill 




Weighted Performance 3.4 3.6 1.7 6.4 6.1 6.1 8.5 7.3 4.4 6.1 4.3 5.8 6.0 6.1 75.6
Percent Performance 0.044 0.047 0.023 0.085 0.080 0.080 0.112 0.096 0.058 0.081 0.056 0.076 0.079 0.081
0.00
0.15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
 




eceive intel cueing 
A
























Max number of sufficient power supply situations for 
mission accomplishment per minute 0.044 0.044 1 1 9 9 3 9 3 9 3 9
Max number of missions completed regardless of 
environmental conditions (wind, seas, cloud cover) per 
minute 0.047 0.047 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 3 1
Number of days of sustained operations 0.023 0.023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Probability of detection 0.085 0.085 3 3 9 9 3 3 0 3 3 9
Probability of false alarm 0.080 0.080 1 0 9 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Probability of correct identification 0.080 0.080 3 3 9 9 9 1 9 3 3 3
Max number of targets simultaneously tracked and 
identified per minute 0.112 0.112 1 3 9 9 9 0 0 0 9 3
Probability of world wide sensor coverage 0.096 0.096 0 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 9 3
Probability of cooperative information exchange (CIX) 
function operational 0.058 0.058 0 9 3 3 3 3 9 3 9 3
Max number of targets effectively engaged per minute 0.081 0.081 0 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 3 3
Probability of kill 0.056 0.056 1 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 3
Number of successful BDA's (good or bad) gathered 
and processed per minute 0.076 0.076 0 3 9 3 9 0 1 0 3 9
Number of successful Command and Control decisions 
made per minute 0.079 0.079 1 3 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9
Max number of designated target files passed to other 




Weighted Performance 0.9 3.9 7.4 6.2 5.9 4.3 4.9 3.0 5.2 4.1 45.9
Percent Performance 0.020 0.085 0.161 0.135 0.128 0.094 0.107 0.066 0.114 0.090
0.00
0.15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 

















ber of non-detections 
N
um

















ber of failed engagem
ents 
M




e to relay detection
M
ean tim
e to process detection
M








e to identify 
M







Receive intel cueing 0.020 0.020 0 3 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
Acquire non-organic asset information? 0.085 0.085 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 9 3 3 3 3 3 3
Acquire / Detect target 0.161 0.161 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9
Track target 0.135 0.135 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9
Identify target 0.128 0.128 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9
Generate fire control solution(s) 0.094 0.094 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 9
Make C2 / Decision 0.107 0.107 9 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 0 1 0 0 0 3 9 9
Engage ballistic missile 0.066 0.066 9 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Exchange information 0.114 0.114 3 3 3 1 9 3 9 3 3 9 1 1 9 9 9 9




Weighted Performance 6.7 3.4 3.4 1.8 7.2 7.6 8.3 7.6 0.7 1.9 1.8 1.8 3.9 5.5 7.0 7.0
Percent Performance 0.064 0.033 0.033 0.017 0.068 0.073 0.079 0.073 0.007 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.038 0.053 0.067 0.067
0.00
0.15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
 
Figure 159.  House of Quality 4 Functions to MOPs 
 
261 


































Identify Current and 
Future BM Threats
1.5






































Update and Refine 
Models
 














































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 265 
APPENDIX C:  AUTOMATED BATTLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (ABMS) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff define a command and control system as the facilities, 
equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for 
planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions 
assigned.101  In this sense, the ABMS is the system of facilities, equipment, 
communications, procedures, and personnel that perform functions in direct support of 
planning, directing, and controlling operations of forces pursuant to the missions 
assigned, specifically relating to the high degree of automation at the tactical and 
operational levels of action.  In the definition of the ABMS, the term “forces” is a set of 
force assets from multiple nation-states, which means that the ABMS is defined to 
operate across independent nation-states.  This section will discuss the requirements and 
high level design of such a system in detail.  Although this report applies concepts to the 
specific mission of short-range, medium-range, and intermediate-range BMD  
(SR to IR BMD), the ABMS defined herein is applicable to various mission areas and in 
situations that involve multiple mission areas. 
B. ABMS CONCEPTS 
 The underlying principle of ABMS as compared to other command and control 
systems is that the ABMS is by design meant to include and operate across all force 
assets, including coalition assets.  The current command and control systems, such as the 
Global Command and Control System (GCCS),102 do operate across service and coalition 
assets, but not to the degree of the ABMS.  Additionally, the ABMS is conceptualized to 
generate orders such as asset positioning and asset-target pairing.  The C2 structure 
                                                 
101 JPUB 1-02, p. 101. 
102 GCCS is used by the United States Navy (GCCS-M), United States Army (GCCS-A), British, and 
Australian assets; additionally, Japanese and South Korean forces are connected to a limited version  
of GCCS. 
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supported by the ABMS is envisioned to incorporate automatic generation and execution 
of orders, but also operate with a man-in-the-loop as designated by the C2. 
 At first look, the concepts behind the ABMS seem to be at odds with both what is 
technically feasible as well as what is allowed by doctrine.  When viewed in a layered 
manner, the ABMS is envisioned to operate above the current level of C2 systems and 
above the individual participating assets, as depicted in Figure 166.  This is not to say that 
the ABMS cannot and will not operate at the unit level, it is merely to say that the ABMS 
will operate with lower-level systems as opposed to directly controlling unit-level 
systems.  Figure 167 gives an example of current day systems and where they fit into the 
ABMS architecture as depicted in Figure 166.  Work is currently being conducted by the 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) at the Force/State C2 Level.103 
Figure 168 shows an architecture design where the ABMS is combined with the 
Force/State C2.  This design is a feasible design, but does not provide a level of 
autonomy that a nation-state would desire.  It is not foreseeable in the near future that a 
nation-state would give up its inherent right to control and protect its assets over the 
protection of foreign assets.  The separation of the force/state C2 layer and the ABMS 
accounts for this situation.  Additionally, it is likely that there will be procedures  
(both operational and algorithmic) that a nation-state would not choose to share with 
any/all participants of the ABMS.  The separation of the four-layer model better 
accommodates the desire of a nation-state to protect its procedures.  The separation of the 
AMBS and force/state layers also places a natural point in which a man-in-the-loop can 
be injected.  This is not to say that the communication between the ABMS and force/state 
system are done manually.  The envisioning of the ABMS does call for an automatic 
means of communication and execution between the ABMS and force/state system, and 
in between all layers of the architecture.  The above arguments discussing the issues with 
the three-layer ABMS architecture can also be applied to the two-layer architecture, as 
well as the one-layer architecture. 
 
                                                 








Figure 167.  Current Day 
Example Architecture Layers 
Note:  The dashed line 
arrows indicate that data is 
exchanged between the 
layers, but C2 information 
is not.  This is not an actual 
system implementation. 
 
Figure 168.  ABMS Combined 
with Force/State C2
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Additionally, the joining of layers reduces the level of abstraction and modularity 
of the system design.  The reduction of layers leads to larger complex layers and 
ultimately to a monolithic architecture (a single-layer architecture).  Given that the 
envisioned ABMS is expected to be in operation for an extended amount of time it will 
need maintenance and updating throughout the time it will be used.  The added 
complexity resulting from the merging of layers will lead to increased effort in 
implementing future modifications and upgrades.  Furthermore, it is generally known, 
regarding information assurance that as the level of complexity of a system increases, the 
ability to prove overall information security of the system increases.  The sensitive nature 
of the ABMS would require the security of the system to be formally evaluated  
and proven. 
C. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (SE) PROCESS AND ABMS 
 The SE process generated needs, requirements, and functions for the overall  
sea-based SR to IR BMD system.  The needs, requirements and functions can be applied 
to the ABMS.  The SE process was applied to a specific problem—SR to IR BMD—the 
following discussion applies to an ABMS that will operate in a multimission 
environment.  This section will discuss in greater detail the needs, requirements, and 
functions generated by the SE process and how they apply to the ABMS.  The SE process 
also generated a list of MOEs and a list of MOPs.  The items in these lists are used to 
evaluate the different system architectures that were studied in this project.  In that sense, 
the lists of MOEs and MOPs do not specifically map to tasks that the systems must 
explicitly perform.  When an ABMS is designed with a set of specific facilities, 
equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel the designers must and will 
create a specific set of MOEs and MOPs that will be used to evaluate the ABMS. 
D. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (SE) PROCESS NEEDS GENERATED 
 There are four needs generated through the SE process that can be applied to the 
ABMS.  Each one will be discussed.  The system must operate independent of  
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nation-state territorial boundaries; this need applies to the SR to IR BMD system, the 
BMD system as a whole, and the ABMS.  The concept of nation-state territorial 
boundaries is a political vice physical issue.  The ABMS must be approved for use on all 
assets that are to participate in the ABMS.  This is to say that the design of the system 
and the components that implement the system design must be open among all 
participating parties and must be agreed on by all initial designing and implementing 
parties.  This leads into the realm of trust between nation-states.  There must be a level of 
trust and agreed on standards between the initial designing and implementing parties in 
order for the concept of the ABMS to become reality.  After design and implementation 
of the ABMS, future nation-states that want to participate in the ABMS must have the 
same level of trust among all the already participating nation-states and conform to the 
set of standards.  This need might prove to be the hardest to implement in the real world 
given the current state of multinational organizations.  The degree of effort that is 
required to come to a consensus in organizations such as NATO and the UN can be 
extensive for any issue, even issues that most of the participating states are concerned 
about and generally agree on.  That being said, efforts such as the Common Criteria are a 
step in the right direction.104 
 The system must be employable over a wide range of environmental conditions.  
Again, this need applies to the system as a whole as well as to the ABMS.  This need 
must be applied to all aspects of the ABMS.  The physical housing of the components 
that comprise the ABMS must be designed in such a way as to protect the components 
from the operating environment.  The ABMS is envisioned to operate on assets that will 
be deployed on sea, air, land, undersea, and space.  Each component must be designed to 
operate in any of the above environments that the individual component is expected to 
operate in.  A few examples of environmental factors that must be considered are weather 
(including temperature, humidity, wind, sea state, and precipitation), electromagnetic 
                                                 
104 The Common Criteria (CC) is a formalized international set of criteria that are used to evaluate the 
security of information systems and components.  The following countries currently have schemes that 
support the CC:  Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
United Kingdom, and United States of America.  The following countries do not have a national scheme, 
but accept the CC:  Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, and Turkey. 
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spectrum, and interference.  These factors must be addressed by the design of the 
component housings as well as by the design of the communication links. 
 The SR to IR BMD system is designed to fit within the layered ballistic missile 
defense currently adopted by the United States through the MDA.105  The ABMS would 
operate above the layered BMD architecture.  The ABMS envisioned would allow the 
layered BMD system to run within the construct of the ABMS.  Furthermore, the ABMS 
would allow other threat defense systems to run within the ABMS, and run concurrently.  
In other words, the various threat systems could view the ABMS as a tool in which to 
operate within. 
 By the above definition, the ABMS must be able to interoperate with coalition 
partners.  One of the underlying concepts behind the design of the ABMS is that it will 
operate across all force assets, to include coalition partners.  The layered architecture 
presented in Figure 166 supports the need for the ABMS to interoperate with  
coalition partners. 
 One might initially make the argument that the ABMS would need to both protect 
coalition partners from BM threats and destroy BMs with a high probability of kill.  
When taking a deep look at the DoD definition of a C2 system and the definition of the 
ABMS, the execution of the missions that the C2 system plans, directs, and controls is 
done by commanded assets.  The commanded or end asset is responsible for executing 
the orders, whether that asset is a seaman, soldier, missile, round, or other asset.  The 
ABMS will play a significant part in the ability to protect forces from a BM threat and 
aid in the end assets ability to execute the commands.  Additionally, the ABMS will be a 
critical player in achieving a high probability of kill for BMs.  The actions required to 
protect forces and destroy BMs are missions that the ABMS can be used to plan, direct, 
and control; the commands generated by the ABMS will be carried out by layers below 
the ABMS.  The Unit Level System from Figure 166 would be ultimately responsible for 
the destruction of BMs with a high probability of kill. 
                                                 
105 MDA Life. 
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E. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (SE) PROCESS REQUIREMENTS 
GENERATED 
 The SE process also generated a list of requirements that the SR to IR BMD 
system must meet.  As above, the application of the generated requirements will be 
discussed in relation to the ABMS.  The first requirement pertains to the ability of the 
system to be rapidly deployed and capable of prolonged operations.  The specific 
requirement generated pertains specifically to the sea-based platform; however, this 
applies to the ABMS as well.  Any asset that houses equipment that is a part of the 
ABMS will have an associated logistics support requirement.  Components that fit within 
the ABMS must be designed with logistics support in mind during the design phase.  
Specifically, significant effort should be put into insuring that the designed components 
have the lowest amount of logistics support requirements as feasibly and economically 
possible.  Additionally, the reliability and maintainability of the components that 
comprise the ABMS must also be considered.  This requirement includes applying the 
concepts of integrated logistics support throughout the life cycle of the system.106 
 The overall system including the ABMS must be a stable platform capable of 
operations in heavy seas.  This requirement states that the system must operate over a 
wide range of environmental conditions.  This requirement goes further and states that the 
system must operate in heavy seas.  This study has used a sea state of 6 on the Beaufort 
scale as the definition of heavy seas in which the system must be capable of operating 
in.107  The components of the ABMS used on the sea-based platform must be capable of 
operating in such conditions if the sea-based platform is to perform missions in such 
conditions.  The components of the ABMS must be designed to withstand, at a minimum, 
the maximum sea state that the sea-based platform will be expected to experience.  The 
                                                 
106 The concepts of Integrated Logistics Support include:  Maintenance and Supply Plan, Supply 
Support, Support and Test Equipment, Facilities, Manpower/Contractor Technical Services, Training and 
Training Equipment, Technical Documentation, Computer Resources, and Packaging, Handling, Storage, 
and Transportation. 
107 The Beaufort scale defines a sea state of 6 as having waves with a height of three meters.  
Simulations will need to be done on the sea-based platform to estimate the likely pitch, roll, and yaw that 
the platform will experience in expected sea states. 
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amount of time that the sea-based platform is expected to experience the maximum 
designed sea state, as well as the rate of occurrence of such a sea state, must also be 
considered when designing the components of the ABMS. 
 The sharing of sensor, weapon, fire control, and BDA data among participating 
forces in near real-time is central to the ABMS having the ability to perform as defined at 
the beginning of this section.  The above categorizations of data are among the data that 
is critical to the ABMS being able to provide services to the commander.  The envisioned 
ABMS would perform the sharing of this data, other data, as well as other  
C2 requirements. 
 One example of another C2 function that the ABMS would perform is the passing 
off of targets that an asset reports as having a low probability of kill.  The layers below 
the ABMS, specifically the Unit Command and Control Level, would be the best able to 
determine the probability of kill that the unit’s assets can achieve.  This determination 
would be passed up the layers to the ABMS.  The ABMS would take such determinations 
from all participating units and compute the course of actions that would best address the 
threat scenario.  The other aspect of computing the course of actions that best address the 
threat situation is to prioritize the targets that compose the threat scenario.  Again, the 
ABMS would use the information provided via participating units to prioritize the targets 
and optimally pair assets to targets in a manner that best addresses the threat scenario. 
 The actual detection and tracking of targets would occur at the unit-level layers.  
A radar system such as the AN/SPY-1 would perform the initial detection and tracking of 
contacts.  This data would most certainly be consolidated and be passed up to the ABMS 
through the layers of ABMS architecture.  The ABMS could be used to merge contact 
information among various assets and end detection systems to better identify the target, 
such as correlating radar track information from one asset with infrared sensor track 
information from another asset. 
F. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (SE) PROCESS FUNCTIONS GENERATED 
 The requirements generated by the SE process lead to functions that the system 
must perform.  As seen with the needs and requirements generated by the process some 
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apply to the ABMS, while others will fall to layers below the ABMS.  The first function 
generated does apply to the ABMS.  The ABMS must be able to receive intelligence 
cueing.  In fact, it is envisioned that the intelligence assets will be seen as participants or 
assets just as a sea-based platform would be.  The ABMS would use this intelligence 
cueing information in the calculations to determine the best course of actions.  For 
instance, the ABMS could take intelligence on where threats are known or suspected to 
be located and generate commands to optimally place the assets to counter the  
threat scenario.108 
 The ABMS correlates track information from various participants to better 
identify a target.  The ABMS would not perform this function only at the beginning phase 
of tracking a contact, but continue it throughout.  If the target was deemed a threat and 
action was to be taken against the threat, the ABMS would again correlate the track 
information of end detection assets in order to determine a more comprehensive BDA.  
The ABMS would then determine the best course of actions to further deal with the threat 
if the BDA determined that the threat had not been eliminated. 
 The ability of the ABMS to pass information among participants goes beyond the 
concept of having a COP across the participants.  Current day COP systems share track 
information among assets giving all participants position and track information on 
contacts held by any participant.  They also correlate discrepancies in track information 
among the participants and present the best track information to participants.  The ABMS 
is envisioned to pass this information as well as more detailed information about the 
participating assets.  In order for the ABMS to perform the functions envisioned, the 
participating units will have to provide more detailed information than is currently 
provided in today’s COP systems.  Specifically participating assets would need to 
provide system status information to the ABMS, as well as weapon employment 
capabilities.  Participating assets need not provide the exact number of weapons or the 
specific capabilities of such weapons to the ABMS, but would need to provide sufficient 
information to the ABMS in order for the ABMS to perform the function of optimally 
addressing the threat scenario based on the capabilities of participating assets. 
                                                 
108 Brown discusses a model that optimizes defender asset placing based on attacker asset placing. 
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 As mentioned above, there are functions that would be performed at layers below 
the ABMS.  The detection and tracking of targets would occur at the unit level layers of 
the architecture.  The generation of fire control solutions will also occur at the unit levels 
of the architecture.  The ABMS will, as mentioned, optimally pair available assets to 
targets in an effort to best address the threat scenario.  The execution of the actions 
necessary to engage a target will be carried out by layers below the ABMS, specifically 
the unit-level layers. 
G. INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) AND ABMS 
 DoD Directive 8500.1 (DoDD 8500.1) Information Assurance applies to all  
DoD-owned or -controlled information systems that receive, process, store, display, or 
transmit DoD information, regardless of mission assurance category, classification or 
sensitivity.109  The ABMS, as is any C2 system, is a system that deals with and depends 
on information and the interconnection between participating assets.  The ability to 
gather, produce, and disseminate information securely is at the very heart of any C2 
system.  Furthermore, DoDD 8500.1 states that an information system (IS) shall maintain 
appropriate levels of confidentiality, integrity, authentication, nonrepudiation, and 
availability; the five components of Information Assurance (IA).  As such, one cannot 
fully discuss the issues regarding the design of a C2 system without discussing IA-related 
issues.  Additionally, the five components of Information Systems Security (INFOSEC):  
personnel security, physical security, communications security (COMSEC),  
computer security (COMPSEC), and emissions security (EMSEC) will be discussed in 
this section. 
                                                 
109 DoDD 8500.1, 2.1.2, p. 2. 
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H. COMPONENTS OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) 
 The availability of the data and information that the ABMS uses and produces is 
vital to its ability to perform the functions required of it.  Availability is defined as 
timely, reliable access to data and information services for authorized users.110  The 
design of the ABMS must insure the availability of data and information across 
participating assets.  The storage and communication of data and information both play a 
role in availability.  The large distances and range of environments that will separate 
participating assets of the ABMS requires a robust communications network.  The 
communications architecture should not be a designed component of the ABMS.  The 
communications architecture should be separate from the ABMS; in other words, the 
ABMS would be a user of the communications network.  The separation of the ABMS 
and communications network will result in numerous benefits.  This will allow for 
maintenance and upgrades to the ABMS and the underlying communications network 
components to occur independent on each other.  Resulting in each component to be 
designed to best handle the functions it performs.  A valid candidate for an architectural 
design of the communications network is depicted in Figure 169, a representation of the 
current day TCP/IP stack, or model of communications that occur across the Internet.111  
This is not to say that the ABMS will or should be run across the Internet.  In this model, 
the ABMS would sit at the Application layer as depicted in Figure 170.  The architectural 
design presented in Figure 169 allows for the use of both wired and wireless 
communications.  Additionally, as shown with the success of the Internet and its 
predecessor ARPANet, such an architectural design allows for a robust communications 
network that is flexible and able to continue operations under high stress environments.  
The storage of data and information must also been considered in order to insure their 
availability.  The reliability and hardening capabilities of solid state storage lends 
products based on such technology to be viable candidates worthy of design 
consideration across all components of the ABMS. 
 
                                                 
110 CNSSI 4009, p. 5. 
111 Kurose, p. 48. 
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Figure 169.  TCP/IP Stack [KURO] 
 
Figure 170.  ABMS as Application
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The large amounts of data and information that the ABMS will need to handle and 
the way in which that data and information will be processed by large land based 
installations leads to RAID architectures to be considered for storage needs.  Redundant 
Arrays of Independent Disks (RAID) is a multidisk architecture that is used to address 
data availability and reliability in the occurrence of disk failures.  There are a variety of 
open and proprietary RAID standards that should be evaluated for system performance as 
a part of ABMS components.  The current trend in processor design has shifted from 
doubling processor speed approximately every 18 months to increasing the number of 
processors that are on a single chip.  The continued increase in the number of processors 
per chip leads to the viable need to evaluate chip and motherboard memory architectures 
implemented as RAID architectures. 
 The integrity of the data both as it is stored and during transfer must also be 
addressed.  CNSSI 4009 defines integrity as the quality of an IS reflecting the logical 
correctness and reliability of the operating system; the logical completeness of the 
hardware and software implementing the protection mechanisms; and the consistency of 
the data structures and occurrence of the stored data.  The logical correctness and 
completeness requirements from the definition are achieved through formal methods 
analysis.  Due to the sensitive nature of the data and information that is handled by the 
ABMS and the range of nation-states that will contribute to the ABMS a formal security 
model, as depicted in Figure 171, vice an informal security model, shown in Figure 172, 
must be used to satisfy the completeness and correctness requirements imposed on the 
ABMS.  The formal methods analysis will also verify the consistency of the data 
structures used by the ABMS.  The formal methods analysis process must be open to and 
approved by all participants.  This is required for all participants to have trust in the 
ABMS and its implementation.  To address the issue of stored and transmitted data 
consistency integrity check values should be used.112  Integrity check values that provide 
both a means to detect and correct modifications should be employed, especially across 
communication links. 
 
                                                 
112 An integrity check value is a checksum capable of detecting modification of an IS [CNSSI 4009]. 
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Figure 171.  Formal Security Model [CS3600] 
 
Figure 172.  Informal Security Model [CS3600] 
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By using integrity check values that can detect and correct modifications the system will 
be able to recover from unauthorized or unintentional modifications.  At a minimum, 
integrity check values that can detect modifications must be used by the system. 
 Generally, it is understood that confidentiality of information applies to people, 
however, confidentiality of information extends to processes and devices as well.  The 
CNSSI 4009 defines confidentiality as the assurance that information is not disclosed to 
unauthorized individuals, processes, or devices.  Across communications links and on 
storage devices, encryption methods can and need to be used to address the 
confidentiality of the information.  This, however, is not sufficient to address all the 
confidentiality concerns that are associated with the ABMS.  The access mechanisms that 
are provided by both the operating systems and hardware that comprise the ABMS 
components must be designed in a way to control access to information that the ABMS 
handles.  There is current work being done in trusted computing environments and 
multilevel security environments.113 
 The use of the term unauthorized in the definition of confidentiality implies that 
there are authorized individuals, processes, and devices that are allowed access to the 
information.  An individual, process, or device is authorized through the act of 
authentication.  The definition of authenticate from CNSSI 4009 addresses the issue of 
verifying the identity of entities that interact with an IS.  There are three ways in which 
the identity of a person can be verified.  The first way is through the use of passwords, or 
other information that the individual knows.  The use of tokens, such as the  
Common Access Card (CAC), is representative of validating a user’s identity through 
their control of a unique item, or something that the individual has.  The third way that an 
individual’s identity can be verified is by validating their biometrics, such as fingerprints 
or retinal scans; biometric information is an example of something that the individual is.  
The same concepts applied to verifying the identity of individuals can be applied to the 
components of the ABMS.  The concept of something that is known is easily transferred 
                                                 
113 The Trusted Computing Exemplar (TCX) is a project intended to make high assurance development 
methods and technology available to the DoD and U.S. Government.  The Monterey Security Architecture 
(MYSEA) is intended to develop high assurance security services and integrated operating system 
mechanisms to protect distributed, multilevel, heterogeneous, computing environments from malicious 
code and other attacks.  Both projects are areas of research at the Cebrowski Institute for Information 
Innovation and Superiority at NPS. 
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to computer systems through the use of shared secrets between the communicating 
processes.  The use and validation of digital signatures also authenticate identity through 
knowing information.  The concept of authenticating a component by an item it possesses 
can be implemented through the use of hardware dongles.  The use of hashing techniques 
on the code of a module can be thought of as a fingerprint of sorts for the module, or 
something that the module is.  Due to the sensitivity of the ABMS, at a minimum strong, 
or two-factor, authentication will need to be used; some aspects of the ABMS will need 
to employ a three-factor authentication scheme. 
 There are two aspects of nonrepudiation, as defined by CNSSI 4009:  the first is 
that the sender of data is provided proof that the data was received; the second is that the 
receiver is provided proof of the sender’s identity.  As with confidentiality, the concept of 
nonrepudiation depends on the authentication of entities.  Providing the sender with proof 
that the receiver did receive the data can be a nontrivial issue, especially in the context of 
C2 applications.  A simple assurance that the receiver correctly received the data is not 
sufficient in a C2 application.  The sender must be provided additional information, such 
as whether the receiver understood the data and whether or not the receiver is or will act 
according to the data.  For instance, it is not sufficient for an order to act to be given to an 
asset, and the only information that is returned to the sender (command entity) is that the 
receiver (subordinate entity) correctly received the command.  In this case, the command 
entity would want to know whether the subordinate understood the order; whether the 
subordinate is able to comply with the order; and be able to receive routine updates on the 
status of executing the order.  Being a C2 system, the ABMS must provide 
nonrepudiation of this nature.  The second aspect of nonrepudiation is implemented today 
via the use of digital signatures. 
I. COMPONENTS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS (IS) SECURITY 
 CNSSI 4009 defines INFOSEC as the protection of information systems against 
unauthorized access to or modification of information, whether in storage, processing or 
transit, and against the denial of service to authorized users, including those measures 
necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats.  There are five components that 
comprise INFOSEC:  personnel security, physical security, COMSEC, COMPSEC, and 
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EMSEC.  All five components of INFOSEC must be addressed in the design of the 
ABMS and its components.  Additionally, the techniques, tactics, and procedures that 
address and enforce INFOSEC for the ABMS must be approved and adhered to by all 
participating nations and assets.  The underlying principle of defense-in-depth that is 
associated with other forms of security is also applicable to INFOSEC; the ABMS must 
incorporate a defense-in-depth security architecture to include INFOSEC. 
 Personnel security involves the trustworthiness and suitability of individuals to 
perform in position of trust.  In DoD, the trustworthiness and suitability of an individual 
is ascertained through the conduct of a personnel security investigation (PSI).114  The 
trustworthiness required by individuals that will access the ABMS is intended to be 
determined by an already established PSI.  This is to say that an individual already 
determined to be trustworthy at the levels required for use of the ABMS will not need to 
go through a separate PSI specific to the ABMS.  Additionally, the PSI conducted is not 
envisioned to be conducted by members from all participating nations; rather, 
participating nations would honor investigations conducted by other participating nations 
in context to allowing access and use of the ABMS.  The concept of honoring other 
nations’ assessments is consistent with the ideas and implementation of the  
Common Criteria.  The criteria by which personnel are judged for their trustworthiness 
must be agreed on and consistent across all participating nations.  The issue of initial 
personnel whose trustworthiness is based on investigations that do not meet the agreed on 
criteria must be addressed during the design phase of the ABMS.  There must also be 
procedures for incorporating personnel from nations who begin to participate in the 
ABMS after the date the ABMS is brought online. 
 Physical security has perhaps been the oldest and most well-known form of 
security.  The concept of defense-in-depth often began with physical security concepts.  
JPUB 1-02 defines physical security as that part of security concerned with physical 
measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment 
installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, 
sabotage, damage, and theft.  Physical security begins with controlling the access to the 
installation as whole; the installation being viewed as the base or port.  The next 
                                                 
114 JPUB 1-02, p. 409. 
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significant layer of security would be the control of access to the building or ship.  In 
applications that handle highly sensitive data, access to the rooms that house equipment 
that handle the highly sensitive data is also controlled.  The last steps in physical security 
occur at the actual component level.  The physical construction of components can also 
been done with security in mind.  Mechanisms can be put in place such that if the 
external housing of a component is penetrated in an unauthorized way, then the data and 
internal components are destroyed and security ensured.  The physical security associated 
with the ABMS and its components must include these defense-in-depth concepts.  When 
an actual ABMS is designed, it will likely be the case that the physical security of the 
installation, building/ship, and room will be enforced through policies and procedures 
that are common across a range of sensitive applications.  The design of the physical 
security required in the definition of the ABMS is not envisioned to require the complete 
overhaul of the physical security of the installations, buildings, and even rooms in which 
the ABMS or its components are located; this is to say, the design of the ABMS will 
assume that the physical security measures external to the ABMS components are already 
in place. 
 COMSEC is already an integral part of present-day C2 systems, and will continue 
to be.  COMSEC includes measures and controls taken to deny unauthorized individuals 
information derived from telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of such 
telecommunications.  COMSEC includes:  cryptosecurity, transmission security, 
emissions security, and physical security of COMSEC material.115  The most well-known 
form of COMSEC is the use of cryptography between communications links.  
Cryptography is used between wired and wireless links, and is even used internal to 
systems in highly sensitive applications.  The other hand that goes along with the use of 
cryptography is the security of the cryptographic keys or the security of COMSEC 
material.  The need to securely store and control access to cryptographic material has 
been known since the time cryptographic codes were first used.  The need to securely 
transmit the keys between participants has also been an issue of great concern.  With the 
inception of digital communications and the use of cryptography between participants 
who are physically separated by large distances and who might not ever physically meet, 
                                                 
115 CNSSI 4009, p. 11. 
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the need to securely transmit cryptographic keys across untrusted communications lines 
arose.  In the early through middle part of the last century, this was still a problem.  With 
the advent of public-key cryptography, or asymmetric cryptography,116 the secure 
transmission of cryptographic keys across untrusted communications lines became 
possible.  Due to the nature of the participants of the ABMS, a comprehensive public-key 
cryptographic system will need to be incorporated into the design.  In present-day,  
public-key cryptography, the use of public keys is limited to the encryption of small 
pieces of information, such as symmetric keys,117 due to the complexity associated with 
encrypting and decrypting data using asymmetric cryptography.  The use of public-key 
cryptography could be used at the component level of the ABMS to securely transmit 
session keys between the communicating components.  The transmitted session key 
would be a symmetric key that is only known between the two communicating links and 
only used for the duration of the communication. 
 CNSSI 4009 defines COMPSEC as measures and controls that ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of IS assets including hardware, software, 
firmware, and information being processed, stored, and communicated.  In practice, 
COMPSEC is achieved through clear and consistent policies that are able to be 
implemented and enforced by the systems.  For example, the ABMS would need to have 
clearly defined account management policies and resource accessing policies among 
others.  An account management policy includes business rules regarding account 
passwords, account lockout schemes, and account creation and deletion schemes.  After a 
policy is determined, a set of guidelines should be drafted.  The guidelines would 
describe methods that can be employed to satisfy the policy requirements.  At the lowest 
level, there would be techniques and procedures that are used to implement the policy 
based on the guidelines.  For example, the account management policy would include 
procedures for creating and deleting accounts.  Each policy would also need to include 
procedures that address event logging and the auditing of the created logs.  The nature of 
                                                 
116 Asymmetric cryptography uses two separate but mathematically related keys to encrypt and decrypt 
data.  Each participant has their own unique pair of keys, one public-key that everyone knows, and a private 
key that the participant keeps secret. 
117 Symmetric cryptography uses a single key to encrypt and decrypt data; the single key must be 
known by all participants. 
 284 
the ABMS leads to the adoption of a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policy vice a 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policy in reference to accessing resources.  A MAC 
policy is one in which the user is given limited or no control over allowing other users to 
access resources that they own.  A DAC, on the other hand, allows the users to have full 
control over the resources under their ownership and just as easily allows other users to 
gain access to those resources.  It is standard practice in sensitive applications to employ 
MAC policies over DAC policies.  A DAC policy is generally less secure and has the 
tendency to allow for the leaking of information.  A MAC policy has a greater ability to 
protect the system from unintentional information leaks.  The policies of the ABMS 
would also clearly state the specific roles and responsibilities of the personnel who use 
and manage the ABMS. 
 EMSEC has been a topic of interest in both the theoretical and real worlds since 
well into last century.  The ability to determine information emanating from and through 
electronic equipment has been demonstrated numerous times through the detection of the 
emitted electromagnetic field.118  There are also recognized methods to address the 
vulnerabilities associated with EMSEC.  A common method used to address EMSEC is 
through electromagnetic hardening components, which can be done through the use of 
Faraday cages.  Faraday cages are designed to prevent the emanations of electromagnetic 
fields, thus reducing the ability to detect electromagnetic fields emanating from the area 
internal to the cage.  The ABMS needs to be designed with Faraday cages at the 
component level, both to prevent external detection of internal electromagnetic fields and 
electromagnetic interference (EMI).  Due to the nature of ABMS, the use of fiber optic 
cabling is preferred over the use of metal cabling, such as copper.  Fiber optic cables have 
a significant advantage over metal cables in that fiber optic cables do not emanate 
electromagnetic fields external to the cable itself.  The detection of signals transmitted 
across fiber optic cables is possible, but is more difficult to do than the detection of 
signals transmitted across metal cables.  If metal cabling is required to be used between 
components of the ABMS, shielded metal cabling must be used.  The concept of shielded 
                                                 
118 There are proven methods to retrieve signals as they travel through copper wire without the need of 
physically penetrating the cabling.  There are methods to reproduce screen images of CRT monitors. 
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cabling is similar to a Faraday cage, in that the shielding is designed to limit the 
electromagnetic emanations of the cable, while also limiting EMI. 
J. FUTURE WORK 
The next step in the ABMS design process is to expand on the ideas and begin to 
come up with an actual ABMS system design.  The ABMS is a component system of the 
BMD system that can be designed and implemented independent of the BMD system.  
This is to say that the progress of the ABMS does not need to be held up by the progress 
of the BMD system.  The design of the ABMS would definitely fall under the cognizance 
of the DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process 
(DITSCAP);119 additionally, the ABMS would also be viewed as a national security 
system as defined in the CNSSI 4009.  As such, the appropriate directives and 
instructions would need to be thoroughly reviewed and adhered to throughout the 
lifecycle of the ABMS.  The DITSCAP is a current, applicable directive that would guide 
the design efforts of the ABMS.  During the design phase of the ABMS, an analysis 
would need to be done to determine the best design among a list of candidate solutions.  
This analysis would need to include results from models and simulations of not only the 
ABMS by itself, but how the ABMS interacts with other systems.  NETWARS is an 
example of an application that could be used to model the interaction of the ABMS with 
the underlying communications network.  Before the design of the ABMS can begin, the 
partner nations would need to come to an agreement that the level of coordination and 
cooperation afforded through the implementation of the ABMS is something that all 
parties want and will fully participate in.  Without this agreement, the ABMS as 
envisioned for the BMD system will not become a reality. 
K. AUTOMATED BATTLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (ABMS) SUMMARY 
 The ABMS, as required by this SABR project, is a realistic and attainable system.  
Specific needs, requirements, and functions generated by the SE process for the SABR 
                                                 
119 The DITSCAP applies to the acquisition, operation, and sustainment of any DoD system that 
collects, stores, transmits, or processes unclassified or classified information [DoDI 5200.40]. 
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system were mapped to the ABMS itself and to the layers within the ABMS architecture.  
Concepts that must be applied during the design of the ABMS were presented; 
specifically, the five components of IA (confidentiality, integrity, authentication, 
nonrepudiation, and availability) and IS (personnel security, physical security, COMSEC, 
COMPSEC, and EMSEC).  The next step in the lifecycle of the ABMS is for an initial 
group of nation-states to come to an agreement on the need for and desire to design the 
ABMS.  Once an agreement has been reached, an open and formal design of the ABMS 
can begin, ultimately leading to the implementation of a coalition-wide, automated  
C2 system. 
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